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The Honest Society: Stability and Policy Considerations

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  • Nyberg, Sten

    (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN))

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  • Nyberg, Sten, 1992. "The Honest Society: Stability and Policy Considerations," Working Paper Series 341, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0341
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:bla:kyklos:v:39:y:1986:i:2:p:245-66 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Fudenberg, D. & Harris, C., 1992. "Evolutionary dynamics with aggregate shocks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 420-441, August.
    3. Frank, Robert H, 1987. "If Homo Economicus Could Choose His Own Utility Function, Would He Want One with a Conscience?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(4), pages 593-604, September.
    4. Friedman, Daniel, 1991. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 637-666, May.
    5. Joel Sobel, 1985. "A Theory of Credibility," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 52(4), pages 557-573.
    6. Frank, Robert H, 1989. "If Homo Economicus Could Choose His Own Utility Function, Would He Want One with a Conscience? Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 594-596, June.
    7. Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring.
    8. Harrington, Joseph E, Jr, 1989. "If Homo Economicus Could Choose His Own Utility Function, Would He Want One with a Conscience?: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 588-593, June.
    9. Selten, Reinhard, 1991. "Evolution, learning, and economic behavior," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 3-24, February.
    10. Ulrich Witt, 1986. "Evolution and Stability of Cooperation without Enforceable Contracts," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(2), pages 245-266, May.
    11. Steven Shavell, 1990. "Individual Precautions to Prevent Theft: Private Versus Socially OptimalBehavior," NBER Working Papers 3560, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Michihiro Kandori, 1992. "Social Norms and Community Enforcement," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(1), pages 63-80.
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    Cited by:

    1. Shuihua Han & Bin Cao & Yufang Fu & Zongwei Luo, 2018. "A liner shipping competitive model with consideration of service quality management," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 270(1), pages 155-177, November.
    2. Patrick Francois & Jan Zabojnik, 2005. "Trust, Social Capital, and Economic Development," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 3(1), pages 51-94, March.
    3. Valeria Maggian & Marie Claire Villeval, 2016. "Social preferences and lying aversion in children," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 19(3), pages 663-685, September.
    4. Francois, P. & Zabojnik, J., 2001. "Culture and Development : An Analytical Framework," Discussion Paper 2001-25, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    5. Massimiliano Mazzanti & Giulio Cainelli & Susanna Mancinelli, 2005. "Social Capital, R&D and Industrial Districts," Working Papers 2005.84, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    6. van de Ven, J., 2000. "The Economics of the Gift," Other publications TiSEM c4c17d0c-941f-4bb6-b9e6-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    7. van de Ven, J., 2000. "The Economics of the Gift," Discussion Paper 2000-68, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    8. Julian Romero, 2011. "The Effect of Hysteresis on Equilibrium Selection in Coordination Games," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1265, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
    9. Romero, Julian, 2015. "The effect of hysteresis on equilibrium selection in coordination games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 88-105.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Evolutionary game theory; Social values;

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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