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Insurance, Information, and Individual Action

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Daniel McFadden & Carlos Noton & Pau Olivella, "undated". "Remedies for Sick Insurance," Working Papers 620, Barcelona School of Economics.
  2. Patrick Bajari & Christina Dalton & Han Hong & Ahmed Khwaja, 2014. "Moral hazard, adverse selection, and health expenditures: A semiparametric analysis," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(4), pages 747-763, December.
  3. Hirnle, Christoph, 2005. "Assessing the risk for opportunism in collective IT investment: A principal-agent based framework for use in inter-firm networks," Working Papers 1/2005, University of Munich, Munich School of Management, Institute for Information Systems and New Media.
  4. Kelchen, Robert & Ortagus, Justin & Rosinger, Kelly & Cassell, Alex, 2022. "The effects of state performance funding policies on student loan debt," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
  5. Romuald Elie & Dylan Possamai, 2016. "Contracting theory with competitive interacting agents," Papers 1605.08099, arXiv.org.
  6. Roberto Carlos Klann & Ilse Maria Beuren, 2011. "Characteristics of companies that influence their voluntary disclosure of performance indicators," Brazilian Business Review, Fucape Business School, vol. 8(2), pages 92-113, April.
  7. Cohen Alma, 2006. "The Disadvantages of Aggregate Deductibles," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-28, April.
  8. Thurber, Mark C. & Hults, David R. & Heller, Patrick R.P., 2011. "Exporting the "Norwegian Model": The effect of administrative design on oil sector performance," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(9), pages 5366-5378, September.
  9. Glazer, Amihai & Hassin, Refael, 1998. "Governmental Failures in Evaluating Programs," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(1-2), pages 105-115, January.
  10. J. Eric Bickel, 2006. "Some Determinants of Corporate Risk Aversion," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 3(4), pages 233-251, December.
  11. Benjamin Lorent, 2006. "Raisons fondamentales d'une régulation prudentielle du secteur des assurances," Brussels Economic Review, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles, vol. 49(3), pages 203-244.
  12. Uhr, Daniel & Ziero Uhr, Júlia & Mueller, Bernardo, 2012. "Como as ONGs ambientais influenciam a política ambiental brasileira?," Revista Brasileira de Economia - RBE, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil), vol. 66(1), March.
  13. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1998. "Regulation of a Risk Averse Firm," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 149-173, November.
  14. Holmstrom, Bengt R. & Tirole, Jean, 1989. "The theory of the firm," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 61-133, Elsevier.
  15. Hulisi Öğüt & Srinivasan Raghunathan & Nirup Menon, 2011. "Cyber Security Risk Management: Public Policy Implications of Correlated Risk, Imperfect Ability to Prove Loss, and Observability of Self‐Protection," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 31(3), pages 497-512, March.
  16. Kou, Zonglai & Tang, Yue & Wu, Hong & Zhou, Min, 2023. "Ownership, volatility, and equity incentives: Theory and evidence from listed companies in China," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 128(C).
  17. Stephan Leitner & Friederike Wall, 2021. "Decision-facilitating information in hidden-action setups: an agent-based approach," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 16(2), pages 323-358, April.
  18. Biener, Christian & Eling, Martin & Landmann, Andreas & Pradhan, Shailee, 2018. "Can group incentives alleviate moral hazard? The role of pro-social preferences," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 230-249.
  19. Basov Suren, 2003. "Incentives for Boundedly Rational Agents," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-16, June.
  20. Nicol'as Hern'andez Santib'a~nez & Dylan Possamai & Chao Zhou, 2017. "Bank monitoring incentives under moral hazard and adverse selection," Papers 1701.05864, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2019.
  21. Kenneth Gillingham & Matthew Harding & David Rapson, 2012. "Split Incentives in Residential Energy Consumption," The Energy Journal, , vol. 33(2), pages 37-62, April.
  22. Arnott, Richard & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1986. "Moral hazard and optimal commodity taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 1-24, February.
  23. Stewart, Jay, 1994. "The Welfare Implications of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in Competitive Insurance Markets," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 32(2), pages 193-208, April.
  24. Cohen, Alma & Dehejia, Rajeev, 2004. "The Effect of Automobile Insurance and Accident Liability Laws on Traffic Fatalities," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 47(2), pages 357-393, October.
  25. Dionne, Georges & Harrington, Scott, 2017. "Insurance and Insurance Markets," Working Papers 17-2, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
  26. Röell, Ailsa & Peng, Lin & Tang, Hongfei, 2016. "CEO Incentives: Measurement, Determinants, and Impact on Performance," CEPR Discussion Papers 11417, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  27. Noorderhaven, N.G., 1993. "Trust and transactions : Transaction cost analysis with a differential behavioral assumption," Research Memorandum FEW 590, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  28. Henri Loubergé, 1998. "Risk and Insurance Economics 25 Years After," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 23(4), pages 540-567, October.
  29. Patrick Bajari & Han Hong & Ahmed Khwaja, 2006. "Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection and Health Expenditures: A Semiparametric Analysis," NBER Working Papers 12445, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  30. M. Boyer, 2003. "Contracting under ex post moral hazard and non-commitment," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 8(1), pages 1-38, August.
  31. Nicolás Hernández Santibáñez & Dylan Possamaï & Chao Zhou, 2020. "Bank monitoring incentives under moral hazard and adverse selection," Post-Print hal-01435460, HAL.
  32. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 1982. "Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial Incentives," NBER Chapters, in: The Economics of Information and Uncertainty, pages 107-140, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  33. Lukas, Daniel, 2009. "Efficiency effects of cross-border medical demand," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 15/09, Technische Universität Dresden, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
  34. Cutler, David M. & Zeckhauser, Richard J., 2000. "The anatomy of health insurance," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 11, pages 563-643, Elsevier.
  35. Bender, Klaus & Richter, Andreas, 2002. "Optimales Vertragsdesign bei moralischem Risiko in der Rückversicherung," Working Papers on Risk and Insurance 9, University of Hamburg, Institute for Risk and Insurance.
  36. Cai, Dong & Zhang, Guoxing & Lai, Kee-hung & Guo, Chunxiang & Su, Bin, 2024. "Government incentive contract design for carbon reduction innovation considering market value under asymmetric information," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
  37. Jean-Jacques Laffont, 1987. "Le risque moral dans la relation de mandat," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 38(1), pages 5-24.
  38. Jan Pieter Krahnen, 2005. "Der Handel von Kreditrisiken: Eine neue Dimension des Kapitalmarktes," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 6(4), pages 499-519, November.
  39. M. Martin Boyer, 2004. "Overcompensation as a Partial Solution to Commitment and Renegotiation Problems: The Case of Ex Post Moral Hazard," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 71(4), pages 559-582, December.
  40. Townsend, Robert M., 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 265-293, October.
  41. Rosa Ferrentino & Luca Vota, 2023. "The optimal financing of a conglomerate firm with hidden information and costly state verification," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 23-62, March.
  42. Ross A. Hammond & Robert Axelrod, 2006. "The Evolution of Ethnocentrism," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 50(6), pages 926-936, December.
  43. Sengupta, Reshmi & Rooj, Debasis, 2019. "The effect of health insurance on hospitalization: Identification of adverse selection, moral hazard and the vulnerable population in the Indian healthcare market," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 110-129.
  44. Li, Zhaolin, 2020. "Robust Moral Hazard with Distributional Ambiguity," Working Papers BAWP-2020-03, University of Sydney Business School, Discipline of Business Analytics.
  45. Jung, Jin Yong & Kim, Son Ku, 2015. "Information space conditions for the first-order approach in agency problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 243-279.
  46. Richard Arnott, 1982. "The Structure of Multi-Period Employment Contracts with Incomplete Insurance Markets," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 15(1), pages 51-76, February.
  47. Modibo Camara & Jason Hartline & Aleck Johnsen, 2020. "Mechanisms for a No-Regret Agent: Beyond the Common Prior," Papers 2009.05518, arXiv.org.
  48. Daniel Herold, 2017. "The Impact of Incentive Pay on Corporate Crime," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201752, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  49. Barinova, V. A. (Баринова, В.) & Eremkin, V. A. (Еремкин, В.) & Lanshina, T. A. (Ланьшина, Т.) & Pleskachev, Yuriy Andreevich (Плескачев, Юрий Андреевич), 2016. "Restrictions on the Use of Effective (Incentive) Contracts in the Public Sector and Public Service [Ограничения Применения Эффективных (Стимулирующих) Контрактов В Бюджетном Секторе И На Государств," Working Papers 964, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.
  50. Cowen, Tyler & Glazer, Amihai, 1996. "More monitoring can induce less effort," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 113-123, July.
  51. Xueying Yu, 2016. "Central–local conflicts in China’s environmental policy implementation: the case of the sloping land conversion program," Natural Hazards: Journal of the International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, Springer;International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, vol. 84(1), pages 77-96, November.
  52. Anlauf, Markus & Wigger, Berthold U., 1999. "Health insurance and consumer welfare : The case of monopolistic drug markets," Discussion Papers 565, Institut fuer Volkswirtschaftslehre und Statistik, Abteilung fuer Volkswirtschaftslehre.
  53. M. Martin Boyer, 2001. "Project Financing when the Principal Cannot Commit," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-29, CIRANO.
  54. Peter Zweifel, 2006. "Auftrag und Grenzen der Sozialen Krankenversicherung," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 7(s1), pages 5-26, May.
  55. Ben‐jiang Ma & Jing‐yu Ye & Yuan‐ji Huang & Muhammad Farhan Bashir, 2020. "Research of two‐period insurance contract model with a low compensation period under adverse selection," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 41(3), pages 293-307, April.
  56. repec:fgv:epgrbe:v:66:n:1:a:4 is not listed on IDEAS
  57. Dionne, Georges, 1981. "Le risque moral et la sélection adverse : une revue critique de la littérature," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 57(2), pages 193-224, avril-jui.
  58. Onjewu, Adah-Kole Emmanuel & Walton, Nigel & Koliousis, Ioannis, 2023. "Blockchain agency theory," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
  59. Zuo Quan Xu, 2018. "Pareto optimal moral-hazard-free insurance contracts in behavioral finance framework," Papers 1803.02546, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2021.
  60. Peter Zweifel & Friedrich Breyer, 2012. "The Economics of Social Health Insurance," Chapters, in: Andrew M. Jones (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Health Economics, Second Edition, chapter 12, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  61. Schradin, Heinrich R. & Malik, Alexander, 2008. "Betriebswirtschaftslehre der Versicherung (Versicherungsbetriebslehre)," Mitteilungen 1/2008, University of Cologne, Institute of Insurance Science.
  62. Hermann Donfouet & Pierre-Alexandre Mahieu & Eric Malin, 2013. "Using respondents’ uncertainty scores to mitigate hypothetical bias in community-based health insurance studies," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 14(2), pages 277-285, April.
  63. Zhang, Yijing & Toppinen, Anne & Uusivuori, Jussi, 2014. "Internationalization of the forest products industry: A synthesis of literature and implications for future research," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 8-16.
  64. Yacine Belghitar & Ephraim Clark & Konstantino Kassimatis, 2019. "A measure of total firm performance: new insights for the corporate objective," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 281(1), pages 121-141, October.
  65. Ellis, Randall P. & Jiang, Shenyi & Manning, Willard G., 2015. "Optimal health insurance for multiple goods and time periods," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 89-106.
  66. Innes, Robert, 1986. "Moral Hazard and the Genesis of Farm Debt," CUDARE Working Papers 198349, University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
  67. Noorderhaven, N.G., 1993. "Trust and transactions : Transaction cost analysis with a differential behavioral assumption," Other publications TiSEM 96033acf-767b-49ae-8d46-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  68. Nicolás Hernández Santibáñez & Dylan Possamaï & Chao Zhou, 2017. "Bank monitoring incentives under moral hazard and adverse selection," Working Papers hal-01435460, HAL.
  69. Eduard Marinov, 2016. "The 2016 Nobel Prize in Economics," Economic Thought journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 6, pages 97-149.
  70. Henry Tosi, 2008. "Quo Vadis? Suggestions for future corporate governance research," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 12(2), pages 153-169, May.
  71. Wigger, Berthold U. & Anlauf, Markus, 2002. "Moral Hazard, Market Power, and Second Best Health Insurance," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2002-06, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
  72. Matthias Wrede, 2005. "Health Values, Preference Inconsistency, and Insurance Demand," CESifo Working Paper Series 1634, CESifo.
  73. Blomqvist, Ake, 1997. "Optimal non-linear health insurance," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 303-321, June.
  74. Richard Dusansky & Çağatay Koç, 2010. "Implications of the Interaction Between Insurance Choice and Medical Care Demand," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 77(1), pages 129-144, March.
  75. Simona GRASSI, 2006. "On the characteristics of a mixed system of provision of a private good. An application to health care," Departmental Working Papers 2006-14, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
  76. Leitner, Stephan & Wall, Friederike, 2022. "Micro-level dynamics in hidden action situations with limited information," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 204(C), pages 372-393.
  77. Sakuma, Akimitsu, 1982. "Imperfect Information and Contracts Between Two Firms," Hitotsubashi Journal of commerce and management, Hitotsubashi University, vol. 17(1), pages 25-41, October.
  78. Daniel McFadden, 2009. "The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 13(1), pages 77-100, April.
  79. Chia-Chung Chan & Yung-Ho Chang & Chia-wei Chen & Yuwei Wang, 2019. "Directors’ liability insurance and investment-cash flow sensitivity," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 43(1), pages 27-43, January.
  80. Nguyen Vinh Khuong & Nguyen Thi Lan Huong & Vy Bao Chau & Nguyen Ton Huong Mai & Nguyen Le Cam Thi & Cu Tong Hoai Linh, 2021. "The impact of audit opinion on cost of debt: Evidence from Vietnam," HO CHI MINH CITY OPEN UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF SCIENCE - ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, HO CHI MINH CITY OPEN UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF SCIENCE, HO CHI MINH CITY OPEN UNIVERSITY, vol. 11(1), pages 83-93.
  81. Nell, Martin, 2001. "Managed Claims: Zur Notwendigkeit einer vertikalen Integration von Versicherungs- und Reparaturleistungen," Working Papers on Risk and Insurance 2, University of Hamburg, Institute for Risk and Insurance.
  82. Pepper, Alexander & Gore, Julie, 2015. "Behavioral agency theory: new foundations for theorizing about executive compensation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 47569, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  83. Brahmadev Panda & N. M. Leepsa, 2017. "Agency theory: Review of Theory and Evidence on Problems and Perspectives," Indian Journal of Corporate Governance, , vol. 10(1), pages 74-95, June.
  84. repec:eee:labchp:v:2:y:1986:i:c:p:789-848 is not listed on IDEAS
  85. Astrid Zabel & Karen Pittel & Göran Bostedt & Stefanie Engel, 2011. "Comparing Conventional and New Policy Approaches for Carnivore Conservation: Theoretical Results and Application to Tiger Conservation," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 48(2), pages 287-301, February.
  86. Arnott, Richard, 1987. "Essai sur le risque moral," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 63(2), pages 74-97, juin et s.
  87. repec:bla:jpbect:v:2:y:2000:i:1:p:101-34 is not listed on IDEAS
  88. Chifeng Dai, 2022. "Optimal risk sharing with ex post private information: Rules versus discretion," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 89(1), pages 160-184, July.
  89. Filippo Ferrari, 2014. "Output-Based Agency Relationship and Organizational Justice What Equilibrium Is Possible?," International Journal of Management Sciences, Research Academy of Social Sciences, vol. 3(9), pages 704-717.
  90. Clifford Afoakwah & Joshua Byrnes & Paul Scuffham & Son Nghiem, 2023. "Testing for selection bias and moral hazard in private health insurance: Evidence from a mixed public‐private health system," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 32(1), pages 3-24, January.
  91. Jeffrey M. Lacker, 1991. "Why is there debt?," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, vol. 77(Jul), pages 3-19.
  92. Tomás Lopes Ilídio, 2014. "The information compliance indexes: The illustrative case of income taxes," Contaduría y Administración, Accounting and Management, vol. 59(4), pages 11-37, octubre-d.
  93. Balmaceda, Felipe & Balseiro, Santiago R. & Correa, José R. & Stier-Moses, Nicolás E., 2016. "Bounds on the welfare loss from moral hazard with limited liability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 137-155.
  94. Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1978. "Problems of market adjustments to occupational safety and health hazards," MPRA Paper 7998, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  95. Marks-Bielska, Renata, 2021. "Conditions underlying agricultural land lease in Poland, in the context of the agency theory," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
  96. Mai, Nhat Chi, 2016. "The Influence Of Macroeconomic Announcements Into Vietnamese Stock Market Volatility," OSF Preprints ydmhx, Center for Open Science.
  97. Petr Marek, 2007. "Agency theory and Its Impact on Corporate Finance Theory [Vliv teorie zastoupení na teorii podnikových financí]," Český finanční a účetní časopis, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2007(2), pages 6-16.
  98. Woodard, Joshua D. & Chiu Verteramo, Leslie & Miller, Alyssa P., 2015. "Adaptation of U.S. Agricultural Production to Drought and Climate Change," 2015 AAEA & WAEA Joint Annual Meeting, July 26-28, San Francisco, California 205903, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
  99. Goldman, Eitan & Slezak, Steve L., 2006. "An equilibrium model of incentive contracts in the presence of information manipulation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(3), pages 603-626, June.
  100. Boyer, Martin, 2001. "Les clauses de valeur à neuf sont-elles optimales?," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 77(1), pages 53-74, mars.
  101. Rishi Basak & Sylvia Karlsson‐Vinkhuyzen & Katrien J. A. M. Termeer, 2022. "Information for climate finance accountability regimes: Proposed framework and case study of the Green Climate Fund," Public Administration & Development, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(5), pages 261-280, December.
  102. Sidorenko, Alexandra, 2001. "Stochastic Model of Demand for Medical Care with Endogenous Labour Supply and Health Insurance," Departmental Working Papers 2001-08, The Australian National University, Arndt-Corden Department of Economics.
  103. Goldsmith, Peter D. & Basak, Rishi, 1999. "Environmental Performance Indicators And Executive-Employee Risk Sharing," 1999 Annual meeting, August 8-11, Nashville, TN 21546, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  104. Asheim, Geir B. & Emblem, Anne Wenche & Nilssen, Tore, 2010. "Health insurance: Medical treatment vs disability payment," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 137-145, September.
  105. Lipszyc, Barbara & Marchand, Maurice, 1999. "Assurance-maladie : comment adapter les taux de remboursement aux dépenses individuelles de santé?," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 75(1), pages 447-473, mars-juin.
  106. Nie, Georege Yulin, 2023. "Address Challenges Markowitz (1952) Faces: A New Measure of Asset Risk," SocArXiv tgvb2, Center for Open Science.
  107. Saromi Newton & Sahayaselvi Susainathan & Hesil Jerda George & Majdi Quttainah & Satyanarayana Parayitam, 2024. "Top Management Commitment as a Moderator in the Relationship Between Green Banking Adoption Practices and Performance: Evidence from India," Indian Journal of Corporate Governance, , vol. 17(1), pages 33-62, June.
  108. Luis Almeida Costa & Joao Amaro de Matos, 2000. "Afinity, animosity and organizational design," Nova SBE Working Paper Series wp372, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Nova School of Business and Economics.
  109. Khosa,Amrinder & Ahmed,Kamran & Henry,Darren, 2019. "Ownership Structure, Related Party Transactions, and Firm Valuation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108492195, January.
  110. Hans-Werner Sinn, 1996. "The Principle and Market Failure in Systems Competition," NBER Working Papers 5411, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  111. Monica Haynes & Christopher R. McIntosh & Tommy Olafson, 2024. "Is the split incentive problem worse for college student renters: an analysis of landlord self-reported and hypothetical choices?," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 26(4), pages 781-802, October.
  112. J François Outreville, 2010. "The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review 2009: In Quest of Behavioural Insurance," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 35(3), pages 484-497, July.
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