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Environmental Performance Indicators And Executive-Employee Risk Sharing

Author

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  • Goldsmith, Peter D.
  • Basak, Rishi

Abstract

A principal-agent approach is used to address issues of environmental risk sharing within a firm. The principal (top management), fearing penalties for environmental damages, wants to avoid environmental harm and induce the agent (employee manipulating hazardous materials) to take appropriate actions to achieve due diligence.

Suggested Citation

  • Goldsmith, Peter D. & Basak, Rishi, 1999. "Environmental Performance Indicators And Executive-Employee Risk Sharing," 1999 Annual meeting, August 8-11, Nashville, TN 21546, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea99:21546
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.21546
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rogerson, William P, 1985. "The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1357-1367, November.
    2. Hueth, Brent & Ligon, Ethan, 1998. "Quality Measurement And Risk-Sharing In Contracts For California Fruits And Vegetables," 1998 Annual meeting, August 2-5, Salt Lake City, UT 20957, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    3. Sinclair-Desgagne, Bernard & Gabel, H. Landis, 1997. "Environmental Auditing in Management Systems and Public Policy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 331-346, July.
    4. Singh, Nirvikar, 1985. "Monitoring and Hierarchies: The Marginal Value of Information in a Principal-Agent Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 599-609, June.
    5. Gabel H. Landis & Sinclair-Desgagne Bernard, 1993. "Managerial Incentives and Environmental Compliance," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 229-240, May.
    6. Jewitt, Ian, 1988. "Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1177-1190, September.
    7. Peter Goldsmith & Rishi Basak, 1999. "Environmental Management Systems and Executive-Employee Risk Sharing," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie, vol. 47(4), pages 474-474, December.
    8. Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring.
    9. Rollins, Kimberly & Briggs, Hugh III, 1996. "Moral Hazard, Externalities, and Compensation for Crop Damages from Wildlife," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 368-386, November.
    10. Spence, Michael & Zeckhauser, Richard, 1971. "Insurance, Information, and Individual Action," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(2), pages 380-387, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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