Rationalist and Constructivist Perspectives on Reputation
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DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2007.00643.x
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Vasiliki Baka, 2016. "Formative Reputation: From Being an Organizational Asset to Becoming a Process in The Making," Corporate Reputation Review, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 19(2), pages 152-165, April.
- George E. Mitchell & Sarah S. Stroup, 2017. "The reputations of NGOs: Peer evaluations of effectiveness," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 397-419, September.
- Andreea Năstase & Claire Muurmans, 2020. "Regulating lobbying activities in the European Union: A voluntary club perspective," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 14(2), pages 238-255, April.
- Jasper Krommendijk, 2015. "The domestic effectiveness of international human rights monitoring in established democracies. The case of the UN human rights treaty bodies," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 489-512, December.
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