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Migration disequilibrium and specific division rules

Author

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  • Susan H. Gensemer

    (Department of Economics, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13244-1090, USA)

  • Lu Hong

    (Department of Economics, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13244-1090, USA)

  • Jerry S. Kelly

    (Department of Economics, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13244-1090, USA)

Abstract

We examine the extent to which migration equilibria fail to exist in a global economy in which a specific division rule determines the allocation of a perfectly divisible, nondisposable resource among individuals with single-peaked preferences who reside in local economies. In particular, almost without exception, under the egalitarian, proportional, queuing, and uniform division rules, migration equilibria fail to exist for some sets of preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Susan H. Gensemer & Lu Hong & Jerry S. Kelly, 1998. "Migration disequilibrium and specific division rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(2), pages 201-209.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:15:y:1998:i:2:p:201-209
    Note: Received: 23 May 1995 / Accepted: 1 October 1996
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    Cited by:

    1. Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Inés Moreno de Barreda & Alejandro Neme, 2015. "Stable partitions in many division problems: the proportional and the sequential dictator solutions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 79(2), pages 227-250, September.
    2. Tierney, Ryan, 2019. "The problem of multiple commons: A market design approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 1-27.
    3. Anirban Kar & Özgür Kıbrıs, 2008. "Allocating multiple estates among agents with single-peaked preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(4), pages 641-666, December.

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