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Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games
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- Blume, Andreas & Franco, April Mitchell, 2007. "Decentralized learning from failure," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 504-523, March.
- Flavio Toxvaerd & Chryssi Giannitsarou, 2004.
"Recursive global games,"
Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2003
104, Money Macro and Finance Research Group.
- Toxvaerd, Flavio & Giannitsarou, Chryssi, 2007. "Recursive Global Games," CEPR Discussion Papers 6470, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Drew Fudenberg, 2006.
"Advancing Beyond Advances in Behavioral Economics,"
Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(3), pages 694-711, September.
- Fudenberg, Drew, 2006. "Advancing Beyond "Advances in Behavioral Economics"," Scholarly Articles 3208222, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Lipman, Barton L. & Wang, Ruqu, 2009.
"Switching costs in infinitely repeated games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 292-314, May.
- Barton L. Lipman & Ruqu Wang, 2005. "Switching Costs in Infinitely Repeated Games," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2005-021, Boston University - Department of Economics, revised Jan 2006.
- Barton L. Lipman & Ruqu Wang, 2006. "Switching Costs In Infinitely Repeated Games," Working Paper 1032, Economics Department, Queen's University.
- János Flesch & Arkadi Predtetchinski, 2016. "Subgame-perfect $$\epsilon $$ ϵ -equilibria in perfect information games with sigma-discrete discontinuities," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 61(3), pages 479-495, March.
- Martin W. Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2004.
"Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(2), pages 407-432, March.
- Cripps,M.W. & Mailath,G.J. & Samuelson,L., 2002. "Imperfect monitoring and impermanent reputations," Working papers 17, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Martin W. Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2002. "Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-016, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 30 May 2003.
- Martin Cripps & George J Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2010. "Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000060, David K. Levine.
- Mailath, George J. & Postlewaite, Andrew & Samuelson, Larry, 2005.
"Contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 126-140, October.
- Mailath,G.J. & Postlewaite,A. & Samuelson,L., 2002. "Contemporaneous perfect Epsilon-equilibria," Working papers 5, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- George Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson, 2003. "Contemporaneous Perfect Epsilon-Equilibria," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-021, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Liang Mao, 2017. "Subgame perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model with deterministic procedures," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 82(4), pages 485-500, April.
- Cingiz, Kutay & Flesch, János & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2016.
"Doing it now, later, or never,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 174-185.
- Cingiz, K. & Flesch, J. & Herings, P.J.J. & Predtetchinski, A., 2015. "Doing it now, later, or never," Research Memorandum 022, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
- Mao, Liang, 2015. "Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model with Deterministic Procedures," MPRA Paper 67859, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 2001.
"Markov Perfect Equilibrium: I. Observable Actions,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 191-219, October.
- Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, 1997. "Markov Perfect Equilibrium, I: Observable Actions," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1799, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Echenique, Federico, 2004.
"Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 348-364, February.
- Federico Echenique, 2000. "Extensive Form Games and Strategic Complementarities," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7553, David K. Levine.
- Federico Echenique, 2000. "Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities," Game Theory and Information 0004005, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Federico Echenique, 2000. "Extensive-Form Games and Strategic Complementarities," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 1300, Department of Economics - dECON.
- Efe A Ok & Yusufcan Masatlioglu, 2003. "A General Theory of Time Preferences," Levine's Bibliography 234936000000000089, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Chakrabarti, S. K., 1999. "Finite and infinite action dynamic games with imperfect information1," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 243-266, October.
- Simina Br^anzei & Yuval Peres, 2019. "Multiplayer Bandit Learning, from Competition to Cooperation," Papers 1908.01135, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2024.
- János Flesch & P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Jasmine Maes & Arkadi Predtetchinski, 2022. "Individual upper semicontinuity and subgame perfect $$\epsilon $$ ϵ -equilibria in games with almost perfect information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 73(2), pages 695-719, April.
- Subir K Chakrabarti, 1987. "Infinite Horizon Games With Perfect Equilibrium Points," Discussion Papers 742, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Kuipers, J. & Flesch, J. & Schoenmakers, G. & Vrieze, K., 2009. "Pure subgame-perfect equilibria in free transition games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 199(2), pages 442-447, December.
- Mikhail Golosov & Larry E. Jones & Michèle Tertilt, 2007.
"Efficiency with Endogenous Population Growth,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(4), pages 1039-1071, July.
- Mikhail Golosov & Larry E Jones & Michèle Tertilt, 2003. "Effciency with Endogenous Population Growth," Levine's Working Paper Archive 666156000000000310, David K. Levine.
- Mikhail Golosov & Larry E. Jones & Michele Tertilt, 2004. "Efficiency with Endogenous Population Growth," NBER Working Papers 10231, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Mikhail Golosov & Larry E. Jones & Michèle Tertilt, 2006. "Efficiency with Endogenous Population Growth," Discussion Papers 05-012, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- Mikhail Golosov & Larry E. Jones, 2004. "Efficiency with Endogenous Population Growth," 2004 Meeting Papers 8, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Mikhail Golosov & Larry E. Jones & Michele Tertilt, 2004. "Efficiency with endogenous population growth," Working Papers 630, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Flesch, Janos & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Maes, Jasmine & Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2019. "Individual upper semicontinuity and subgame perfect ϵ-equilibria in games with almost perfect information," Research Memorandum 002, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
- János Flesch & Arkadi Predtetchinski, 2017. "A Characterization of Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium Plays in Borel Games of Perfect Information," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 42(4), pages 1162-1179, November.
- Levine, David K., 1989.
"Infinite horizon equilibrium with incomplete markets,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 357-376, September.
- David K. Levine, 1986. "Infinite Horizon Equilibrium with Incomplete Markets," UCLA Economics Working Papers 418, UCLA Department of Economics.
- David K. Levine, 1989. "Infinite Horizon Equilibrium with Incomplete Markets," Levine's Working Paper Archive 49, David K. Levine.
- Mariotti, Thomas, 2000. "Subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes in continuous games of almost perfect information1," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 99-128, August.
- Ashok P. Maitra & William D. Sudderth, 2007. "Subgame-Perfect Equilibria for Stochastic Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 32(3), pages 711-722, August.
- Duggan, John, 2017. "Existence of stationary bargaining equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 111-126.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008.
"Reputation And Equilibrium Selection In Games With A Patient Player,"
World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 7, pages 123-142,
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1989. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(4), pages 759-778, July.
- Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 1987. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games With a Patient Player," Working papers 461, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1995. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Levine's Working Paper Archive 103, David K. Levine.
- D. Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1989. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Levine's Working Paper Archive 508, David K. Levine.
- Brown, Alexander L. & Velez, Rodrigo A., 2016.
"The costs and benefits of symmetry in common-ownership allocation problems,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 115-131.
- Alexander L. Brown & Rodrigo A. Velez, 2014. "The costs and benefits of symmetry in common-ownership allocation problems," Working Papers 20140918-001, Texas A&M University, Department of Economics.
- He, Wei & Sun, Yeneng, 2020. "Dynamic games with (almost) perfect information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(2), May.
- A. Garcia, 2004. "Forecast Horizon for a Class of Dynamic Games," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 122(3), pages 471-486, September.
- Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 2008.
"Limit Games and Limit Equilibria,"
World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 2, pages 21-39,
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1986. "Limit games and limit equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 261-279, April.
- Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 1983. "Limit Games and Limit Equilibria," UCLA Economics Working Papers 289, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1986. "Limit Games and Limit Equilibria," Scholarly Articles 3350443, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1986. "Limit Games and Limit Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 220, David K. Levine.
- Michael Ostrovsky, 2012.
"Information Aggregation in Dynamic Markets With Strategic Traders,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(6), pages 2595-2647, November.
- Ostrovsky, Michael, 2009. "Information Aggregation in Dynamic Markets with Strategic Traders," Research Papers 2053, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Per Overgaard, 1992. "Adverse producer incentives and product quality when consumers are short-term players," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 55(2), pages 169-191, June.
- Guilherme Carmona, 2005.
"On Games Of Perfect Information: Equilibria, Ε–Equilibria And Approximation By Simple Games,"
International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 7(04), pages 491-499.
- Guilherme Carmona, 2003. "On games of perfect information: equilibria, e-equilibria and approximation by simple games," Nova SBE Working Paper Series wp427, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Nova School of Business and Economics.
- David K. Levine, 1989.
"Efficiency and the Value of Money,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 56(1), pages 77-88.
- David K. Levine, 1989. "Efficiency and the Value of Money," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2161, David K. Levine.
- Sugaya, Takuo & Wolitzky, Alexander, 2017. "Bounding equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.
- Méder, Zsombor Z. & Flesch, János & Peeters, Ronald, 2017.
"Naiveté and sophistication in dynamic inconsistency,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 40-54.
- Méder, Z.Z. & Flesch, J. & Peeters, R.J.A.P., 2014. "Naiveté and sophistication in dynamic inconsistency," Research Memorandum 005, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
- Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Klaus Ritzberger, 2017. "Characterizing existence of equilibrium for large extensive form games: a necessity result," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 63(2), pages 407-430, February.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008.
"Continuous time limits of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring,"
World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 17, pages 369-388,
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 2007. "Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 10(2), pages 173-192, April.
- Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew, 2007. "Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," Scholarly Articles 3196334, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2007. "Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," Levine's Working Paper Archive 699152000000000028, David K. Levine.
- Eric Bahel, 2018. "Cooperation and Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Global Pollution Problems with Critical Threshold," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 70(2), pages 457-481, June.
- Drew Fudenberg & David M. Kreps & Eric S. Maskin, 1990.
"Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 57(4), pages 555-573.
- Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps & Eric Maskin, 1988. "Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players," Working papers 474, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Maskin, Eric & Kreps, David & Fudenberg, Drew, 1990. "Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players," Scholarly Articles 3226950, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- D. Fudenberg & D. M. Kreps & E. Maskin, 1998. "Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players," Levine's Working Paper Archive 608, David K. Levine.
- Heidhues, Paul & Rady, Sven & Strack, Philipp, 2015.
"Strategic experimentation with private payoffs,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 531-551.
- Heidhues, Paul & Rady, Sven & Strack, Philipp, 2012. "Strategic Experimentation with Private Payoffs," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 387, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Rady, Sven & Heidhues, Paul & Strack, Philipp, 2015. "Strategic Experimentation with Private Payoffs," CEPR Discussion Papers 10634, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- János Flesch & P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Jasmine Maes & Arkadi Predtetchinski, 2021.
"Subgame Maxmin Strategies in Zero-Sum Stochastic Games with Tolerance Levels,"
Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 704-737, December.
- Flesch, Janos & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Maes, Jasmine & Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2018. "Subgame maxmin strategies in zero-sum stochastic games with tolerance levels," Research Memorandum 020, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
- Méder, Z.Z. & Flesch, J. & Peeters, R.J.A.P., 2012. "Optimal choice for finite and infinite horizons," Research Memorandum 024, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Kalai, Ehud & Stanford, William, 1988.
"Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 397-410, March.
- Ehud Kalai & William Stanford, 1986. "Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games," Discussion Papers 679, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Hannu Salonen, 2010. "On the existence of Nash equilibria in large games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 39(3), pages 351-357, July.
- Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2021. "Simple collective equilibria in stopping games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
- Guéron, Yves & Lamadon, Thibaut & Thomas, Caroline D., 2011. "On the folk theorem with one-dimensional payoffs and different discount factors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 287-295, September.
- Anesi, Vincent, 2010.
"Noncooperative foundations of stable sets in voting games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 488-493, November.
- Vincent Anesi, 2007. "Noncooperative Foundations of Stable Sets in Voting Games," Discussion Papers 2007-09, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Vincent Anesi, 2009. "Noncooperative Foundations of Stable Sets in Voting Games," RCER Working Papers 551, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Sandroni, Alvaro, 1998. "Does Rational Learning Lead to Nash Equilibrium in Finitely Repeated Games?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 195-218, January.
- Andreas Blume & April Franco, 2002. "Learning from failure," Staff Report 299, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Mitri Kitti, 2013. "Conditional Markov equilibria in discounted dynamic games," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 78(1), pages 77-100, August.
- Aoyagi, Masaki, 1998. "Mutual Observability and the Convergence of Actions in a Multi-Person Two-Armed Bandit Model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 405-424, October.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1988. "Open and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Dynamic Games With Many Players," Levine's Working Paper Archive 221, David K. Levine.
- Francesco Caruso & Maria Carmela Ceparano & Jacqueline Morgan, 2024.
"Asymptotic behavior of subgame perfect Nash equilibria in Stackelberg games,"
Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 336(3), pages 1573-1590, May.
- Francesco Caruso & Maria Carmela Ceparano & Jacqueline Morgan, 2022. "Asymptotic Behavior of Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria in Stackelberg Games," CSEF Working Papers 661, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
- Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Ritzberger, Klaus, 2017. "Does backwards induction imply subgame perfection?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 19-29.
- Renault, Regis, 2000.
"Privately Observed Time Horizons in Repeated Games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 117-125, October.
- Renault, R., 1997. "Privately Observed Time Horizons in Repeated Games," Papers 97.483, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Valimaki, Juuso, 2006.
"Dynamic price competition,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 127(1), pages 232-263, March.
- Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 2003. "Dynamic Price Competition," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1412, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 2004. "Dynamic Price Competition," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm360, Yale School of Management.
- Weinstein, Jonathan & Yildiz, Muhamet, 2017. "Interim correlated rationalizability in infinite games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 82-87.
- Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Ritzberger, Klaus, 2021.
"Multi-lateral strategic bargaining without stationarity,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(C).
- Alos-Ferrer, Carlos & Ritzberger, Klaus, 2017. "Multi-Lateral Strategic Bargaining Without Stationarity," Economics Series 332, Institute for Advanced Studies.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008.
"An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information,"
World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 14, pages 309-330,
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1991. "An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 26-47, June.
- Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K., 1989. "An Approximative Folk Theorem With Imperfect Private Information," Working papers 525, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine, 1991. "An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 607, David K. Levine.
- Gabriele Gratton & Richard Holden & Barton E Lee, 2022.
"Political Capital [“Formal and Real Authority in Organizations],"
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(3), pages 632-674.
- Gabriele Gratton & Richard Holden & Barton E. Lee, "undated". "Political Capital," Discussion Papers 2019-04, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
- González Pimienta,Carlos & Litan, Cristian M., 2005. "On the equivalence between subgame perfection and sequentiality," UC3M Working papers. Economics we052616, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa.
- William D. Sudderth, 2016. "Finitely Additive Dynamic Programming," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 41(1), pages 92-108, February.
- Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 1997.
"Shaping long-run expectations in problems of coordination,"
European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 783-806, December.
- Fernando Vega Redondo, 1993. "Shaping Long-Run Expectations In Problems Of Coordination," Working Papers. Serie AD 1993-05, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Tava Lennon Olsen & Rodney P. Parker, 2014. "On Markov Equilibria in Dynamic Inventory Competition," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 62(2), pages 332-344, April.
- Rodney P. Parker & Roman Kapuściński, 2011. "Managing a Noncooperative Supply Chain with Limited Capacity," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 59(4), pages 866-881, August.
- Wei He & Yeneng Sun, 2015. "Dynamic Games with Almost Perfect Information," Papers 1503.08900, arXiv.org.
- Pérez-Nievas, Mikel & Conde-Ruiz, José I. & Giménez, Eduardo L., 2019.
"Efficiency and endogenous fertility,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(2), May.
- Mikel Pérez-Nievas & J. Ignacio Conde-Ruiz & Eduardo L. Giménez, 2014. "Efficiency and Endogenous Fertility," Working Papers 2014-10, FEDEA.
- Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Ritzberger, Klaus, 2016. "Equilibrium existence for large perfect information games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 5-18.
- Carlos Pimienta & Cristian Litan, 2008. "Conditions for equivalence between sequentiality and subgame perfection," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 35(3), pages 539-553, June.
- János Flesch & Jeroen Kuipers & Ayala Mashiah-Yaakovi & Gijs Schoenmakers & Eran Shmaya & Eilon Solan & Koos Vrieze, 2014. "Non-existence of subgame-perfect $$\varepsilon $$ ε -equilibrium in perfect information games with infinite horizon," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(4), pages 945-951, November.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008.
"Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed,"
World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 8, pages 143-161,
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1992. "Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(3), pages 561-579.
- Fudenberg, D., 1991. "Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed," Working papers 589, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine, 1999. "Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed," Levine's Working Paper Archive 571, David K. Levine.
- Ji Ang & David Levinson, 2020. "A Review of Game Theory Models of Lane Changing," Working Papers 2022-01, University of Minnesota: Nexus Research Group.
- Vincent Anesi, 2018. "Dynamic Legislative Policy Making under Adverse Selection," Discussion Papers 2018-08, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Velez, Rodrigo A., 2015. "Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 1114-1129.
- Harry Pei, 2020. "Reputation for Playing Mixed Actions: A Characterization Theorem," Papers 2006.16206, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2021.
- Manea, Mihai, 2017. "Bargaining in dynamic markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 59-77.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Jean Tirole, 1985. "Infinite-Horizon Models of Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1098, David K. Levine.
- Levine, David K., 1991.
"Asset trading mechanisms and expansionary policy,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 148-164, June.
- David K. Levine, 1991. "Asset Trading Mechanisms and Expansionary Policy," Levine's Working Paper Archive 43, David K. Levine.
- Roy Lothan & Noa Gutman & Dan Yamin, 2022. "Country versus pharmaceutical company interests for hepatitis C treatment," Health Care Management Science, Springer, vol. 25(4), pages 725-749, December.
- Krishnamurthy Iyer & Ramesh Johari & Ciamac C. Moallemi, 2014. "Information Aggregation and Allocative Efficiency in Smooth Markets," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 60(10), pages 2509-2524, October.
- Jeroen Kuipers & János Flesch & Gijs Schoenmakers & Koos Vrieze, 2021. "Subgame perfection in recursive perfect information games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(2), pages 603-662, March.
- Duvocelle, Benoit & Flesch, János & Staudigl, Mathias & Vermeulen, Dries, 2022.
"A competitive search game with a moving target,"
European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 303(2), pages 945-957.
- Benoit Duvocelle & J'anos Flesch & Mathias Staudigl & Dries Vermeulen, 2020. "A competitive search game with a moving target," Papers 2008.12032, arXiv.org.
- János Flesch & Arkadi Predtetchinski, 2016. "Subgame-Perfect ϵ-Equilibria in Perfect Information Games with Common Preferences at the Limit," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 41(4), pages 1208-1221, November.
- Guilherme Carmona, 2004. "On Games of Perfect Information: Equilibria, epsilon-Equilibria and Approximation by Simple Games," Game Theory and Information 0402002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Kuipers, J. & Flesch, J. & Schoenmakers, G.M. & Vrieze, K., 2008. "Pure subgame-perfect equilibria in free transition games," Research Memorandum 027, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Monte, Daniel, 2016. "Reputation with one-sided monitoring: Ignorance as a commitment device," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 18-21.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Paul Ruud, 1984. "Strike Activity, Wage Settlements and Rationality," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2205, David K. Levine.
- Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 1997. "Efficiency in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 345-361, October.
- Fernando Vega Redondo, 1993. "Industrial Dynamics, Path-Dependence And Technological Change," Working Papers. Serie AD 1993-04, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Marco Celentani & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2008.
"Maintaining A Reputation Against A Long-Lived Opponent,"
World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 9, pages 163-176,
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Celentani, Marco, et al, 1996. "Maintaining a Reputation against a Long-Lived Opponent," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(3), pages 691-704, May.
- Marco Celentani, 1993. "Maintaining a Reputation Against A Long-Lived Opponent," Discussion Papers 1075R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Takahashi, Satoru, 2005. "Infinite horizon common interest games with perfect information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 231-247, November.
- He, Wei & Sun, Yeneng, 2015. "Dynamic Games with Almost Perfect Information," MPRA Paper 63345, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Barton L. Lipman & Ruqu Wang, 2006. "Switching Costs in Infinitely Repeated Games1," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2006-003, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Thomas Brzustowski & Alkis Georgiadis-Harris & Balázs Szentes, 2023. "Smart Contracts and the Coase Conjecture," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 113(5), pages 1334-1359, May.
- Larry Samuelson, 2003. "Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations," Theory workshop papers 505798000000000030, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Li, Yingkai & Pei, Harry, 2021. "Equilibrium behaviors in repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).