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Déréglementer la profession d’avocat ? Les apories de l’analyse économique

Author

Listed:
  • Camille Chaserant

    (EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Sophie Harnay

    (EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Cet article présente, de manière critique, les analyses économiques de la réglementation de la profession d'avocat s'inscrivant dans le débat, plus large, sur la libéralisation des professions réglementées en Europe. Issues de l'économie publique et de l'économie industrielle les plus standards, ces analyses s'avèrent datées. Elles n'apportent alors aucune originalité par rapport aux travaux sur la déréglementation des marchés des biens plus traditionnels et s'avèrent sans portée pratique réelle. Elles conduisent à des recommandations théoriques antithétiques que le recours à l'empirie ne permet pas, à l'heure actuelle, de départager. Surtout, l'accent exclusif sur l'alternative déréglementer / maintenir la réglementation occulte la question préalable de l'identité de l'autorité en charge de la réglementation : la profession doit-elle être auto- ou hétéro-régulée ?

Suggested Citation

  • Camille Chaserant & Sophie Harnay, 2010. "Déréglementer la profession d’avocat ? Les apories de l’analyse économique," Working Papers hal-04140922, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-04140922
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04140922
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