IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/annopr/v281y2019i1d10.1007_s10479-018-2983-z.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A measure of total firm performance: new insights for the corporate objective

Author

Listed:
  • Yacine Belghitar

    (Cranfield University)

  • Ephraim Clark

    (Middlesex University Business School)

  • Konstantino Kassimatis

    (Athens University of Economics and Business)

Abstract

Because heterogenous and unknown shareholder utility functions make it difficult to define a corporate objective common to all shareholders based on utility, the traditional theory of the firm concentrates on wealth maximization as the main measure of performance. Using the concept of ranked marginal utility, we develop a multi-dimensional measure of firm performance (TPM) that reflects the preferences of all risk averse shareholders towards all aspects of risk. We verify empirically that this is, in fact, the case for the first four moments of a large sample of US stocks over the period 2002–2010. Then, using the manager/shareholder agency conflict as the analytical framework, we show that TPM is a reliable, multi-dimensional performance measure and that one dimensional performance measures, such as mean returns, volatility or Tobin’s Q can lead to erroneous inference. By including shareholder preferences towards risk in the measure of firm performance as the corporate objective, we bring together the corporate finance literature and the literature on portfolio investment theory and practice.

Suggested Citation

  • Yacine Belghitar & Ephraim Clark & Konstantino Kassimatis, 2019. "A measure of total firm performance: new insights for the corporate objective," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 281(1), pages 121-141, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:annopr:v:281:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s10479-018-2983-z
    DOI: 10.1007/s10479-018-2983-z
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10479-018-2983-z
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10479-018-2983-z?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Olga Gorbachev, 2011. "Did Household Consumption Become More Volatile?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(5), pages 2248-2270, August.
    2. Ephraim Clark & Konstantinos Kassimatis, 2013. "International equity flows, marginal conditional stochastic dominance and diversification," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 251-271, February.
    3. Clark, Ephraim & Jokung, Octave & Kassimatis, Konstantinos, 2011. "Making inefficient market indices efficient," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 209(1), pages 83-93, February.
    4. Anant K. Sundaram & Andrew C. Inkpen, 2004. "The Corporate Objective Revisited," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 15(3), pages 350-363, June.
    5. Guest, Paul M., 2008. "The determinants of board size and composition: Evidence from the UK," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 51-72, February.
    6. Kenneth Shaw, 2012. "CEO incentives and the cost of debt," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 323-346, April.
    7. Liu, Yixin & Mauer, David C., 2011. "Corporate cash holdings and CEO compensation incentives," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 183-198, October.
    8. McConnell, John J. & Servaes, Henri, 1990. "Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 595-612, October.
    9. Demsetz, Harold & Lehn, Kenneth, 1985. "The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(6), pages 1155-1177, December.
    10. Short, Helen & Keasey, Kevin, 1999. "Managerial ownership and the performance of firms: Evidence from the UK," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 79-101, March.
    11. Viral V. Acharya & Alberto Bisin, 2009. "Managerial hedging, equity ownership, and firm value," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(1), pages 47-77, March.
    12. Stephen Bond, 2002. "Dynamic panel data models: a guide to microdata methods and practice," CeMMAP working papers CWP09/02, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    13. Florackis, Chrisostomos & Kostakis, Alexandros & Ozkan, Aydin, 2009. "Managerial ownership and performance," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 62(12), pages 1350-1357, December.
    14. Post, Thierry & van Vliet, Pim & Levy, Haim, 2008. "Risk aversion and skewness preference," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(7), pages 1178-1187, July.
    15. Fang, Hsing & Lai, Tsong-Yue, 1997. "Co-Kurtosis and Capital Asset Pricing," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 32(2), pages 293-307, May.
    16. Demsetz, Harold & Villalonga, Belen, 2001. "Ownership structure and corporate performance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 209-233, September.
    17. Steen Thomsen & Torben Pedersen, 2000. "Ownership structure and economic performance in the largest european companies," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(6), pages 689-705, June.
    18. Alberto de Miguel & Julio Pindado & Chabela de la Torre, 2004. "Ownership structure and firm value: new evidence from Spain," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(12), pages 1199-1207, December.
    19. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-795, December.
    20. Jean Helwege & Christo Pirinsky & René M. Stulz, 2007. "Why Do Firms Become Widely Held? An Analysis of the Dynamics of Corporate Ownership," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(3), pages 995-1028, June.
    21. Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger & Stulz, René M., 2009. "Managerial ownership dynamics and firm value," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3), pages 342-361, June.
    22. Clifford G. Holderness & Randall S. Kroszner & Dennis P. Sheehan, 1999. "Were the Good Old Days That Good? Changes in Managerial Stock Ownership Since the Great Depression," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(2), pages 435-469, April.
    23. Demsetz, Harold, 1983. "The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 375-390, June.
    24. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 1991. "The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 20(4), Winter.
    25. Anant K. Sundaram & Andrew C. Inkpen, 2004. "Stakeholder Theory and “The Corporate Objective Revisited”: A Reply," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 15(3), pages 370-371, June.
    26. Kraus, Alan & Litzenberger, Robert H, 1976. "Skewness Preference and the Valuation of Risk Assets," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 31(4), pages 1085-1100, September.
    27. Arellano, Manuel & Bover, Olympia, 1995. "Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-components models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 29-51, July.
    28. David J. Denis & Diane K. Denis & Atulya Sarin, 1999. "Agency theory and the influence of equity ownership structure on corporate diversification strategies," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(11), pages 1071-1076, November.
    29. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1974. "Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 41(2), pages 219-255.
    30. John E. Core & Wayne R. Guay & David F. Larcker, 2003. "Executive equity compensation and incentives: a survey," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 9(Apr), pages 27-50.
    31. Ulf Von Lilienfeld-Toal & Stefan Ruenzi, 2014. "CEO Ownership, Stock Market Performance, and Managerial Discretion," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 69(3), pages 1013-1050, June.
    32. Saeyoung Chang & Eric Mais & Michael Sullivan, 2013. "The effect of target managerial ownership on the choice of acquisition financing and CEO job retention," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 423-442, April.
    33. Stulz, ReneM., 1988. "Managerial control of voting rights : Financing policies and the market for corporate control," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 25-54, January.
    34. Berger, Philip G & Ofek, Eli & Yermack, David L, 1997. "Managerial Entrenchment and Capital Structure Decisions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(4), pages 1411-1438, September.
    35. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    36. K. Victor Chow, 2001. "Marginal Conditional Stochastic Dominance, Statistical Inference, And Measuring Portfolio Performance," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 24(2), pages 289-307, June.
    37. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation," Scholarly Articles 29407535, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    38. Stephen R. Bond, 2002. "Dynamic panel data models: a guide to micro data methods and practice," Portuguese Economic Journal, Springer;Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestao, vol. 1(2), pages 141-162, August.
    39. Blundell, Richard & Bond, Stephen, 1998. "Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 115-143, August.
    40. Spence, Michael & Zeckhauser, Richard, 1971. "Insurance, Information, and Individual Action," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(2), pages 380-387, May.
    41. Mitchell A. Petersen, 2009. "Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing Approaches," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(1), pages 435-480, January.
    42. Davies, J.R. & Hillier, David & McColgan, Patrick, 2005. "Ownership structure, managerial behavior and corporate value," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 645-660, September.
    43. Ross, Stephen A, 1973. "The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 134-139, May.
    44. James A. Bennett, 2003. "Greener Pastures and the Impact of Dynamic Institutional Preferences," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 16(4), pages 1203-1238.
    45. Cheung, W.K. Adrian & Wei, K.C. John, 2006. "Insider ownership and corporate performance: Evidence from the adjustment cost approach," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(5), pages 906-925, December.
    46. Robert F. Dittmar, 2002. "Nonlinear Pricing Kernels, Kurtosis Preference, and Evidence from the Cross Section of Equity Returns," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(1), pages 369-403, February.
    47. R. Edward Freeman & Andrew C. Wicks & Bidhan Parmar, 2004. "Stakeholder Theory and “The Corporate Objective Revisited”," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 15(3), pages 364-369, June.
    48. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-325, June.
    49. Coles, Jeffrey L. & Daniel, Naveen D. & Naveen, Lalitha, 2006. "Managerial incentives and risk-taking," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 431-468, February.
    50. Aggarwal, Rajesh K. & Samwick, Andrew A., 2006. "Empire-builders and shirkers: Investment, firm performance, and managerial incentives," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 489-515, June.
    51. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation : An empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 293-315, January.
    52. Belghitar, Yacine & Clark, Ephraim & Kassimatis, Konstantino, 2011. "The prudential effect of strategic institutional ownership on stock performance," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 191-199, August.
    53. Haim Shalit & Shlomo Yitzhaki, 1994. "Marginal Conditional Stochastic Dominance," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 40(5), pages 670-684, May.
    54. Paul Brockman & Xiumin Martin & Emre Unlu, 2010. "Executive Compensation and the Maturity Structure of Corporate Debt," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 65(3), pages 1123-1161, June.
    55. Chen, Carl R & Steiner, Thomas L, 1999. "Managerial Ownership and Agency Conflicts: A Nonlinear Simultaneous Equation Analysis of Managerial Ownership, Risk Taking, Debt Policy, and Dividend Policy," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 34(1), pages 119-136, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Lu Tang & Shihan Zhang & Chenhui Ding & Jinyao Huan, 2022. "How Can the Sustainable Motivational Effect of Equity Incentives on Corporate Performance Be Exploited?—A Study Based on the Moderating Effect of Aspiration Level," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(24), pages 1-17, December.
    2. Cave, Joshua & Chaudhuri, Kausik & Kumbhakar, Subal C., 2023. "Dynamic firm performance and estimator choice: A comparison of dynamic panel data estimators," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 307(1), pages 447-467.
    3. Takuriramunashe Famba & Lloyd Chiriseri & Grace Chituku-Dzimiro & Ophias Kurauone, 2024. "Two-tier corporate board structure, corporate governance reforms and financial performance of firms listed on the China stock market," SN Business & Economics, Springer, vol. 4(11), pages 1-32, November.
    4. Victor Dragotă & Camelia Delcea, 2019. "How Long Does It Last to Systematically Make Bad Decisions? An Agent-Based Application for Dividend Policy," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 12(4), pages 1-34, November.
    5. Yusheng Kong & Takuriramunashe Famba & Grace Chituku-Dzimiro & Huaping Sun & Ophias Kurauone, 2020. "Corporate Governance Mechanisms, Ownership and Firm Value: Evidence from Listed Chinese Firms," IJFS, MDPI, vol. 8(2), pages 1-26, April.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Lai Trung Hoang & Cuong Cao Nguyen & Baiding Hu, 2017. "Ownership Structure and Firm Performance Improvement: Does it Matter in the Vietnamese Stock Market?," Economic Papers, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 36(4), pages 416-428, December.
    2. Georgeta Vintila & Stefan Cristian Gherghina, 2014. "Insider Ownership and the Value of the Bucharest Stock Exchange Listed Companies: Convergence-of-Interest or Entrenchment Effect?," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 4(1), pages 183-195.
    3. Roberto Mura, 2007. "Firm Performance: Do Non‐Executive Directors Have Minds of their Own? Evidence from UK Panel Data," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 36(3), pages 81-112, September.
    4. James, Hui & Benson, Bradley W. & Wu, Chen (Ken), 2017. "Does CEO ownership affect payout policy? Evidence from using CEO scaled wealth-performance sensitivity," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 328-345.
    5. Bradley W. Benson & Wallace N. Davidson III & Hongxia Wang & Dan L. Worrell, 2011. "Deviations from Expected Stakeholder Management, Firm Value, and Corporate Governance," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 40(1), pages 39-81, March.
    6. Mai, Nhat Chi, 2017. "Ownership concentration, state ownership and firm performance: Empirical evidence from the Vietnamese stock market," OSF Preprints zgvsw, Center for Open Science.
    7. Benson, Bradley W. & Chen, Yu & James, Hui L. & Park, Jung Chul, 2020. "So far away from me: Firm location and the managerial ownership effect on firm value," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    8. Stavros E. Arvanitis & Theodoros V. Stamatopoulos & Dimitris Terzakis, 2018. "Is There a Non-linear Relationship of Market Value with Cash and Ownership?," SPOUDAI Journal of Economics and Business, SPOUDAI Journal of Economics and Business, University of Piraeus, vol. 68(1), pages 3-25, January-M.
    9. Florackis, Chrisostomos & Kostakis, Alexandros & Ozkan, Aydin, 2009. "Managerial ownership and performance," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 62(12), pages 1350-1357, December.
    10. Weiß, Christian, 2010. "The Ownership Concentration of Firms: Three Essays on the Determinants and Effects," EconStor Theses, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, number 30247, June.
    11. Benson, Bradley W. & Davidson III, Wallace N., 2009. "Reexamining the managerial ownership effect on firm value," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(5), pages 573-586, December.
    12. Zeineb Barka & Taher Hamza, 2020. "The effect of large controlling shareholders on equity prices in France: monitoring or entrenchment?," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 24(3), pages 769-798, September.
    13. Fabisik, Kornelia & Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger & Stulz, René M. & Taillard, Jérôme P., 2021. "Why are firms with more managerial ownership worth less?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 140(3), pages 699-725.
    14. Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger & Stulz, René M., 2009. "Managerial ownership dynamics and firm value," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3), pages 342-361, June.
    15. Collins G. Ntim, 2012. "Director shareownership and corporate performance in South Africa," African Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 1(4), pages 359-373.
    16. Arifur Khan & Paul Mather & Balasingham Balachandran, 2014. "Managerial share ownership and operating performance: Do independent and executive directors have different incentives?," Australian Journal of Management, Australian School of Business, vol. 39(1), pages 47-71, February.
    17. Chrisostomos Florackis & Aydin Ozkan, 2009. "The Impact of Managerial Entrenchment on Agency Costs: An Empirical Investigation Using UK Panel Data," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 15(3), pages 497-528, June.
    18. Hussein Abedi Shamsabadi & Byung-Seong Min & Richard Chung, 2016. "Corporate governance and dividend strategy: lessons from Australia," International Journal of Managerial Finance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 12(5), pages 583-610, October.
    19. Sylvain Marsat & Yves Mard & Fabien Roux, 2014. "Ownership structure and corporate financial performance: evidence from France [Structure de l’actionnariat et performance financière de l’entreprise : le cas français]," Post-Print hal-02156607, HAL.
    20. Nam Hoai Tran & Chi Dat Le, 2022. "Ownership concentration and firm valuation in a typical frontier market," Afro-Asian Journal of Finance and Accounting, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 12(4), pages 427-454.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:annopr:v:281:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s10479-018-2983-z. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.