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A Theory of Credibility
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Cited by:
- Hanjoon Michael Jung, 2008.
"Paradox of Credibility,"
Microeconomics Working Papers
22267, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
- Jung, Hanjoon Michael, 2008. "Paradox of Credibility," MPRA Paper 7443, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- David Ettinger & Philippe Jehiel, 2010.
"A Theory of Deception,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 1-20, February.
- David Ettinger & Philippe Jehiel, 2010. "A Theory of Deception," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-00701286, HAL.
- David Ettinger & Philippe Jehiel, 2010. "A Theory of Deception," Post-Print hal-00701286, HAL.
- Li, Ming & Madarász, Kristóf, 2008. "When mandatory disclosure hurts: Expert advice and conflicting interests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 47-74, March.
- Watson, Joel, 2002.
"Starting Small and Commitment,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 176-199, January.
- Joel Watson, 1999. "Starting Small and Commitment," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1217, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Watson, Joel, 1999. "Starting Small and Commitment," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt37p340fc, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Irene Valsecchi, 2013. "The expert problem: a survey," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 303-331, November.
- Valentino Larcinese, 2007.
"Does political knowledge increase turnout? Evidence from the 1997 British general election,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(3), pages 387-411, June.
- Valentino Larcinese, 2005. "Does Political Knowledge Increase Turnout? Evidence from the 1997 British General Election," STICERD - Political Economy and Public Policy Paper Series 01, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Larcinese, Valentino, 2005. "Does political knowledge increase turnout? Evidence from the 1997 British general election," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 3614, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- David Ettinger & Philippe Jehiel, 2021.
"An experiment on deception, reputation and trust,"
Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(3), pages 821-853, September.
- David Ettinger & Philippe Jehiel, 2021. "An experiment on deception, reputation and trust," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-03105728, HAL.
- David Ettinger & Philippe Jehiel, 2021. "An experiment on deception, reputation and trust," Post-Print hal-03105728, HAL.
- Olszewski, Wojciech, 2004. "Informal communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 117(2), pages 180-200, August.
- Boleslavsky, Raphael & Taylor, Curtis R., 2024. "Make it 'til you fake it," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 217(C).
- Kunal Sengupta & Amal Sanyal, 2004. "Delegation in a Cheap-Talk Game: A Voting Example," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 471, Econometric Society.
- Artyom Jelnov & Yair Tauman & Chang Zhao, 2021. "Stag Hunt with unknown outside options," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(1), pages 303-335, July.
- Wang, Hefei, 2008. "Staged-financing contracts with private information," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 276-294, April.
- Nyberg, Sten, 1997.
"The honest society: Stability and policy considerations,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 83-99, April.
- Nyberg, Sten, 1992. "The Honest Society: Stability and Policy Considerations," Working Paper Series 341, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Rode, Julian, 2007. "Truth and Trust in Communication: An Experimental Study of Behavior under Asymmetric Information," Ratio Working Papers 111, The Ratio Institute.
- Vranceanu, Radu, 2005. "The Ethical Dimension of Economic Choices," ESSEC Working Papers DR 05001, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
- Alessandro Acquisti, 2014. "Inducing Customers to Try New Goods," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 44(2), pages 131-146, March.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2012.
"Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma With Small Fines: The Penance Contract,"
The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 63(3), pages 333-347, September.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Small Fines: Penance Contract," CARF F-Series CARF-F-208, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Small Fines: Penance Contract," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-720, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Ambrus, Attila & Pathak, Parag A., 2011.
"Cooperation over finite horizons: A theory and experiments,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7), pages 500-512.
- Ambrus, Attila & Pathak, Parag A., 2011. "Cooperation over finite horizons: A theory and experiments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7-8), pages 500-512, August.
- Fasten, Erik R. & Hofmann, Dirk, 2010. "Two-sided Certification: The market for Rating Agencies," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 338, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- , & , & ,, 2008.
"Credible ratings,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 3(3), September.
- Damiano, Ettore & Li, Hao & Suen, Wing, 2006. "Credible Ratings," Microeconomics.ca working papers damiano-06-01-17-01-56-45, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 17 Jan 2006.
- Ettore Damiano & Hao Li & Wing Suen, 2006. "Credible Ratings," Working Papers tecipa-219, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Aleksei Smirnov & Egor Starkov, 2019. "Timing of predictions in dynamic cheap talk: experts vs. quacks," ECON - Working Papers 334, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
- Stephen Morris, 2001.
"Political Correctness,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(2), pages 231-265, April.
- Stephen Morris, 1999. "Political Correctness," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1242, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Daron Acemoglu & Alexander Wolitzky, 2012.
"Cycles of Distrust: An Economic Model,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
786969000000000502, David K. Levine.
- Daron Acemoglu & Alexander Wolitzky, 2012. "Cycles of Distrust: An Economic Model," NBER Working Papers 18257, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- David Ettinger & Philippe Jehiel, 2004.
"Towards a Theory of Deception,"
Levine's Bibliography
122247000000000247, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Philippe Jehiel & David Ettinger, 2007. "Towards a Theory of Deception," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000126, UCLA Department of Economics.
- David Ettinger & Philippe Jehiel, 2006. "Towards a Theory of Deception," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000775, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Philippe Jehiel & David Ettinger, 2005. "Towards a theory of deception," PSE Working Papers halshs-00590767, HAL.
- Philippe Jehiel & David Ettinger, 2005. "Towards a theory of deception," Working Papers halshs-00590767, HAL.
- Bassetto, Marco, 2019.
"Forward guidance: Communication, commitment, or both?,"
Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 69-86.
- Marco Bassetto, 2015. "Forward Guidance: Communication, Commitment, or Both?," 2015 Meeting Papers 216, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Marco Bassetto, 2019. "Forward guidance: communication, commitment, or both?," IFS Working Papers W19/20, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Marco Bassetto, 2019. "Forward Guidance: Communication, Commitment, or Both?," Working Paper Series WP-2019-5, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
- Elizabeth Demers & Clara Vega, 2008.
"Soft information in earnings announcements: news or noise?,"
International Finance Discussion Papers
951, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Elizabeth Demers & Clara Vega, 2009. "Soft Information in Earnings Announcements: News or Noise?," 2009 Meeting Papers 80, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Keongtae Kim & Jooyoung Park & Yang Pan & Kunpeng Zhang & Xiaoquan (Michael) Zhang, 2022. "Risk Disclosure in Crowdfunding," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 33(3), pages 1023-1041, September.
- Junghun Cho, 2008. "Sequential Cheap Talk from Advisors with Reputation," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp352, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
- Philippe Jehiel, 2022.
"Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium and Related Concepts:Theory, Applications, and Beyond,"
Working Papers
halshs-03735680, HAL.
- Philippe Jehiel, 2022. "Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium and Related Concepts:Theory, Applications, and Beyond," PSE Working Papers halshs-03735680, HAL.
- Kurschilgen, Michael & Marcin, Isabel, 2019. "Communication is more than information sharing: The role of status-relevant knowledge," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 651-672.
- Liu, Yaozhou Franklin & Sanyal, Amal, 2012.
"When second opinions hurt: A model of expert advice under career concerns,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 1-16.
- Liu, Yaozhou Franklin & Sanyal, Amal, 2010. "When Second Opinions Hurt: A Model of Expert Advice under Career Conce rns," Working Papers 2010-08, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
- Liu, Yaozhou Franklin & Sanyal, Amal, 2010. "When second opinions hurt: a model of expert advice under career concerns," MPRA Paper 27176, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Vincent P. Crawford, 2003.
"Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 133-149, March.
- Crawford, Vincent P., 2001. "Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt6k65014s, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Li, Ming & Tymofiy Mylovanov, 2009.
"Credibility for Sale: the Effect of Disclosure on Information Acquisition and Transmission,"
Working Papers
09008, Concordia University, Department of Economics, revised Oct 2009.
- LI, Ming & MYLOVANOV, Tymofiy, 2010. "Credibility for Sale - The Effect of Disclosure on Information Acquisition and Transmission," Cahiers de recherche 08-2010, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Ellingsen, Tore & Östling, Robert & Wengström, Erik, 2018. "How does communication affect beliefs in one-shot games with complete information?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 153-181.
- Jullien, Bruno & Park, In-Uck, 2019.
"Communication, Feedbacks and Repeated Moral Hazard with Short-lived Buyers,"
TSE Working Papers
19-1027, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Apr 2020.
- Bruno Jullien & In-Uck Park, 2020. "Communication, Feedbacks and Repeated Moral Hazard with Short-lived Buyers," Working Papers hal-03095669, HAL.
- Gesche, Tobias, 2021. "De-biasing strategic communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 452-464.
- Cheng, Ing-Haw & Hsiaw, Alice, 2022.
"Distrust in experts and the origins of disagreement,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
- Alice Hsiaw & Ing-Haw Cheng, 2016. "Distrust in Experts and the Origins of Disagreement," Working Papers 110R2, Brandeis University, Department of Economics and International Business School, revised Jan 2017.
- Alice Hsiaw & Ing-Haw Cheng, 2016. "Distrust in Experts and the Origins of Disagreement," Working Papers 110R3, Brandeis University, Department of Economics and International Business School, revised Mar 2018.
- Alice Hsiaw & Ing-Haw Cheng, 2016. "Distrust in Experts and the Origins of Disagreement," Working Papers 110R, Brandeis University, Department of Economics and International Business School, revised Nov 2016.
- Alice Hsiaw & Ing-Haw Cheng, 2016. "Distrust in Experts and the Origins of Disagreement," Working Papers 110, Brandeis University, Department of Economics and International Business School.
- Brown, M. & Serra Garcia, M., 2010.
"Relational Contracting Under the Threat of Expropriation – Experimental Evidence,"
Discussion Paper
2010-85, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Brown, M. & Serra Garcia, M., 2010. "Relational Contracting Under the Threat of Expropriation – Experimental Evidence," Other publications TiSEM 2a3179b3-7300-4aee-a62f-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Brown, M. & Serra Garcia, M., 2010. "Relational Contracting Under the Threat of Expropriation – Experimental Evidence," Other publications TiSEM 4c7c42f3-b44d-4327-9556-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Lily Qiu, 2005. "Managerial Reputation Concerns, Outside Monitoring, and Investment Efficiency," Working Papers 2005-08, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Oliver Lukason & María-del-Mar Camacho-Miñano, 2021. "What Best Explains Reporting Delays? A SME Population Level Study of Different Factors," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(9), pages 1-15, April.
- Athey, Susan & Calvano, Emilio & Jha, Saumitra, 2016.
"A Theory of Community Formation and Social Hierarchy,"
Research Papers
3467, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Susan Athey & Emilio Calvano & Saumitra Jha, 2016. "A Theory of Community Formation and Social Hierarchy," CSEF Working Papers 451, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
- Stefano Demichelis & Jorgen W. Weibull, 2008.
"Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1292-1311, September.
- Stefano Demichelis & Jörgen W. Weibull, 2007. "Language, meaning and games: a model of communication, coordination and evolution," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 61, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
- Stefano Demichelis & Jörgen Weibull, 2009. "Language, meaning and games A model of communication, coordination and evolution," Working Papers hal-00354224, HAL.
- Bauernschuster, Stefan & Falck, Oliver & Heblich, Stephan, 2010.
"Social capital access and entrepreneurship,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 821-833, December.
- Stefan Bauernschuster & Oliver Falck & Stephan Heblich, 2010. "Social Capital Access and Entrepreneurship," Post-Print hal-00911835, HAL.
- Bauernschuster, Stefan & Falck, Oliver & Heblich, Stephan, 2010. "Social capital access and entrepreneurship," Munich Reprints in Economics 20137, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2017.
"A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 84(2), pages 816-852.
- David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2013. "A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement," Working Papers E1304E, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
- David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2017. "A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement," Post-Print halshs-01509602, HAL.
- David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2017. "A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01509602, HAL.
- Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey & Stole, Lars, 2014. "A Theory of Contracts With Limited Enforcement," MPRA Paper 53504, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Golosov, Mikhail & Skreta, Vasiliki & Tsyvinski, Aleh & Wilson, Andrea, 2014.
"Dynamic strategic information transmission,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 304-341.
- Mikhail Golosov, 2009. "Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission," 2009 Meeting Papers 181, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Mikhail Golosov & Vasiliki Skreta & Aleh Tsyvinski & Andrea Wilson, 2013. "Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission," Working Papers 13-03, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Mikhail Golosov & Vasiliki Skreta & Aleh Tsyvinski & Andrea Wilson, 2011. "Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission," Working Papers 11-17, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Mikhail Golosov & Vasiliki Skreta & Aleh Tsyvinski & Andrea Wilson, 2011. "Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1802, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jun 2011.
- Mikhail Golosov & Vasiliki Skreta & Aleh Tsyvinski & Andrea Wilson, 2011. "Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission," EIEF Working Papers Series 1110, Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF), revised May 2011.
- Brown, Martin & Serra-Garcia, Marta, 2011. "The Threat of Exclusion and Relational Contracting," Discussion Papers in Economics 12287, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Demichelis, Stefano & Weibull, Jörgen, 2006. "Efficiency, communication and honesty," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 645, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 28 Nov 2006.
- Arnold Polanski & Mark Quement, 2023. "The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(2), pages 463-483, June.
- Choi, Jay Pil & Kristiansen, Eirik Gaard & Nahm, Jae, 2019.
"Strategic Product Pre-announcements in Markets with Network Effects,"
Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, vol. 60(1), pages 1-20, June.
- Jay Pil Choi & Eirik Gaard Kristiansen & Jae Nahm, 2005. "Strategic Product Pre-announcements in Markets with Network Effects," Working Papers 05-09, NET Institute, revised Sep 2005.
- Ottaviani, Marco & Sorensen, Peter Norman, 2006.
"Professional advice,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 120-142, January.
- Marco Ottaviani & Peter Sorensen, 1999. "Professional Advice," Game Theory and Information 9906003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Sylvain Bourjade & Bruno Jullien, 2011.
"The roles of reputation and transparency on the behavior of biased experts,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 42(3), pages 575-594, September.
- Bourjade, Sylvain & Jullien, Bruno, 2011. "The roles of reputation and transparency on the behavior of biased experts," MPRA Paper 34813, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Sébastien Galanti, 2008.
"When the payment mode affects the quality of advices. Financial analysts, fund managers, and brokerage commissions,"
Post-Print
halshs-00464933, HAL.
- Sébastien GALANTI, 2008. "When the payment mode affects the quality of advices. Financial analysts, fund managers, and brokerage commissions," LEO Working Papers / DR LEO 1767, Orleans Economics Laboratory / Laboratoire d'Economie d'Orleans (LEO), University of Orleans.
- Sébastien Galanti, 2008. "When the Payment Mode Affects the Quality of Advices. Financial Analysts, Fund Managers, and Brokerage Commissions," Post-Print halshs-00224805, HAL.
- Alok R. Saboo & Rajdeep Grewal, 2013. "Stock Market Reactions to Customer and Competitor Orientations: The Case of Initial Public Offerings," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 32(1), pages 70-88, October.
- Alfred Wagenhofer, 2000. "Disclosure of proprietary information in the course of an acquisition," Accounting and Business Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 31(1), pages 57-69.
- Mechtenberg, Lydia, 2006. "Cheap talk in the classroom," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2006-019, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
- Kim, Kyungmin & Pogach, Jonathan, 2014. "Honesty vs. advocacy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 51-74.
- Simon Johnson & John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, 2007.
"Courts and Relational Contracts,"
Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Erik Berglöf & Gérard Roland (ed.), The Economics of Transition, chapter 8, pages 243-297,
Palgrave Macmillan.
- Simon Johnson & John McMillan, 2002. "Courts and Relational Contracts," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 18(1), pages 221-277, April.
- Simon Johnson & John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, 2001. "Courts and Relational Contracts," NBER Working Papers 8572, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Panagiotis K. Staikouras, 2012. "A Theoretical and Empirical Review of the EU Regulation on Credit Rating Agencies: In Search of Truth, Not Scapegoats," Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 21(2), pages 71-155, May.
- Wang, Hefei, 2012. "Costly information transmission in continuous time with implications for credit rating announcements," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 36(9), pages 1402-1413.
- Hua, Xiameng & Watson, Joel, 2022.
"Starting small in project choice: A discrete-time setting with a continuum of types,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
- Hua, Xiameng & Watson, Joel, 2022. "Starting small in project choice: A discrete-time setting with a continuum of types," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt1fb0j67c, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Tsuyoshi Hatori & Hayeong Jeong & Kiyoshi Kobayashi, 2014. "Regional learning and trust formation," Chapters, in: Charlie Karlsson & Börje Johansson & Kiyoshi Kobayashi & Roger R. Stough (ed.), Knowledge, Innovation and Space, chapter 8, pages 180-212, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Nica, Melania, 2023. "Reputation formation and reinforcement of biases in a post-truth world," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 215(C), pages 455-478.
- Alp Atakan & Levent Kockesen & Elif Kubilay, 2017. "Optimal Delegation of Sequential Decisions: The Role of Communication and Reputation," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1701, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
- Sascha Behnk & Iván Barreda-Tarrazona & Aurora García-Gallego, 2017. "An experimental test of reporting systems for deception," Working Papers 2017/11, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).
- Sobel, Joel, 2020. "Lying and Deception in Games," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt0015j574, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Johan Lagerlof & Lars Frisell, 2004.
"Lobbying, Information Transmission, and Unequal Representation,"
Public Economics
0402003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Lagerlof, Johan & Frisell, Lars, 2004. "Lobbying, Information Transmission and Unequal Representation," CEPR Discussion Papers 4313, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Johan Lagerlöf & Lars Frisell, 2004. "Lobbying, Information Transmission, and Unequal Representation," CIG Working Papers SP II 2004-02, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
- Johan Lagerlof & Lars Frisell, 2004. "Lobbying, Information Transmission, and Unequal Representation," Microeconomics 0402013, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Archishman Chakraborty & Rick Harbaugh, 2014.
"Persuasive Puffery,"
Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 33(3), pages 382-400, May.
- Archishman Chakraborty & Rick Harbaugh, 2012. "Persuasive Puffery," Working Papers 2012-05, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
- Alistair J. Wilson & Emanuel Vespa, 2012. "Communication With Multiple Senders and Multiple Dimensions: An Experiment," Working Paper 384, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Mar 2012.
- Kartal, Melis & Tremewan, James, 2018.
"An offer you can refuse: The effect of transparency with endogenous conflict of interest,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 44-55.
- Melis Kartal & James Tremewan, 2016. "An offer you can refuse: the effects of transparency with endogenous conflict of interest," Vienna Economics Papers vie1602, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
- Massimiliano Landi & Domenico Colucci, 2005.
"Rational and boundedly rational behavior in sender-receiver games,"
Working Papers
14-2006, Singapore Management University, School of Economics, revised May 2006.
- Massimiliano Landi & Domenico Colucci, 2006. "Rational and Boundedly Rational Behavior in Sender-receiver Games," Development Economics Working Papers 22460, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
- Valsecchi, Irene, 2008. "Learning from Experts," International Energy Markets Working Papers 36756, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
- J. C. Sharman, 2007. "Rationalist and Constructivist Perspectives on Reputation," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 55(1), pages 20-37, March.
- Atakan, Alp & Koçkesen, Levent & Kubilay, Elif, 2020.
"Starting small to communicate,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 265-296.
- Alp Atakan & Levent Kockesen & Elif Kubilay, 2018. "Starting Small to Communicate," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1805, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
- Schottmüller, Christoph, 2019.
"Too good to be truthful: Why competent advisers are fired,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 333-360.
- Christoph Schottmüller, 2016. "Too good to be truthful: Why competent advisers are fired," Discussion Papers 16-10, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Dasgupta, Amil & Sarafidis, Yianis, 2009. "Managers as administrators: Reputation and incentives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(1-2), pages 155-163, May.
- Watson, Joel, 1999. "Starting Small and Renegotiation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 52-90, March.
- Yves Oytana & Nathalie Chappe, 2018.
"Expert opinion in a tort litigation game,"
European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 67-107, August.
- Yves Oytana & Nathalie Chappe, 2016. "Expert opinion in a tort litigation game," Working Papers hal-04141586, HAL.
- Yves Oytana & Nathalie Chappe, 2016. "Expert opinion in a tort litigation game," Working Papers 2016-13, CRESE.
- Yves Oytana & Nathalie Chappe, 2016. "Expert opinion in a tort litigation game," EconomiX Working Papers 2016-23, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
- Yves Oytana & Nathalie Chappe, 2016. "Expert opinion in a tort litigation game," Working Papers hal-01413908, HAL.
- Jung, Hanjoon Michael, 2009. "Who benefits from a sender's credibility concern, the sender or a receiver?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(3), pages 204-207, December.
- John R. Conlon, 2005. "Seemingly Unrelated Repeated Games," Game Theory and Information 0511004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Bruno Jullien & In-Uck Park, 2014.
"New, Like New, or Very Good? Reputation and Credibility,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 81(4), pages 1543-1574.
- Jullien, Bruno & Park, In-Uck, 2009. "New, Like New, or Very Good? Reputation and Credibility," TSE Working Papers 09-086, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised 29 Jan 2014.
- Jullien, Bruno & Park, In-Uck, 2009. "New, Like New, or Very Good? Reputation and Credibility," IDEI Working Papers 564, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised 27 Jan 2014.
- Bruno Jullien & In-Uck Park, 2009.
"Seller Reputation and Trust in Pre-Trade Communication,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
814577000000000330, David K. Levine.
- Bruno Jullien & In-Uck Park, 2011. "Seller Reputation and Trust in Pre-Trade Communication," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 11/272, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
- Cherian, Joseph A. & Perotti, Enrico, 2001.
"Option pricing and foreign investment under political risk,"
Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 359-377, December.
- Cherian, Joseph A & Perotti, Enrico C, 1999. "Option Pricing and Foreign Investment under Political Risk," CEPR Discussion Papers 2327, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Jung, Hanjoon Michael, 2007. "Strategic Information Transmission through the Media," MPRA Paper 5556, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Oct 2007.
- Wonsuk Chung & Rick Harbaugh, 2019. "Biased recommendations from biased and unbiased experts," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(3), pages 520-540, June.
- Chen, Chia-Hui & Ishida, Junichiro, 2015.
"Careerist experts and political incorrectness,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 1-18.
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