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Age and Opportunities for Promotion

Author

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  • Machado, C. Sofia

    (Instituto Politécnico do Cávado e do Ave)

  • Portela, Miguel

    (University of Minho)

Abstract

Using a panel of new firms and their employees, this paper studies the promotion opportunities for older workers within the same firm. Survival analysis suggests that younger employees experience shorter times to promotion than older workers and, therefore, the latter face a smaller likelihood of promotion. Although men are promoted more often than women, empirical results show that women have shorter survival times to promotion than men. Also, previous promotions are stronger determinants of subsequent ones and this finding provides support to the evidence on promotion "fast-tracks".

Suggested Citation

  • Machado, C. Sofia & Portela, Miguel, 2013. "Age and Opportunities for Promotion," IZA Discussion Papers 7784, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7784
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    aging; older workers; employment relationships; promotion;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J14 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of the Elderly; Economics of the Handicapped; Non-Labor Market Discrimination
    • J21 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • J62 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Job, Occupational and Intergenerational Mobility; Promotion

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