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Multi-Lateral Strategic Bargaining Without Stationarity

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  • Alos-Ferrer, Carlos

    (Department of Economics, University of Cologne)

  • Ritzberger, Klaus

    (Royal Holloway, University of London)

Abstract

This paper establishes existence of subgame perfect equilibrium for a general class of sequential multi-lateral bargaining games. The only required hypothesis is that utility functions are continuous on the space of economic outcomes. In particular, no assumption on the space of feasible payoffs is needed. The result covers arbitrary and even time-varying bargaining protocols (acceptance rules), arbitrary specifications of patience or impatience (geometric, hyperbolic, or otherwise), externalities, multiple selves, and other-regarding preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Alos-Ferrer, Carlos & Ritzberger, Klaus, 2017. "Multi-Lateral Strategic Bargaining Without Stationarity," Economics Series 332, Institute for Advanced Studies.
    • Handle: RePEc:ihs:ihsesp:332
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    File URL: https://irihs.ihs.ac.at/id/eprint/4333
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

    bargaining; equilibrium existence; infinite-horizon games; subgame perfection;
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