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Bargaining, Coalitions, Signalling and Repeated Games for Economic Development and Poverty Alleviation

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  • Keshab BHATTARAI

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  • Keshab BHATTARAI, 2008. "Bargaining, Coalitions, Signalling and Repeated Games for Economic Development and Poverty Alleviation," EcoMod2008 23800012, EcoMod.
    • Handle: RePEc:ekd:000238:23800012
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