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Equilibrium existence for large perfect information games

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  • Alós-Ferrer, Carlos
  • Ritzberger, Klaus

Abstract

This paper provides a novel existence theorem for subgame perfect equilibria of potentially large extensive form games with perfect information and continuous preferences, allowing for infinite horizon and infinite action spaces. The approach is based on the properties of the topology on the space of outcomes and differs from all previous approaches in the literature. Furthermore, the existence proof relies on a new algorithm that is independent of the horizon, hence can also be applied to infinite-horizon games.

Suggested Citation

  • Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Ritzberger, Klaus, 2016. "Equilibrium existence for large perfect information games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 5-18.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:62:y:2016:i:c:p:5-18
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.10.005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. J. Jude Kline & Shravan Luckraz, 2016. "Equivalence between graph-based and sequence-based extensive form games," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 4(1), pages 85-94, April.
    3. János Flesch & Arkadi Predtetchinski, 2017. "A Characterization of Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium Plays in Borel Games of Perfect Information," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 42(4), pages 1162-1179, November.
    4. He, Wei & Sun, Yeneng, 2020. "Dynamic games with (almost) perfect information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(2), May.
    5. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Klaus Ritzberger, 2017. "Characterizing existence of equilibrium for large extensive form games: a necessity result," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 63(2), pages 407-430, February.
    6. Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Ritzberger, Klaus, 2017. "Does backwards induction imply subgame perfection?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 19-29.
    7. P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Harold Houba, 2022. "Costless delay in negotiations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 74(1), pages 69-93, July.
    8. Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Ritzberger, Klaus, 2021. "Multi-lateral strategic bargaining without stationarity," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(C).
    9. János Flesch & Arkadi Predtetchinski, 2020. "Parameterized games of perfect information," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 287(2), pages 683-699, April.
    10. Shravan Luckraz, 2019. "A Survey on the Relationship Between the Game of Cops and Robbers and Other Game Representations," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 506-520, June.

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