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Lawyers, Markets and Regulation

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  • Frank H. Stephen

Abstract

Frank H. Stephen’s evaluation of public policy on the legal profession in UK and European jurisdictions explores how regulation and self-regulation have been liberalized over the past 30 years. The book surveys where the most recent and radical liberalization involving the ownership of law firms by non-lawyers is likely to lead, and appraises the economic literature on the costs and benefits of regulating markets for professional services. It challenges socio-legal views on professional legislation and highlights the limitations of regulatory competition, as well as the importance of dominant business models. The author reviews the empirical work underpinning these theories and policies. He also evaluates the effectiveness of regulatory competition as a response to regulatory capture.

Individual chapters are listed in the "Chapters" tab

Suggested Citation

  • Frank H. Stephen, 2013. "Lawyers, Markets and Regulation," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 14803.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eebook:14803
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Garoupa, Nuno, 2014. "Globalization and deregulation of legal services," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(S), pages 77-86.
    2. Romain Espinosa & Claudine Desrieux & Hengrui Wan, 2017. "Fewer courts, less justice? Evidence from the 2008 French reform of labor courts," Post-Print halshs-01634211, HAL.

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    Keywords

    Economics and Finance; Law - Academic;

    JEL classification:

    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology

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