Promoting Honesty in Negotiation: An Exercise in Practical Ethics
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- Peter Cramton & J. Gregory Dees, 1998. "Promoting Honesty in Negotiation: An Exercise in Practical Ethics," Papers of Peter Cramton 93beq, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998.
References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Al-Khatib, Jamal A. & Malshe, Avinash & AbdulKader, Mazen, 2008. "Perception of unethical negotiation tactics: A comparative study of US and Saudi managers," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 78-102, February.
- Moshe Banai & Abraham Stefanidis & Ana Shetach & Mehmet Özbek, 2014. "Attitudes Toward Ethically Questionable Negotiation Tactics: A Two-Country Study," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 123(4), pages 669-685, September.
- Desmond, John & Crane, Andrew, 2004. "Morality and the consequences of marketing action," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 57(11), pages 1222-1230, November.
- Massoud Moslehpour & Mein-Woei Suen & Yu-Te Tu & Ranfeng Qiu, 2021. "The Moderating Role of Gender in the Relationship between Ethics and Negotiation Style," Advances in Decision Sciences, Asia University, Taiwan, vol. 25(3), pages 26-45, September.
- SimanTov-Nachlieli, Ilanit & Har-Vardi, Liron & Moran, Simone, 2020. "When negotiators with honest reputations are less (and more) likely to be deceived," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 68-84.
- Peter Cramton & J. Gregory Dees, 1995. "Deception and Mutual Trust: A Reply to Strudler," Papers of Peter Cramton 95beq, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998.
- Kerry Pedigo & Verena Marshall, 2009. "Bribery: Australian Managers’ Experiences and Responses When Operating in International Markets," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 87(1), pages 59-74, June.
- Muhammad Alshurideh & B. H. Al Kurdi & Anu Vij, Zaid Obiedat & Abdallah Naser, 2016. "Marketing Ethics and Relationship Marketing - An Empirical Study that Measure the Effect of Ethics Practices Application on Maintaining Relationships with Customers," International Business Research, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 9(9), pages 78-90, September.
- Jason R. Pierce & Leigh Thompson, 2022. "Feeling Competitiveness or Empathy Towards Negotiation Counterparts Mitigates Sex Differences in Lying," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 178(1), pages 71-87, June.
- Hillie Aaldering & Alfred Zerres & Wolfgang Steinel, 2020. "Constituency Norms Facilitate Unethical Negotiation Behavior Through Moral Disengagement," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 29(5), pages 969-991, October.
- Claudio Weber Abramo, 2003. "What If? A Look at Integrity Pacts," Public Economics 0310008, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- M29 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics - - - Other
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