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Regional learning and trust formation

In: Knowledge, Innovation and Space

Author

Listed:
  • Tsuyoshi Hatori
  • Hayeong Jeong
  • Kiyoshi Kobayashi

Abstract

The contributions in this volume extend our understanding about the different ways distance impacts the knowledge conversion process. Knowledge itself is a raw input into the innovation process which can then transform it into an economically useful output such as prototypes, patents, licences and new companies. New knowledge is often tacit and thus tends to be highly localized, as indeed is the conversion process. Consequently, as the book demonstrates, space or distance matter significantly in the transformation of raw knowledge into beneficial knowledge.

Suggested Citation

  • Tsuyoshi Hatori & Hayeong Jeong & Kiyoshi Kobayashi, 2014. "Regional learning and trust formation," Chapters, in: Charlie Karlsson & Börje Johansson & Kiyoshi Kobayashi & Roger R. Stough (ed.), Knowledge, Innovation and Space, chapter 8, pages 180-212, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:13819_8
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