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Optimal Attorney Advertising

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  • Michael P. Stone

    (University of Connecticut)

Abstract

Attorney advertising routinely targets tort victims. In this paper, a theoretical model is developed which incorporates advertising intensity, litigation costs, and an endogenous number of lawsuits. Since advertising induces victims to bring suit, it increases the level of injurer care. However, litigation costs are also incurred. At the optimum, the marginal benefit of deterrence equals the sum of the marginal costs of litigation and advertising. It is shown that even though blanket prohibitions on attorney advertising are likely suboptimal, ethical regulations which increase the marginal cost of advertising may be justified. Nevertheless, despite the widespread use of legal services advertising, it is unclear whether law firms are currently advertising excessively or inefficiently low. Whether firms are advertising excessively from a social standpoint is a purely empirical question.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael P. Stone, 2010. "Optimal Attorney Advertising," Working papers 2010-14, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:uct:uconnp:2010-14
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Frank H. Stephen, 2013. "Lawyers, Markets and Regulation," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 14803.
    2. Yannick Gabuthy & Eve-Angéline Lambert, 2018. "Legal Advertising and Frivolous Lawsuits," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 174(3), pages 570-593, September.
    3. Friehe, Tim & Gabuthy, Yannick & Lambert, Eve-Angéline, 2020. "Settlement implications of lawyer advertising," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Tort; Liability; Advertising; Attorneys; Lawyer; Legal Services;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
    • L84 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Personal, Professional, and Business Services

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