Switching Costs in Infinitely Repeated Games1
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References listed on IDEAS
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"Switching Costs in Frequently Repeated Games,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 149-190, August.
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Cited by:
- Lipman, Barton L. & Wang, Ruqu, 2009.
"Switching costs in infinitely repeated games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 292-314, May.
- Barton L. Lipman & Ruqu Wang, 2005. "Switching Costs in Infinitely Repeated Games," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2005-021, Boston University - Department of Economics, revised Jan 2006.
- Barton L. Lipman & Ruqu Wang, 2006. "Switching Costs In Infinitely Repeated Games," Working Paper 1032, Economics Department, Queen's University.
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2006-10-28 (Game Theory)
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