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Politiques de la Concurrence

Author

Listed:
  • David Encaoua

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Roger Guesnerie

    (Collège de France - Chaire Théorie économique et organisation sociale - CdF (institution) - Collège de France)

Abstract

This report, on behalf of the French Prime Minister Economic Analysis Council, deals with three aspects of the competition policy in Europe: historical, economical and political. The report focuses also on the links between competition and innovation. Finally, the report includes economic policy recommendations.

Suggested Citation

  • David Encaoua & Roger Guesnerie, 2006. "Politiques de la Concurrence," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00177629, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00177629
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00177629
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1984. "The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 361-366, May.
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    5. Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June.
    6. Carbajo, Jose & de Meza, David & Seidmann, Daniel J, 1990. "A Strategic Motivation for Commodity Bundling," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(3), pages 283-298, March.
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    8. Whinston, Michael D, 1990. "Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 837-859, September.
    9. Barry Nalebuff, 2000. "Competing Against Bundles," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm157, Yale School of Management.
    10. Ilya Segal & Michael D. Whinston, 2000. "Exclusive Contracts and Protection of Investments," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(4), pages 603-633, Winter.
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    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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    Cited by:

    1. Camille Chaserant & Sophie Harnay, 2010. "Déréglementer la profession d’avocat ? Les apories de l’analyse économique," Working Papers hal-04140922, HAL.
    2. David Encaoua, 2014. "Kaplow, Louis: Competition policy and price fixing," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 113(2), pages 205-209, October.
    3. Patrice Bougette & Florent Venayre, 2008. "Contrôles a priori et a posteriori des concentrations : comment augmenter l'efficacité des politiques de concurrence," Revue d'économie industrielle, De Boeck Université, vol. 0(1), pages 9-40.
    4. Frédéric Marty, 2007. "Incertitudes économiques et insécurité juridique : la notion de position dominante collective dans les politiques de concurrence européennes," Documents de Travail de l'OFCE 2007-20, Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE).
    5. Christian Montet & Florent Venayre, 2012. "Politique de la concurrence dans les petits pays insulaires : Le rapport pour le Forum du Pacifique," Post-Print halshs-00722665, HAL.
    6. Marc Deschamps, 2013. "L'articulation économie, droit et politique dans la pensée ordolibérale," GREDEG Working Papers 2013-31, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
    7. Nicolae Marius Jula & Bogdan Buneci, 2013. "Critical Loss Of Social Welfare Under Monopoly," Working papers 06, Ecological University of Bucharest, Department of Economics.
    8. Francesca Barbiero & Michael Blanga-Gubbay & Valeria Cipollone & Koen De Backer & Sébastien Miroudot & Alexandros Ragoussis & André Sapir & Reinhilde Veugelers & Erkki Vihriälä & Guntram B. Wolff & Ge, . "Manufacturing Europe’s future," Blueprints, Bruegel, number 795, June.
    9. Marc Deschamps, 2013. "Pourquoi des politiques de concurrence ?," GREDEG Working Papers 2013-23, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.

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