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Emergence of Cooperation in ANonymous Social Networks through Social Capital

Author

Listed:
  • Nicole Immorlica

    (Northwestern University)

  • Brendan Lucier

    (University of Toronto)

  • Brian W. Rogers

    (Northwestern University, Kellogg)

Abstract

of cooperating and defecting agents at equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicole Immorlica & Brendan Lucier & Brian W. Rogers, 2010. "Emergence of Cooperation in ANonymous Social Networks through Social Capital," 2010 Meeting Papers 1134, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    • Handle: RePEc:red:sed010:1134
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 2008. "The Folk Theorem In Repeated Games With Discounting Or With Incomplete Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 11, pages 209-230, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    5. Annen, Kurt, 2003. "Social capital, inclusive networks, and economic performance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 449-463, April.
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    14. Joel Sobel, 2002. "Can We Trust Social Capital?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 40(1), pages 139-154, March.
    15. Abreu, Dilip, 1988. "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 383-396, March.
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    2. Pin, Paolo & Rogers, Brian W., 2015. "Cooperation, punishment and immigration," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 72-101.

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