William George Stanford
Personal Details
First Name: | William |
Middle Name: | George |
Last Name: | Stanford |
Suffix: | |
RePEc Short-ID: | pst204 |
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public] | |
Affiliation
Department of Economics
University of Illinois at Chicago
Chicago, Illinois (United States)http://www.uic.edu/depts/econ/
RePEc:edi:deuicus (more details at EDIRC)
Research output
Jump to: Working papers ArticlesWorking papers
- Ehud Kalai & William Stanford, 1986.
"Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games,"
Discussion Papers
679, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Kalai, Ehud & Stanford, William, 1988. "Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 397-410, March.
- Ehud Kalai & William Stanford, 1983. "Conjectural Variations Strategies in Dynamic Cournot Games With Fast Reactions," Discussion Papers 575, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Ehud Kalai & William Stanford, 1982. "Duopoly, Conjectural Variations and Supergames," Discussion Papers 525, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
Articles
- Stanford, William, 2011. "A family of identities related to zero-sum and team games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 91-94, September.
- Stanford, William, 2010. "The number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in random multi-team games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(3), pages 352-354, September.
- Stanford, William, 2004. "Improvement paths in repeated pure coordination games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 85(3), pages 341-345, December.
- Stanford, William, 2004. "Individually rational pure strategies in large games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 221-233, April.
- Stanford, William, 2000. "On comparing equilibrium and optimum payoffs in a class of discrete bimatrix games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 13-20, January.
- Stanford, William, 1999. "On the number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in finite common payoffs games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 29-34, January.
- Stanford, William, 1997. "On the distribution of pure strategy equilibria in finite games with vector payoffs," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 115-127, April.
- Stanford, William, 1991. "Prestable strategies in discounted duopoly games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 129-144, February.
- Stanford, William, 1989. "Symmetric paths and evolution to equilibrium in the discounted prisoners' dilemma," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 139-143, December.
- Kalai, Ehud & Stanford, William, 1988.
"Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 397-410, March.
- Ehud Kalai & William Stanford, 1986. "Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games," Discussion Papers 679, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Kalai, Ehud & Samet, Dov & Stanford, William, 1988. "A Note on Reactive Equilibria in the Discounted Prisoner's Dilemma and Associated Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 17(3), pages 177-186.
- Stanford, William G., 1986. "Subgame perfect reaction function equilibria in discounted duopoly supergames are trivial," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 226-232, June.
- Stanford, William G., 1986. "On continuous reaction function equilibria in duopoly supergames with mean payoffs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 233-250, June.
- Kalai, Ehud & Stanford, William, 1985.
"Conjectural variations strategies in accelerated cournot games,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 133-152, June.
RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:21:y:1996:i:3:p:726-733 is not listed on IDEAS
Citations
Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.Working papers
- Ehud Kalai & William Stanford, 1986.
"Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games,"
Discussion Papers
679, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Kalai, Ehud & Stanford, William, 1988. "Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 397-410, March.
Cited by:
- Norman, Thomas W.L., 2022. "The possibility of Bayesian learning in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 142-152.
- Barlo, Mehmet & Carmona, Guilherme & Sabourian, Hamid, 2016. "Bounded memory Folk Theorem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 728-774.
- Barlo, Mehmet & Urgun, Can, 2011. "Stochastic discounting in repeated games: Awaiting the almost inevitable," MPRA Paper 28537, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Sylvain Béal, 2010.
"Perceptron versus Automaton in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma,"
Post-Print
halshs-00530593, HAL.
- Sylvain Béal, 2010. "Perceptron versus automaton in the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(2), pages 183-204, August.
- Ben-Porath, Elchanan, 1991. "Repeated Games with Finite Automata," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275511, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
- Mehmet Barlo & Guilherme Carmona, 2007. "One - memory in repeated games," Nova SBE Working Paper Series wp500, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Nova School of Business and Economics.
- David Baron & Ehud Kalai, 1990. "Dividing a Cake by Majority: The Simplest Equilibria," Discussion Papers 919, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Jones, Matthew T., 2014. "Strategic complexity and cooperation: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 352-366.
- Harold L. Cole & Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 2001.
"Finite memory and imperfect monitoring,"
Staff Report
287, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Cole, Harold L. & Kocherlakota, Narayana R., 2005. "Finite memory and imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 59-72, October.
- Harold L. Cole & Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 2000. "Finite memory and imperfect monitoring," Working Papers 604, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Ehud Kalai & Alejandro Neme, 1989.
"The Strength of a Little Perfection,"
Discussion Papers
858, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Kalai, E & Neme, A, 1992. "The Strength of a Little Perfection," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 20(4), pages 335-355.
- Lee, J. & Sabourian, H., 2004. "Complexity and Efficiency in Repeated Games and Negotiation," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0419, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Barlo, Mehmet & Carmona, Guilherme & Sabourian, Hamid, 2009. "Repeated games with one-memory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 312-336, January.
- Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler, 1994.
"Infinite Histories and Steady Orbits in Repeated Games,"
Post-Print
hal-00481357, HAL.
- Gilboa Itzhak & Schmeidler David, 1994. "Infinite Histories and Steady Orbits in Repeated Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 370-399, May.
- Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler, 1989. "Infinite Histories and Steady Orbits in Repeated Games," Discussion Papers 846, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Marco Scarsini & Tristan Tomala, 2012.
"Repeated congestion games with bounded rationality,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(3), pages 651-669, August.
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- John H. Nachbar, 1995.
"Prediction, Optimization, and Learning in Repeated Games,"
Game Theory and Information
9504001, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 22 Feb 1996.
- John H. Nachbar, 1997. "Prediction, Optimization, and Learning in Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(2), pages 275-310, March.
- John Nachbar, 2010. "Prediction, Optimization and Learning in Repeated Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 576, David K. Levine.
- Olivier Compte & Andrew Postlewaite, 2010.
"Plausible Cooperation,Third Version,"
PIER Working Paper Archive
13-008, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Dec 2012.
- Olivier Compte & Andrew Postlewaite, 2007. "Effecting Cooperation," PIER Working Paper Archive 09-019, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 29 May 2009.
- Andrew Postlewaite & Olivier Compte, 2009. "Plausible Cooperation, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 10-039, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 16 Dec 2010.
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"A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt,"
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1441, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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- Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2006. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 321307000000000026, www.najecon.org.
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"A Lower Bound on Computational Complexity Given by Revelation Mechanisms,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 237-266, February.
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- Kenneth R. Mount & Stanley Reiter, 1994. "A Lower Bound on Computational Complexity Given by Revelation Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 1085, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Hamid Sabourian & Jihong Lee, 2004. "Complexity and Efficiency in the Negotiation Game," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 82, Econometric Society.
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"- Unmediated Communication In Repeated Games With Imperfect Monitoring,"
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1998-27, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
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"Competition Policy With Optimally Differentiated Rules Instead Of “Per Se Rules Vs Rule Of Reason”,"
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"Bounded Rationality and Repeated Network Formation,"
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PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint)
halshs-01204780, HAL.
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- Olivier Compte & Andrew Postlewaite, 2015. "Plausible cooperation," Post-Print halshs-01204780, HAL.
- Bhaskar, V. & Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 2002. "Asynchronous Choice and Markov Equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 334-350, April.
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"Non-computable Strategies and Discounted Repeated Games,"
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- Ehud Kalai, 1995. "Games," Discussion Papers 1141, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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- Michael D. McGinnis, 1992. "Deterrence Theory Discussion: I," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 4(4), pages 443-457, October.
- Stanford, William, 2004. "Improvement paths in repeated pure coordination games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 85(3), pages 341-345, December.
- Jihong Lee & Hamid Sabourian, 2005. "Efficiency in Negotiation: Complexity and Costly Bargaining," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 0505, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.
- Lehrer, Ehud & Solan, Eilon, 2009. "Approachability with bounded memory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 995-1004, July.
- Guilherme Carmona, 2006. "A Strong Anti-Folk Theorem," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 34(1), pages 131-151, April.
- Hubie Chen, 2013. "Bounded rationality, strategy simplification, and equilibrium," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(3), pages 593-611, August.
- Roy, Jaideep, 2000. "Learning with bounded memory," UC3M Working papers. Economics 7224, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa.
- Olivier Gossner & Penélope Hernández & Ron Peretz, 2016. "The complexity of interacting automata," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 45(1), pages 461-496, March.
- Samuelson, Larry, 2001. "Analogies, Adaptation, and Anomalies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 320-366, April.
- Katerina Sherstyuk, 2011. "Complexity and bidder behavior in iterative auctions," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 31(4), pages 2769-2776.
- Ben-Porath, Elchanan, 1991. "Repeated Games with Finite Automata," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275510, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
- Guilherme Carmona, 2003. "A Re-Interpretation of Nash Equilibrium Based on the Notion of Social Institutions," Game Theory and Information 0311005, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- George J. Mailath & : Wojciech Olszewski, 2008. "Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-027, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 28 Jul 2008.
- Jenna Bednar & Scott Page, 2007. "Can Game(s) Theory Explain Culture?," Rationality and Society, , vol. 19(1), pages 65-97, February.
- Ehud Kalai & William Stanford, 1982.
"Duopoly, Conjectural Variations and Supergames,"
Discussion Papers
525, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
Cited by:
- Gamal Atallah & Aggey Semenov, 2018.
"Technological Progress and Sectoral Shares,"
Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(2), pages 142-153, June.
- Gamal Atallah & Aggey Semenov, 2016. "Technological Progress and Sectoral Shares," Working Papers 1610e, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
- Gamal Atallah & Aggey Semenov, 2018.
"Technological Progress and Sectoral Shares,"
Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(2), pages 142-153, June.
Articles
- Stanford, William, 2004.
"Individually rational pure strategies in large games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 221-233, April.
Cited by:
- Stanford, William, 2011. "A family of identities related to zero-sum and team games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 91-94, September.
- Stanford, William, 1999.
"On the number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in finite common payoffs games,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 29-34, January.
Cited by:
- Szabó, György & Borsos, István & Szombati, Edit, 2019. "Games, graphs and Kirchhoff laws," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 521(C), pages 416-423.
- Pei, Ting & Takahashi, Satoru, 2019. "Rationalizable strategies in random games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 110-125.
- Marco Scarsini & Yosef Rinott, 2000.
"On the number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in random games,"
Post-Print
hal-00540207, HAL.
- Rinott, Yosef & Scarsini, Marco, 2000. "On the Number of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Random Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 274-293, November.
- Torsten Heinrich & Yoojin Jang & Luca Mungo & Marco Pangallo & Alex Scott & Bassel Tarbush & Samuel Wiese, 2023. "Best-response dynamics, playing sequences, and convergence to equilibrium in random games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(3), pages 703-735, September.
- Stanford, William, 2010. "The number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in random multi-team games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(3), pages 352-354, September.
- Roberts, David P., 2005. "Pure Nash equilibria of coordination matrix games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 7-11, October.
- Pangallo, Marco & Heinrich, Torsten & Jang, Yoojin & Scott, Alex & Tarbush, Bassel & Wiese, Samuel & Mungo, Luca, 2021.
"Best-Response Dynamics, Playing Sequences, And Convergence To Equilibrium In Random Games,"
INET Oxford Working Papers
2021-02, Institute for New Economic Thinking at the Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford.
- Torsten Heinrich & Yoojin Jang & Luca Mungo & Marco Pangallo & Alex Scott & Bassel Tarbush & Samuel Wiese, 2021. "Best-response dynamics, playing sequences, and convergence to equilibrium in random games," Papers 2101.04222, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2022.
- Pangallo, Marco & Heinrich, Torsten & Jang, Yoojin & Scott, Alex & Tarbush, Bassel & Wiese, Samuel & Mungo, Luca, 2021. "Best-Response Dynamics, Playing Sequences, And Convergence To Equilibrium In Random Games," INET Oxford Working Papers 2021-23, Institute for New Economic Thinking at the Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford.
- Ben Amiet & Andrea Collevecchio & Marco Scarsini & Ziwen Zhong, 2021.
"Pure Nash Equilibria and Best-Response Dynamics in Random Games,"
Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 46(4), pages 1552-1572, November.
- Ben Amiet & Andrea Collevecchio & Marco Scarsini & Ziwen Zhong, 2019. "Pure Nash Equilibria and Best-Response Dynamics in Random Games," Papers 1905.10758, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2020.
- Takahashi, Satoru, 2008. "The number of pure Nash equilibria in a random game with nondecreasing best responses," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 328-340, May.
- Stanford, William, 1997.
"On the distribution of pure strategy equilibria in finite games with vector payoffs,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 115-127, April.
Cited by:
- Marco Scarsini & Yosef Rinott, 2000.
"On the number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in random games,"
Post-Print
hal-00540207, HAL.
- Rinott, Yosef & Scarsini, Marco, 2000. "On the Number of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Random Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 274-293, November.
- Klaus Kultti & Hannu Salonen & Hannu Vartiainen, 2011. "Distribution of pure Nash equilibria in n-person games with random best replies," Discussion Papers 71, Aboa Centre for Economics.
- Torsten Heinrich & Yoojin Jang & Luca Mungo & Marco Pangallo & Alex Scott & Bassel Tarbush & Samuel Wiese, 2023. "Best-response dynamics, playing sequences, and convergence to equilibrium in random games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(3), pages 703-735, September.
- Pangallo, Marco & Heinrich, Torsten & Jang, Yoojin & Scott, Alex & Tarbush, Bassel & Wiese, Samuel & Mungo, Luca, 2021.
"Best-Response Dynamics, Playing Sequences, And Convergence To Equilibrium In Random Games,"
INET Oxford Working Papers
2021-02, Institute for New Economic Thinking at the Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford.
- Torsten Heinrich & Yoojin Jang & Luca Mungo & Marco Pangallo & Alex Scott & Bassel Tarbush & Samuel Wiese, 2021. "Best-response dynamics, playing sequences, and convergence to equilibrium in random games," Papers 2101.04222, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2022.
- Pangallo, Marco & Heinrich, Torsten & Jang, Yoojin & Scott, Alex & Tarbush, Bassel & Wiese, Samuel & Mungo, Luca, 2021. "Best-Response Dynamics, Playing Sequences, And Convergence To Equilibrium In Random Games," INET Oxford Working Papers 2021-23, Institute for New Economic Thinking at the Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford.
- Ben Amiet & Andrea Collevecchio & Marco Scarsini & Ziwen Zhong, 2021.
"Pure Nash Equilibria and Best-Response Dynamics in Random Games,"
Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 46(4), pages 1552-1572, November.
- Ben Amiet & Andrea Collevecchio & Marco Scarsini & Ziwen Zhong, 2019. "Pure Nash Equilibria and Best-Response Dynamics in Random Games," Papers 1905.10758, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2020.
- Takahashi, Satoru, 2008. "The number of pure Nash equilibria in a random game with nondecreasing best responses," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 328-340, May.
- Marco Scarsini & Yosef Rinott, 2000.
"On the number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in random games,"
Post-Print
hal-00540207, HAL.
- Stanford, William, 1991.
"Prestable strategies in discounted duopoly games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 129-144, February.
Cited by:
- Stanford, William, 2004. "Improvement paths in repeated pure coordination games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 85(3), pages 341-345, December.
- Stanford, William, 1989.
"Symmetric paths and evolution to equilibrium in the discounted prisoners' dilemma,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 139-143, December.
Cited by:
- Nachbar, John H & Zame, William R, 1996.
"Non-computable Strategies and Discounted Repeated Games,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(1), pages 103-122, June.
- William R. Zame, 1995. "Non-Computable Strategies and Discounted Repeated Games," UCLA Economics Working Papers 735, UCLA Department of Economics.
- William R. Zame & John H. Nachbar, 1996. "Non-computable strategies and discounted repeated games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(1), pages 103-122.
- Nachbar, John H & Zame, William R, 1996.
"Non-computable Strategies and Discounted Repeated Games,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(1), pages 103-122, June.
- Kalai, Ehud & Stanford, William, 1988.
"Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 397-410, March.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Ehud Kalai & William Stanford, 1986. "Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games," Discussion Papers 679, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Kalai, Ehud & Samet, Dov & Stanford, William, 1988.
"A Note on Reactive Equilibria in the Discounted Prisoner's Dilemma and Associated Games,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 17(3), pages 177-186.
Cited by:
- Ehud Kalai & Alejandro Neme, 1989.
"The Strength of a Little Perfection,"
Discussion Papers
858, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Kalai, E & Neme, A, 1992. "The Strength of a Little Perfection," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 20(4), pages 335-355.
- Takahashi, Satoru, 2010. "Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 42-62, January.
- Fabian Dvorak & Sebastian Fehrler, 2018.
"Negotiating Cooperation Under Uncertainty: Communication in Noisy, Indefinitely Repeated Interactions,"
TWI Research Paper Series
112, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
- Fabian Dvorak & Sebastian Fehrler, 2024. "Negotiating Cooperation under Uncertainty: Communication in Noisy, Indefinitely Repeated Interactions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 16(3), pages 232-258, August.
- Dvorak, Fabian & Fehrler, Sebastian, 2018. "Negotiating Cooperation under Uncertainty: Communication in Noisy, Indefinitely Repeated Interactions," IZA Discussion Papers 11897, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Olivier Compte & Andrew Postlewaite, 2015.
"Plausible cooperation,"
PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint)
halshs-01204780, HAL.
- Compte, Olivier & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2015. "Plausible cooperation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 45-59.
- Olivier Compte & Andrew Postlewaite, 2015. "Plausible cooperation," Post-Print halshs-01204780, HAL.
- Escobar, Juan F. & Llanes, Gastón, 2018.
"Cooperation dynamics in repeated games of adverse selection,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 408-443.
- Juan F. Escobar & Gastón Llanes, 2015. "Cooperation Dynamic in Repeated Games of Adverse Selection," Documentos de Trabajo 311, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
- Ehud Kalai & William Stanford, 1986.
"Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games,"
Discussion Papers
679, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Kalai, Ehud & Stanford, William, 1988. "Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 397-410, March.
- Olivier Compte & Andrew Postlewaite, 2013. "Belief free equilibria," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-020, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- P. Langlois, 1991. "Perfect Equilibria and Stable Cooperation in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma and Related Games," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 11(2), pages 69-98, February.
- Artem Baklanov, 2021. "Reactive Strategies: An Inch of Memory, a Mile of Equilibria," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(2), pages 1-28, May.
- Cho, In-Koo & Matsui, Akihiko, 1995. "Induction and the Ramsey policy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 19(5-7), pages 1113-1140.
- Araujo, Luis & Camargo, Braz, 2015. "Limited monitoring and the essentiality of money," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 32-37.
- Ehud Kalai, 1987. "Bounded Rationality and Strategic Complexity in Repeated Games," Discussion Papers 783, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Neyman, Abraham & Okada, Daijiro, 1999. "Strategic Entropy and Complexity in Repeated Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 191-223, October.
- Takashi Kamihigashi & Taiji Furusawa, 2006. "Immediately Reactive Equilibria in Infinitely Repeated Games with Additively Separable Continuous Payoffs," Discussion Paper Series 199, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
- Takashi Kamihigashi & Taiji Furusawa, 2007. "Global Dynamics in Infinitely Repeated Games with Additively Separable Continuous Payoffs," Discussion Paper Series 210, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
- Eric Rasmusen, 1992. "Heterogeneous Players and Specialized Models," Rationality and Society, , vol. 4(1), pages 83-94, January.
- Ehud Kalai & Alejandro Neme, 1989.
"The Strength of a Little Perfection,"
Discussion Papers
858, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Stanford, William G., 1986.
"Subgame perfect reaction function equilibria in discounted duopoly supergames are trivial,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 226-232, June.
Cited by:
- Ehud Kalai & Alejandro Neme, 1989.
"The Strength of a Little Perfection,"
Discussion Papers
858, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Kalai, E & Neme, A, 1992. "The Strength of a Little Perfection," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 20(4), pages 335-355.
- Seo, Jeong-Yun, 1998. "Exchange rate and market power in import price," ISU General Staff Papers 1998010108000013522, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Ehud Kalai & William Stanford, 1986.
"Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games,"
Discussion Papers
679, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Kalai, Ehud & Stanford, William, 1988. "Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 397-410, March.
- Artem Baklanov, 2021. "Reactive Strategies: An Inch of Memory, a Mile of Equilibria," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(2), pages 1-28, May.
- Ehud Kalai, 1987. "Bounded Rationality and Strategic Complexity in Repeated Games," Discussion Papers 783, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Friedel Bolle, 2011.
"Over- and under-investment according to different benchmarks,"
Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 104(3), pages 219-238, November.
- Bolle, Friedel, 2008. "Over- and under-investment according to different benchmarks," Discussion Papers 265, European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Department of Business Administration and Economics.
- Takashi Kamihigashi & Taiji Furusawa, 2007. "Global Dynamics in Infinitely Repeated Games with Additively Separable Continuous Payoffs," Discussion Paper Series 210, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
- Lu, Yuanzhu & Wright, Julian, 2010. "Tacit collusion with price-matching punishments," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 298-306, May.
- Ehud Kalai & Alejandro Neme, 1989.
"The Strength of a Little Perfection,"
Discussion Papers
858, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Stanford, William G., 1986.
"On continuous reaction function equilibria in duopoly supergames with mean payoffs,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 233-250, June.
Cited by:
- Ehud Kalai & William Stanford, 1986.
"Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games,"
Discussion Papers
679, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Kalai, Ehud & Stanford, William, 1988. "Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 397-410, March.
- Ehud Kalai, 1987. "Bounded Rationality and Strategic Complexity in Repeated Games," Discussion Papers 783, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Scott Moss & Huw David Dixon & Steven Wallis, 1995. "Evaluating Competitive Strategies," Intelligent Systems in Accounting, Finance and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 4(4), pages 245-258, December.
- Ehud Kalai & William Stanford, 1986.
"Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games,"
Discussion Papers
679, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Kalai, Ehud & Stanford, William, 1985.
"Conjectural variations strategies in accelerated cournot games,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 133-152, June.
Cited by:
- Wright, Julian, 2013. "Punishment strategies in repeated games: Evidence from experimental markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 91-102.
- Richards, Timothy J. & Patterson, Paul M., 2002. "Strategic Interaction With Multiple Tools: A New Empirical Model," Working Papers 28545, Arizona State University, Morrison School of Agribusiness and Resource Management.
- Friedman, James W. & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2002. "Bounded rationality, dynamic oligopoly, and conjectural variations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 287-306, November.
- Andrey Lipin, 2013. "Empirical analysis of imperfect competition in the rice market in the Asia-Pacific region (in Russian)," Quantile, Quantile, issue 11, pages 41-60, December.
- Thijssen, J.J.J., 2003. "Investment under uncertainty, market evolution and coalition spillovers in a game theoretic perspective," Other publications TiSEM 672073a6-492e-4621-8d4a-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Jacco Thijssen, 2003. "Evolution of Conjectures in Cournot Oligopoly," Trinity Economics Papers 200316, Trinity College Dublin, Department of Economics.
- Louis-André Gérard-Varet & Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira & Claude d'Aspremont, 1991.
"Concurrence en prix et équilibres cournotiens,"
Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 42(6), pages 967-996.
- D'Aspremont, C. & Dos Santos Ferreira, R. & Gerard-Varet, L.A., 1991. "Concurrence en prix et equilibres cournotiens," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 91a16, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
- Lu, Yuanzhu & Wright, Julian, 2010. "Tacit collusion with price-matching punishments," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 298-306, May.
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