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Reputation effects of information sharing

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  • Lunawat, Radhika

Abstract

This paper analyzes a model of investment and return in an economy characterized by information asymmetry between an investor and a manager. The realized value of the uncertain state of nature is the manager’s private information. The paper first considers an economy where the manager cannot share her private information with the investor. Therefore, dividend payment is the only reputation building tool available to the manager. If the investor’s prior beliefs about the manager’s trustworthiness are sufficiently high, then the manager will return a dividend consistent with the lower possible state of nature having occurred and the investor will revise such beliefs downwards. However, if the beliefs are not so high, then the equilibrium will be mixed strategies.

Suggested Citation

  • Lunawat, Radhika, 2016. "Reputation effects of information sharing," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 131(PA), pages 75-91.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:131:y:2016:i:pa:p:75-91
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.08.006
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    Cited by:

    1. Lunawat, Radhika, 2013. "An experimental investigation of reputation effects of disclosure in an investment/trust game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 130-144.
    2. Lunawat, Radhika & Shields, Timothy W. & Waymire, Gregory, 2021. "Financial reporting and moral sentiments," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(1).
    3. Jia, Zi Tingting & McMahon, Matthew J., 2019. "Dividend payments and excess cash: an experimental analysis," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    4. Janas, Moritz & Oljemark, Emilia, 2020. "Trust and Reputation under Asymmetric Information," VfS Annual Conference 2020 (Virtual Conference): Gender Economics 224518, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    5. Jacob LaRiviere & Matthew McMahon & William Neilson, 2018. "Shareholder Protection and Agency Costs: An Experimental Analysis," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(7), pages 3108-3128, July.
    6. Janas, Moritz & Oljemark, Emilia, 2021. "Trust and reputation under asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 185(C), pages 97-124.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    M41; D82; C11; C73; Information; Reputation; Investment; Return; Trust;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • C11 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Bayesian Analysis: General
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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