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Asymmetric information in external versus internal promotions

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  • Bossler, Mario

    (Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Nuremberg, Germany)

  • Grunau, Philipp

    (Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Nuremberg, Germany)

Abstract

"Individuals have two possible channels through which to obtain a managerial position: external and internal promotions. Employing the revised German Employment Register, we compare external and internal promotions by using multinomial logit regressions while accounting for workplace heterogeneity. Individual characteristics are hypothesized to exert differential effects because of their observability within and across workplaces. We find that actual working hours are a more important source of information for internal versus external promotions. By contrast, formal vocational degrees and initial job task complexity, which are also externally observed, are a relatively more important signal for external promotions. Consistent with statistical discrimination, women and foreigners face a more pronounced disadvantage in external promotions. For women, this differential effect is fully driven by promotions to executive positions characterized by high task complexity. Moreover, actual working hours show a strong positive interaction effect on women's prospects of promotion." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

Suggested Citation

  • Bossler, Mario & Grunau, Philipp, 2016. "Asymmetric information in external versus internal promotions," IAB-Discussion Paper 201611, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany].
  • Handle: RePEc:iab:iabdpa:201611
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    Cited by:

    1. Naoki Mitani & Akira Wakisaka & Atsushi Morimoto, 2017. "Why Women’s Share among Managers Is So Low in Japan: A Statistical Fallacy or A Shadow of the Employment System?," International Journal of Economic Policy Studies, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 42-68, January.
    2. Mario Bossler & Alexander Mosthaf & Thorsten Schank, 2016. "More Female Manager Hires through More Female Managers? Evidence from Germany," Working Papers 1618, Gutenberg School of Management and Economics, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bundesrepublik Deutschland ; Ausländer ; Beförderung ; berufliche Qualifikation ; beruflicher Aufstieg ; Berufsnachwuchs ; Beschäftigtenstatistik ; Determinanten ; Entscheidungsfindung ; Frauen ; Führungskräfte ; interner Arbeitsmarkt ; Personalauswahl ; Tätigkeitsmerkmale ; zwischenbetriebliche Mobilität ; Arbeitszeit;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • J70 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - General
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
    • M51 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions

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