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Content
2012
- 12cshtf How to Fix the Inefficiency of Global Cap and Trade
by Peter Cramton & Steven Stoft - 12csgcg Global Climate Games: How Pricing and a Green Fund Foster Cooperation
by Peter Cramton & Steven Stoft - 12cfosdca Discrete Clock Auctions: An Experimental Study
by Peter Cramton & Emel Filiz-Ozbay & Erkut Ozbay & Pacharasut Sujarittanonta - 12cfosf Fear of Losing in a Clock Auction
by Peter Cramton & Emel Filiz-Ozbay & Erkut Ozbay & Pacharasut Sujarittanonta - 12acmec System and Method for the Efficient Clearing of Spectrum Encumbrances
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Paul Milgrom - 12acmhc System and Method for a Hybrid Clock and Proxy Auction
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Paul Milgrom - 12cmaft Medicare Auction Reform
by Peter Cramton - 12cmafc Response to the Congressional Hearing on Medicare's Durable Medical Equipment Competitive Bidding Program
by Peter Cramton - 12chcfma The Hidden Costs of a Flawed Medicare Auction
by Peter Cramton - 12cekdtf Designed to Fail: The Medicare Auction for Durable Medical Equipment
by Peter Cramton - 12cocap Economics and Design of Capacity Markets for the Power Sector
by Peter Cramton & Axel Ockenfels - 11acjam System and Method for an Auction of Multiple Types of Items
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Wynne P. Jones - 11accw Comparison of Auction Formats for Auctioning Wind Rights
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton - 11acmf Multiple Factor Auction Design for Wind Rights
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton - 11acadw Auction Design for Wind Rights
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton - 11marv Medicare Auction Reform
by Peter Cramton - 11lto Letter from 244 Concerned Auction Experts on the Medicare Competitive Bidding Program
by Peter Cramton - 11ckev Early Pilots of Medicare Auctions Bring No Solace to Auction Experts
by Peter Cramton - 11cadm Auction Design for Medicare Durable Medical Equipment
by Peter Cramton - 11cmaf Medicare Auction Failure: Early Evidence from the Round 1 Rebid
by Peter Cramton - 11cocaps Ökonomik und Design von Kapazitätsmärkten im Stromsektor
by Peter Cramton & Axel Ockenfels - 11acar Activity Rules for the Combinatorial Clock Auction
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton - 11iat Incentive Auctions and Spectrum Policy
by Peter Cramton - 11iauc Incentive Auctions
by Peter Cramton - 11ckrs Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services
by Peter Cramton & Evan Kwerel & Gregory Rosston & Andrzej Skrzypacz - 10cmd Market Design: Harnessing Market Methods to Improve Resource Allocation
by Peter Cramton - 10acmhc System and Method for a Hybrid Clock and Proxy Auction
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Paul Milgrom - 10acfm Fix Medicare’s Bizarre Auction Program
by Ian Ayres & Peter Cramton - 10ltcs Letter from 167 Concerned Auction Experts on Medicare Competitive Bidding Program
by Peter Cramton - 10cmac Medicare Auction Conference
by Peter Cramton - 10cgsma An Auction for Medicare Durable Medical Equipment: Evidence from an Industry Mock Auction
by Peter Cramton & Ulrich Gall & Pacharasut Sujarittanonta - 10ckrhc Reducing Healthcare Costs Requires Good Market Design
by Peter Cramton - 09ccpre Prediction Markets to Forecast Electricity Demand
by Luciano I. de Castro & Peter Cramton
2010
- 98wpesop Bargaining with a Shared Interest: The Impact of Employee Stock Ownership Plans on Labor Disputes
by Peter Cramton & Hamid Mehran & Joseph Tracy - 10kcg Kyoto’s Climate Game and How to Fix It
by Peter Cramton & Steven Stoft - 10icg International Climate Games: From Caps to Cooperation
by Peter Cramton & Steven Stoft - 10ard Auctioning Rough Diamonds: A Competitive Sales Process for BHP Billiton’s Ekati Diamonds
by Peter Cramton & Samuel Dinkin & Robert Wilson - 10wec Wind Energy in Colombia: A Framework for Market Entry
by Walter Vergara & Alejandro Deeb & Natsuko Toba & Peter Cramton & Irene Leino - 10pbcc Price is a Better Climate Commitment
by Peter Cramton & Steven Stoft - 10dca Discrete Clock Auctions: An Experimental Study
by Peter Cramton & Emel Filiz-Ozbay & Erkut Ozbay & Pacharasut Sujarittanonta
2009
- 09gcp Global Carbon Pricing: A Better Climate Commitment
by Peter Cramton & Steven Stoft - 09ufm Using Forward Markets to Improve Electricity Market Design
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton - 09vpp Virtual Power Plant Auctions
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton - 09sad Spectrum Auction Design
by Peter Cramton - 09add Auctioning the Digital Dividend
by Peter Cramton - 09prca Pricing Rule in a Clock Auction
by Peter Cramton & Pacharasut Sujarittanonta - 09anr How Best to Auction Natural Resources
by Peter Cramton - 09aghg Auctioning Greenhouse Gas Emissions Permits in Australia
by Regina Betz & Stefan Seifert & Peter Cramton & Suzi Kerr - 09tsall A Two-Sided Auction for Legacy Loans
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton - 09msab Making Sense of the Aggregator Bank
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton - 09fop No Substitute for the 'P'-Word in Financial Rescue
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton - 09cvawln Common-Value Auctions with Liquidity Needs: An Experimental Test of a Troubled Assets Reverse Auction
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Emel Filiz-Ozbay & Nathaniel Higgins & Erkut Ozbay & Andrew Stocking - 09aibc Auctions for Injecting Bank Capital
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton - 09imd Innovation and Market Design
by Peter Cramton - 09mdc Market Design: Auctions and Matching
by Peter Cramton
2008
- 08tara A Troubled Asset Reverse Auction
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton - 08adcfrp Auction Design Critical for Rescue Plan
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton - 08rtfghz A Review of the 10-40 GHz Auction
by Peter Cramton - 08rlba A Review of the L-Band Auction
by Peter Cramton - 08qcspr Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions
by Robert Day & Peter Cramton - 08gm Auctioning Long-term Gas Contracts in Colombia
by Peter Cramton - 08frm Forward Reliability Markets: Less Risk, Less Market Power, More Efficiency
by Peter Cramton & Steven Stoft - 08ibsaa The Effect of Incumbent Bidding in Set-Aside Auctions: An Analysis of Prices in the Closed and Open Segments of FCC Auction 35
by Peter Cramton & Allan T. Ingraham & Hal J. Singer
2007
- 07c700mhz The 700 MHz Spectrum Auction: An Opportunity to Protect Competition In a Consolidating Industry
by Peter Cramton & Andrzej Skrzypacz & Robert Wilson - 07el700mhz Economist Letter to NTIA on 700 MHz Spectrum Auction
by Peter Cramton & Andrzej Skrzypacz & Simon Wilkie & Robert Wilson - 07rev700 Revenues in the 700 MHz Spectrum Auction
by Peter Cramton & Andrzej Skrzypacz & Robert Wilson - 07d700mhz Economic Comments on the Design of the 700 MHz Spectrum Auction
by Peter Cramton & Andrzej Skrzypacz & Robert Wilson - 07fcc700mhz Comments on the FCC’s Proposed Competitive Bidding Procedures for Auction 73
by Peter Cramton & Gregory Rosston & Andrzej Skrzypacz & Robert Wilson - 07entry700mhz Essential Entry: Revenues in the 700 MHz Spectrum Auction
by Peter Cramton - 07rggi Comments on the RGGI Market Design
by Peter Cramton - 07fem Colombia’s Forward Energy Market
by Peter Cramton - 07oca An Overview of Combinatorial Auctions
by Peter Cramton & Yoav Shoham & Richard Steinberg - 07mbac Market-Based Alternatives for Managing Congestion at New York’s LaGuardia Airport
by Michael O. Ball & Lawrence M. Ausubel & Frank Berardino & Peter Cramton & George Donohue & Mark Hansen & Karla Hoffman - 07cfem Colombia Firm Energy Market
by Peter Cramton & Steven Stoft - 07cpm Why We Need to Stick with Uniform-Price Auctions in Electricity Markets
by Peter Cramton & Steven Stoft
2006
- 06scfem Simulation of the Colombian Firm Energy Market
by Peter Cramton & Steven Stoft & Jeffrey West - 06mdfra The Convergence of Market Designs for Adequate Generating Capacity
by Peter Cramton & Steven Stoft
2005
- 06oil How Best to Auction Oil Rights
by Peter Cramton - 05mdi Review of the Proposed Reserve Markets in New England
by Peter Cramton & Hung-po Chao & Robert Wilson - 05licap A Capacity Market that Makes Sense
by Peter Cramton & Steven Stoft
2004
- 99wpvic Vickrey Auctions with Reserve Pricing
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton - 04mit5 The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Paul Milgrom - 04mit4 Simultaneous Ascending Auction
by Peter Cramton - 04mit Combinatorial Auctions
by Peter Cramton & Yoav Shoham & Richard Steinberg - 04jeea Auctioning Many Divisible Goods
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton - 04hicss Competitive Bidding Behavior in Uniform-Price Auction Markets
by Peter Cramton
2003
- 03ferc2 Rebuttal Addendum: Assessment of Submissions of the California Parties
by Peter Cramton - 03ferc1 Competitive Bidding Behavior in Uniform-Price Auction Markets
by Peter Cramton - 02ubs Unions, Bargaining and Strikes
by Peter Cramton & Joseph Tracy - 02emd Electricity Market Design: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly
by Peter Cramton
2002
- 02barg Bargaining with Incomplete Information
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Raymond J. Deneckere - 02collude Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions
by Peter Cramton & Jesse Schwartz - 02eptc Tradeable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and Why to Auction Not Grandfather
by Peter Cramton & Suzi Kerr - 01hte Spectrum Auctions
by Peter Cramton
2001
- 01calpx Pricing in the California Power Exchange Electricity Market: Should California Switch from Uniform Pricing to Pay-as-Bid Pricing?
by Alfred E. Kahn & Peter Cramton & Robert H. Porter & Richard D. Tabors - 01ej Uniform Pricing or Pay-as-Bid Pricing: A Dilemma for California and Beyond
by Alfred E. Kahn & Peter Cramton & Robert H. Porter & Richard D. Tabors - 01nao Lessons Learned from the UK 3G Spectrum Auction
by Peter Cramton
2000
- 99reserves Review of the Reserves and Operable Capability Markets: New England's Experience in the First Four Months
by Peter Cramton - 00jel A Review of Markets for Clean Air: The U.S. Acid Rain Program
by Peter Cramton - 00flaws Eliminating the Flaws in New England's Reserve Markets
by Peter Cramton & Jeffrey Lien - 00senate Lessons from the United States Spectrum Auctions
by Peter Cramton - 00jre Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions
by Peter Cramton & Jesse Schwartz
1999
- 99irra Impacts of Strike Replacement Bans in Canada
by Peter Cramton & Morley Gunderson & Joseph Tracy - 99ej The Role of the ISO in U.S. Electricity Markets: A Review of Restructuring in California and PJM
by Lisa Cameron & Peter Cramton - 99res The Effect of Collective Bargaining Legislation on Strikes and Wages
by Peter Cramton & Morley Gunderson & Joseph Tracy - 99eedecr The Distributional Effects of Carbon Regulation: Why Auctioned Carbon Permits are Attractive and Feasible
by Peter Cramton & Suzi Kerr
1998
- 98cra2 Simultaneous Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding
by Peter Cramton & John McMillan & Paul Milgrom & Bradley Miller & Bridger Mitchell & Daniel Vincent & Robert Wilson - 98mdi A Review of ISO New England's Proposed Market Rules
by Peter Cramton & Robert Wilson - 98wpoe The Optimality of Being Efficient
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton - 98jole The Use of Replacement Workers in Union Contract Negotiations: The U.S. Experience, 1980-1989
by Peter Cramton & Joseph S. Tracy - 98jleer Efficient Relocation of Spectrum Incumbents
by Peter Cramton & Evan Kwerel & John Williams - 98jlefcc The Efficiency of the FCC Spectrum Auctions
by Peter Cramton - 98eer Ascending Auctions
by Peter Cramton - 97jems Synergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the Broadband PCS Auctions
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan - 93beq Promoting Honesty in Negotiation: An Exercise in Practical Ethics
by Peter Cramton & J. Gregory Dees
1997
- 97cra1b Package Bidding for Spectrum Licenses
by Peter Cramton & John McMillan & Paul Milgrom & Bradley Miller & Bridger Mitchell & Daniel Vincent & Robert Wilson - 98wpas Auctioning Securities
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton - 97cra Auction Design Enhancements for Non-Combinatorial Auctions
by Peter Cramton & John McMillan & Paul Milgrom & Bradley Miller & Bridger Mitchell & Daniel Vincent & Robert Wilson - 97wpad Auction Design for Standard Offer Service
by Peter Cramton & Andrew Parece & Robert Wilson - 97jemsfcc The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment
by Peter Cramton - 97elec Using Auctions to Divest Generation Assets
by Lisa J. Cameron & Peter Cramton & Robert Wilson
1996
- 96slr Deficit Reduction Through Diversity: How Affirmative Action at the FCC Increased Auction Competition
by Ian Ayres & Peter Cramton
1995
- 98wpdr Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions
by Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton - 95jems Money Out of Thin Air: The Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction
by Peter Cramton - 95geb Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement
by Peter Cramton & Thomas R. Palfrey - 95beq Deception and Mutual Trust: A Reply to Strudler
by Peter Cramton & J. Gregory Dees
1994
- 94jolew Wage Bargaining with Time-Varying Threats
by Peter Cramton & Joseph S. Tracy - 94jole The Determinants of U.S. Labor Disputes
by Peter Cramton & Joseph S. Tracy - 94clr Relational Investing and Agency Theory
by Ian Ayres & Peter Cramton
1992
- 92res Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty
by Peter Cramton - 92aer Strikes and Holdouts in Wage Bargaining: Theory and Data
by Peter Cramton & Joseph S. Tracy
1991
- 91ms Dynamic Bargaining with Transaction Costs
by Peter Cramton - 91jleo Using Auction Theory to Inform Takeover Regulation
by Peter Cramton & Alan Schwartz - 91beq Shrewd Bargaining on the Moral Frontier: Toward a Theory of Morality in Pratice
by Peter Cramton & J. Gregory Dees - 90ier Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty About Costs
by Peter Cramton & Thomas R. Palfrey
1989
- 89aids Nonrandom Mixing Models of HIV Transmission
by Peter Cramton & Edward Kaplan & A. David Paltiel
1987
- 87econ Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
by Peter Cramton & Robert Gibbons & Paul Klemperer
1985
- 85roth Sequential Bargaining Mechanisms
by Peter Cramton