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Regulation Of Liberal Professions And Competition Policy: Developments In The Eu And China

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  • Niels J. Philipsen

Abstract

The regulation of professional services has been high on the political agenda for years now in Europe. This paper points out the methods of working and the strategies used by the European Commission (Directorate General for Competition) and various national competition authorities to promote deregulation of the professions throughout the European Union. Central to this discussion are the so-called public interest and private interest approaches to regulation. On the one hand, the European Commission seems to have been influenced by developments in particular Member States (bottom-up effects), whereas on the other hand, there have been top-down effects in recent years, at least in some Member States. The European experience is used to study the recent developments in China, and in particular the regulation of lawyers. I find that the argument of information asymmetry may have more relevance in China than in Europe. In addition, the fact that liability rules may not yet be a good alternative for (or supplement to) quality regulation may also make a stronger case for regulation in China. However, economic theory and European practice have taught us that there is a general risk of disproportional regulation.

Suggested Citation

  • Niels J. Philipsen, 2010. "Regulation Of Liberal Professions And Competition Policy: Developments In The Eu And China," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(2), pages 203-231.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:jcomle:v:6:y:2010:i:2:p:203-231.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/joclec/nhp009
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Thomas Eger & Michael Faure & Zhang Naigen (ed.), 2007. "Economic Analysis of Law in China," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 12554.
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    Cited by:

    1. Marco Alderighi & Claudio A. Piga, 2014. "Selection, Heterogeneity, and Entry in Professional Markets," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(4), pages 925-951, December.
    2. Mel Marquis, 2013. "Abuse of administrative power to restrict competition in China: four reflections, two ideas and a thought," Chapters, in: Michael Faure & Xinzhu Zhang (ed.), The Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law, chapter 2, pages 73-141, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Niels J. Philipsen, 2013. "Competition advocacy and case law in Europe: the case of the liberal professions," Chapters, in: Michael Faure & Xinzhu Zhang (ed.), The Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law, chapter 12, pages 351-374, Edward Elgar Publishing.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • K33 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - International Law
    • L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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