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Disclosing conflicts of interest - Do experience and reputation matter?

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  • Koch, Christopher
  • Schmidt, Carsten

Abstract

In a controlled laboratory experiment, we investigate the effects of disclosing conflicts of interest on the reporting behaviour of information providers. First, we replicate the findings of Cain, Loewenstein, and Moore (Cain, D.M., Loewenstein, G., & Moore, D.A. (2005). The dirt on coming clean: Perverse effects of disclosing conflicts of interest. Journal of Legal Studies 34, 1-25) that such disclosure can trigger more biased reporting, since it removes moral concerns. Second, we show that this effect diminishes or even reverts with experience and reputation. Third, we observe that non-disclosure can have the positive effect of facilitating the formation of reputation.

Suggested Citation

  • Koch, Christopher & Schmidt, Carsten, 2010. "Disclosing conflicts of interest - Do experience and reputation matter?," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 95-107, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:aosoci:v:35:y:2010:i:1:p:95-107
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    4. Bert Scholtens & Feng‐Ching Kang, 2013. "Corporate Social Responsibility and Earnings Management: Evidence from Asian Economies," Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 20(2), pages 95-112, March.
    5. Kartal, Melis & Tremewan, James, 2018. "An offer you can refuse: The effect of transparency with endogenous conflict of interest," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 44-55.
    6. Sascha Behnk & Iván Barreda-Tarrazona & Aurora García-Gallego, 2017. "An experimental test of reporting systems for deception," Working Papers 2017/11, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).
    7. Effron, Daniel A. & Raj, Medha, 2021. "Disclosing interpersonal conflicts of interest: Revealing whom we like, but not whom we dislike," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 164(C), pages 68-85.
    8. Behnk, Sascha & Barreda-Tarrazona, Iván & García-Gallego, Aurora, 2019. "Deception and reputation – An experimental test of reporting systems," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 37-58.
    9. Cardinaels, Eddy & Jia, Y., 2015. "How audits moderate the effects of incentives and peer behavior on misreporting," Other publications TiSEM 15e939fa-d6dd-4bda-824d-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    10. Tobias Gesche, 2016. "De-biasing strategic communication," ECON - Working Papers 216, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Sep 2021.
    11. Marie Caussimont & David Carassus, 2015. "L’audit financier en contexte territorial : vers un audit de performance de la gestion locale ?," Post-Print hal-02141946, HAL.
    12. de Meza, David Emmanuel & Irlenbusch, Bernd & Reyniers, Diane, 2010. "Disclosure, Trust and Persuasion in Insurance Markets," IZA Discussion Papers 5060, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    13. Thomas G. Canace & Leigh Salzsieder & Tammie J. Schaefer, 2023. "Preventing Disclosure-Induced Moral Licensing: Evidence from the Boardroom," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 187(4), pages 841-857, November.
    14. Kartal, Melis & Tremewan, James, 2018. "An offer you can refuse: The effect of transparency with endogenous conflict of interest," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 44-55.
    15. Behnk, Sascha & Barreda-Tarrazona, Iván & García-Gallego, Aurora, 2014. "The role of ex post transparency in information transmission—An experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 45-64.
    16. Ali Meftah Gerged & Khaldoon Albitar & Lara Al‐Haddad, 2023. "Corporate environmental disclosure and earnings management—The moderating role of corporate governance structures," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(3), pages 2789-2810, July.
    17. Eddy Cardinaels & Yuping Jia, 2016. "How Audits Moderate the Effects of Incentives and Peer Behavior on Misreporting," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 25(1), pages 183-204, May.
    18. Chen, D.L. & Levonyan, V. & Reinhart, S.E. & Taksler, G., 2014. "Do Payment Disclosure Laws Affect Industry-Physician Relationships?," Health, Econometrics and Data Group (HEDG) Working Papers 14/24, HEDG, c/o Department of Economics, University of York.
    19. Sascha Behnk & Iván Barreda-Tarrazona & Aurora García-Gallego, 2012. "Reducing deception through subsequent transparency - An experimental investigation," Working Papers 2012/14, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).

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