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Strategy-proof division with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments

Author

Listed:
  • Bettina Klaus

    (Department of Quantitative Economics, University of Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands)

  • Hans Peters

    (Department of Quantitative Economics, University of Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands)

  • Ton Storcken

    (Department of Quantitative Economics, University of Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands)

Abstract

We consider the problem of (re)allocating the total endowment of an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments. We propose an extension of the so-called uniform rule and show that it is the unique rule satisfying Pareto optimality, strategy-proofness, reversibility, and an equal-treatment condition. The resulting rule turns out to be peaks-only and individually rational: the allocation assigned by the rule depends only on the peaks of the preferences, and no agent is worse off than at his individual endowment.

Suggested Citation

  • Bettina Klaus & Hans Peters & Ton Storcken, 1998. "Strategy-proof division with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(2), pages 297-311.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:15:y:1998:i:2:p:297-311
    Note: Received: 8 September 1995/Accepted: 30 October 1996
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Murat Atlamaz & Bettina Klaus, 2007. "Manipulation via Endowments in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(1), pages 1-18, January.
    2. Konovalov, A., 1998. "Core Equivalence in Economies With Satiation," Other publications TiSEM bde29dd4-b328-48b4-8fb4-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. Kibris, Ozgur & Kucuksenel, Serkan, 2005. "Trade rules for uncleared markets," Working Papers 1232, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    4. Youngsub Chun, 2006. "The Separability Principle in Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(2), pages 239-253, April.
    5. Rahmi İlkılıç & Çağatay Kayı, 2014. "Allocation rules on networks," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(4), pages 877-892, December.
    6. Massó, Jordi & Moreno de Barreda, Inés, 2011. "On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 467-484, June.
    7. Kazuhiko Hashimoto & Takuma Wakayama, 2021. "Fair reallocation in economies with single-peaked preferences," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(3), pages 773-785, September.
    8. , & Ilkilic, Rahmi & , & ,, 2012. "Balancing supply and demand under bilateral constraints," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
    9. Agustín Bonifacio, 2015. "Bribe-proof reallocation with single-peaked preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(3), pages 617-638, March.
    10. Nicolò, Antonio & Salmaso, Pietro & Sen, Arunava & Yadav, Sonal, 2023. "Stable sharing," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 337-363.
    11. Tayfun Sönmez & Suryapratim Banerjee & Hideo Konishi, 2001. "Core in a simple coalition formation game," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(1), pages 135-153.
    12. Karol Flores-Szwagrzak, 2017. "Efficient, fair, and strategy-proof (re)allocation under network constraints," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(1), pages 109-131, January.
    13. Konovalov, A., 1998. "Core Equivalence in Economies With Satiation," Discussion Paper 1998-80, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    14. Dietzenbacher, Bas & Tamura, Yuki, 2023. "Stable and efficient reallocations when preferences are single-dipped," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 231(C).
    15. Moulin, Hervé, 2017. "One dimensional mechanism design," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.
    16. Karol Flores-Szwagrzak, 2016. "The replacement principle in networked economies with single-peaked preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(4), pages 763-789, December.
    17. Özgür Kıbrıs & Serkan Küçükşenel, 2009. "Uniform trade rules for uncleared markets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 32(1), pages 101-121, January.
    18. Saralees Nadarajah, 2009. "The Pareto optimality distribution," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 43(6), pages 993-998, November.
    19. Yan Long, 2019. "Strategy-proof group selection under single-peaked preferences over group size," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 68(3), pages 579-608, October.

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