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The Economics of Social Health Insurance

In: The Elgar Companion to Health Economics

Author

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  • Peter Zweifel
  • Friedrich Breyer

Abstract

The aim of The Elgar Companion to Health Economics is to take an audience of advanced undergraduates, postgraduates and researchers to the frontier of research in health economics, by providing them with short and easily readable introductions to key topics. The volume brings together 50 chapters written by more than 90 leading international contributors. The contributions to the Companion are concise and focus on specific concepts, methods and key evidence.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Zweifel & Friedrich Breyer, 2006. "The Economics of Social Health Insurance," Chapters, in: Andrew M. Jones (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Health Economics, chapter 12, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:3572_12
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    7. Hindriks, Jean & De Donder, Philippe, 2003. "The politics of redistributive social insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2639-2660, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Galina Besstremyannaya & Jaak Simm, 2014. "Multi-payer health insurance systems in Central and Eastern Europe: lessons from the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Russia," Working Papers w0203, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
    2. McLean, Karen & Hiscock, Harriet & Goldfeld, Sharon, 2022. "Timeliness and extent of health service use by Victorian (Australian) children within first year after entry to out-of-home care: Retrospective data linkage cohort study," Children and Youth Services Review, Elsevier, vol. 134(C).
    3. Galina Besstremyannaya, 2014. "Urban inequity in the performance of social health insurance system: evidence from Russian regions," Working Papers w0204, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
    4. Galina Besstremyannaya & Jaak Simm, 2014. "Multi-payer health insurance systems in Central and Eastern Europe: lessons from the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Russia," Working Papers w0203, New Economic School (NES).
    5. Besstremyannaya, Galina, 2017. "Measuring income equity in the demand for healthcare with finite mixture models," Applied Econometrics, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), vol. 46, pages 5-29.
    6. Galina Besstremyannaya, 2012. "Estimating income equity in social health insurance system," Working Papers w0172, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).

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