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Conditions underlying agricultural land lease in Poland, in the context of the agency theory

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  • Marks-Bielska, Renata

Abstract

Research into the land owner-lessee relationship is among the oldest and classic examples of analyses made by economists into agency relationships, the fact that has encouraged the author to carry out this empirical study among agricultural land lessees in Poland (227 agricultural producers who lease farmland). The objective was to gain the knowledge of how this form of land use and farmland management was perceived by lessees. The research results were enriched with an analysis of the data from public statistics and an overview of the most important legal acts creating the institutional framework for land use in the form of lease in Poland. The survey addressed to lessees of farmland from the Agricultural Property Stock of the State Treasury confirmed that there is information asymmetry between the principal (the National Support Centre for Agriculture) and the agent (the lessee), including the knowledge of such facts as the application of agronomic treatments on leased land or volumes of harvested yields.

Suggested Citation

  • Marks-Bielska, Renata, 2021. "Conditions underlying agricultural land lease in Poland, in the context of the agency theory," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:lauspo:v:102:y:2021:i:c:s0264837720325898
    DOI: 10.1016/j.landusepol.2020.105251
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Bradfield, Tracy & Butler, Robert & Dillon, Emma J. & Hennessy, Thia & Loughrey, Jason, 2023. "The impact of long-term land leases on farm investment: Evidence from the Irish dairy sector," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 126(C).
    2. Lijing Zhang & Mingyong Hong & Xiaolin Guo & Wenrong Qian, 2022. "How Does Land Rental Affect Agricultural Labor Productivity? An Empirical Study in Rural China," Land, MDPI, vol. 11(5), pages 1-19, April.
    3. Kowalczyk, Cezary & Źróbek-Różańska, Alina & Źróbek, Sabina & Kryszk, Hubert, 2021. "How does government legal intervention affect the process of transformation of state-owned agricultural land? The research methods and their practical application," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
    4. Hubert Kryszk & Krystyna Kurowska & Renata Marks-Bielska, 2022. "Legal and Socio-Economic Conditions Underlying the Shaping of the Agricultural System in Poland," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(20), pages 1-19, October.
    5. Xiang Li & Hyukku Lee, 2022. "An Analysis on the Determining Factors of Farmers’ Land-Scale Management: Empirical Analysis Based on the Micro-Perspective of Farmers in China," Land, MDPI, vol. 11(8), pages 1-15, August.
    6. Hongkun Ma & Hao Zhu & Shuhan Ren & Rudi Liu & Cuixia Qiao, 2023. "The Impact of Government-Led Farmland Construction on Market-Oriented Farmland Transfer—Evidence from Shandong, China," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 20(4), pages 1-12, February.

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