The Courts and the Market: An Economic Analysis of Contingent Fees in Class-Action Litigation
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1086/467851
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Winand Emons & Nuno Garoupa, 2006. "US-style contingent fees and UK-style conditional fees: agency problems and the supply of legal services," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(5), pages 379-385.
- Winand Emons & Nuno Garoupa, 2004.
"The Economics of US-style Contingent Fees and UK-style Conditional Fees,"
Diskussionsschriften
dp0407, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Emons, Winand & Garoupa, Nuno, 2004. "The Economics of US-Style Contingent Fees and UK-Style Conditional Fees," CEPR Discussion Papers 4473, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Chopard, Bertrand & Cortade, Thomas & Langlais, Eric, 2010.
"Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties,"
International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 18-27, March.
- Bertrand Chopard & Thomas Cortade & Eric Langlais, 2008. "Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties," Cahiers du CEREFIGE 0810, CEREFIGE (Centre Europeen de Recherche en Economie Financiere et Gestion des Entreprises), Universite de Lorraine, revised 2008.
- Bertrand Chopard & Thomas Cortade & Eric Langlais, 2008. "Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties," EconomiX Working Papers 2008-32, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
- Thomas Cortade & Bertrand Chopard & Eric Langlais, 2010. "Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties," Post-Print hal-01815022, HAL.
- Chopard, Bertrand & Cortade, Thomas & Langlais, Eric, 2008. "Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties," MPRA Paper 8995, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Bertrand Chopard & Thomas Cortade & Eric Langlais, 2008. "Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties," Working Papers hal-04140723, HAL.
- Emons, Winand & Fluet, Claude, 2016.
"Why plaintiffs’ attorneys use contingent and defense attorneys fixed fee contracts,"
International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 16-23.
- Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2013. "Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts," Cahiers de recherche 1338, CIRPEE.
- Winand Emons & Claude Fluet, 2013. "Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts," Diskussionsschriften dp1306, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Emons, Winand & Fluet, Claude, 2013. "Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 9727, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Bruno Deffains & Eric Langlais, 2011.
"Informational externalities and settlements in mass tort litigations,"
European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 241-262, October.
- Deffains, Bruno & Langlais, Eric, 2010. "Informational Externalities and Settlements in Mass Tort Litigations," MPRA Paper 23016, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Bruno Deffains & Eric Langlais, 2011. "Informational Externalities and Settlements in Mass Tort Litigations," Working Papers hal-04141000, HAL.
- Bruno Deffains & Eric Langlais, 2011. "Informational Externalities and Settlements in Mass Tort Litigations," EconomiX Working Papers 2011-14, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
- Winand Emons, 2007.
"Conditional versus contingent fees,"
Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(1), pages 89-101, January.
- Winand Emons, 2004. "Conditional versus Contingent Fees," Diskussionsschriften dp0409, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Emons, Winand, 2004. "Conditional versus Contingent Fees," CEPR Discussion Papers 4532, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Frank H. Stephen, 2013. "Lawyers, Markets and Regulation," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 14803.
- Camille Chaserant & Sophie Harnay, 2010. "Déréglementer la profession d’avocat ? Les apories de l’analyse économique," Working Papers hal-04140922, HAL.
- Camille Chaserant & Sophie Harnay, 2013.
"The regulation of quality in the market for legal services: Taking the heterogeneity of legal services seriously,"
European Journal of Comparative Economics, Cattaneo University (LIUC), vol. 10(2), pages 267-291, August.
- Camille Chaserant & Sophie Harnay, 2013. "The regulation of quality in the market for legal services: Taking the heterogeneity of legal services seriously," Post-Print hal-01271355, HAL.
- Deffains, Bruno & Langlais, Eric, 2007. "Informational externalities and informational sharing in class action suits," MPRA Paper 4846, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Nuno Garoupa & Fernando Gómez, 2002. "Cashing by the hour: Why large law firms prefer hourly fees over contingent fees," Economics Working Papers 639, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Hans-Bernd Schaefer, 2000. "The Bundling of Similar Interests in Litigation. The Incentives for Class Action and Legal Actions taken by Associations," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 183-213, May.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:19:y:1990:i:1:p:247-60. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Journals Division (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLS .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.