Contingent Fees for Lawyers: The Impact on Litigation and Accident Prevention
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DOI: 10.1086/467892
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Cited by:
- Chopard, Bertrand & Cortade, Thomas & Langlais, Eric, 2010.
"Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties,"
International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 18-27, March.
- Bertrand Chopard & Thomas Cortade & Eric Langlais, 2008. "Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties," Working Papers hal-04140723, HAL.
- Bertrand Chopard & Thomas Cortade & Eric Langlais, 2008. "Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties," Cahiers du CEREFIGE 0810, CEREFIGE (Centre Europeen de Recherche en Economie Financiere et Gestion des Entreprises), Universite de Lorraine, revised 2008.
- Thomas Cortade & Bertrand Chopard & Eric Langlais, 2010. "Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties," Post-Print hal-01815022, HAL.
- Chopard, Bertrand & Cortade, Thomas & Langlais, Eric, 2008. "Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties," MPRA Paper 8995, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Bertrand Chopard & Thomas Cortade & Eric Langlais, 2008. "Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties," EconomiX Working Papers 2008-32, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
- Yun-chien Chang & Su-hao Tu, 2020. "Two-way selection between flat-fee attorneys and litigants: theoretical and empirical analyses," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 49(1), pages 131-164, February.
- Frank H. Stephen, 2013. "Lawyers, Markets and Regulation," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 14803.
- Lambert Eve-Angéline & Chappe Nathalie, 2014. "Litigation with Legal Aid versus Litigation with Contingent/Conditional Fees," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 95-115, March.
- Winand Emons & Nuno Garoupa, 2004.
"The Economics of US-style Contingent Fees and UK-style Conditional Fees,"
Diskussionsschriften
dp0407, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Emons, Winand & Garoupa, Nuno, 2004. "The Economics of US-Style Contingent Fees and UK-Style Conditional Fees," CEPR Discussion Papers 4473, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Leshem Shmuel, 2009. "Contingent Fees, Signaling and Settlement Authority," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 435-460, June.
- Camille Chaserant & Sophie Harnay, 2010. "Déréglementer la profession d’avocat ? Les apories de l’analyse économique," Working Papers hal-04140922, HAL.
- Stone, Michael P. & Miceli, Thomas J., 2012.
"Optimal attorney advertising,"
International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 329-338.
- Michael P. Stone, 2010. "Optimal Attorney Advertising," Working papers 2010-14, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Camille Chaserant & Sophie Harnay, 2013.
"The regulation of quality in the market for legal services: Taking the heterogeneity of legal services seriously,"
European Journal of Comparative Economics, Cattaneo University (LIUC), vol. 10(2), pages 267-291, August.
- Camille Chaserant & Sophie Harnay, 2013. "The regulation of quality in the market for legal services: Taking the heterogeneity of legal services seriously," Post-Print hal-01271355, HAL.
- Dari-Mattiacci Giuseppe, 2006. "On the Optimal Scope of Negligence," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 1(3), pages 331-364, January.
- Max Resnick, 2023. "Contingent Fees in Order Flow Auctions," Papers 2304.04981, arXiv.org.
- Eyal Zamir & Ilana Ritov, 2010. "Revisiting the Debate over Attorneys' Contingent Fees: A Behavioral Analysis," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(1), pages 245-288, January.
- Amy Fanner & Paul Pecorino, 2005. "Dispute Rates and Contingency Fees: An Analysis from the Signaling Model," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 71(3), pages 566-581, January.
- Nuno Garoupa & Fernando Gómez, 2002. "Cashing by the hour: Why large law firms prefer hourly fees over contingent fees," Economics Working Papers 639, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Peter Van Wijck & Ben Van Velthoven, 2000. "An Economic Analysis of the American and the Continental Rule for Allocating Legal Costs," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 115-125, March.
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