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Como as ONGs ambientais influenciam a política ambiental brasileira?

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  • Uhr, Daniel
  • Ziero Uhr, Júlia
  • Mueller, Bernardo

Abstract

Examinamos como as ONGs ambientais, mesmo com recursos escassos (votos e contribuições financeiras), conseguem influenciar de forma efetiva a política ambiental no Brasil. A inovação do trabalho consiste em utilizar a abordagem de agência comum e suas aplicações em economia política para modelar a ação ambientalista no Brasil. O principal resultado teórico é que as ONGs ambientais afetam a política ambiental através da informação, revelando aos eleitores informações a respeito da ação do governo. Os principais resultados empíricos são a mensuração do impacto dos produtores rurais, das ONGs ambientais e da mídia sobre a política ambiental no Brasil.

Suggested Citation

  • Uhr, Daniel & Ziero Uhr, Júlia & Mueller, Bernardo, 2012. "Como as ONGs ambientais influenciam a política ambiental brasileira?," Revista Brasileira de Economia - RBE, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil), vol. 66(1), March.
  • Handle: RePEc:fgv:epgrbe:v:66:y:2012:i:1:a:3043
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