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Information Aggregation and Allocative Efficiency in Smooth Markets

Author

Listed:
  • Krishnamurthy Iyer

    (School of Operations Research and Information Engineering, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14853)

  • Ramesh Johari

    (Department of Management Science and Engineering, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305)

  • Ciamac C. Moallemi

    (Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, New York, New York 10027)

Abstract

Recent years have seen extensive investigation of the information aggregation properties of markets. However, relatively little is known about conditions under which a market will aggregate the private information of rational risk-averse traders who optimize their portfolios over time; in particular, what features of a market encourage traders to ultimately reveal their private information through trades? We consider a market model involving finitely many informed risk-averse traders interacting with a market maker. Our main result identifies a basic asymptotic smoothness condition on prices in the market that ensures information is aggregated as long as portfolios converge; furthermore, under this assumption, the allocation achieved is ex post Pareto efficient. Asymptotic smoothness is fairly mild: it requires that, eventually, infinitesimal purchases or sales should see the same per-unit price. Notably, we demonstrate that, under some mild conditions, algorithmic markets based on cost functions (or, equivalently, markets based on market scoring rules) aggregate the information of traders. This paper was accepted by Brad M. Barber, finance .

Suggested Citation

  • Krishnamurthy Iyer & Ramesh Johari & Ciamac C. Moallemi, 2014. "Information Aggregation and Allocative Efficiency in Smooth Markets," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 60(10), pages 2509-2524, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:60:y:2014:i:10:p:2509-2524
    DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2014.1929
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Lian Jian & Rahul Sami, 2012. "Aggregation and Manipulation in Prediction Markets: Effects of Trading Mechanism and Information Distribution," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 58(1), pages 123-140, January.
    4. Rajiv Sethi & Jennifer Wortman Vaughan, 2016. "Belief Aggregation with Automated Market Makers," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 48(1), pages 155-178, June.
    5. Dian Yu & Jianjun Gao & Weiping Wu & Zizhuo Wang, 2022. "Price Interpretability of Prediction Markets: A Convergence Analysis," Papers 2205.08913, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2023.
    6. Kimon Drakopoulos & Ali Makhdoumi, 2023. "Providing Data Samples for Free," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(6), pages 3536-3560, June.
    7. Mintz, Yonatan & Aswani, Anil & Kaminsky, Philip & Flowers, Elena & Fukuoka, Yoshimi, 2023. "Behavioral analytics for myopic agents," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 310(2), pages 793-811.

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