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Learning to Play Limited Forecast Equilibria

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  • Jehiel, Philippe

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  • Jehiel, Philippe, 1998. "Learning to Play Limited Forecast Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 274-298, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:22:y:1998:i:2:p:274-298
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    12. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1993. "Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1231-1240, September.
    13. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
    14. Noldeke Georg & Samuelson Larry, 1993. "An Evolutionary Analysis of Backward and Forward Induction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 425-454, July.
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    16. Abreu, Dilip & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1988. "The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1259-1281, November.
    17. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1986. "Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 83-96, June.
    18. Jeheil Phillippe, 1995. "Limited Horizon Forecast in Repeated Alternate Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 497-519, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Philippe Jehiel, 2022. "Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium and Related Concepts:Theory, Applications, and Beyond," Working Papers halshs-03735680, HAL.
    2. Philippe Jehiel & Andrew Lilico, 2010. "Smoking Today and Stopping Tomorrow: a Limited Foresight Perspective," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 56(2), pages 141-164, June.
    3. Andrzej Baranski & Ernesto Reuben, 2023. "Competing for Proposal Rights: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 20220085, New York University Abu Dhabi, Department of Social Science, revised Mar 2023.
    4. Rampal, Jeevant, 2022. "Limited Foresight Equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 166-188.
    5. Jehiel, Philippe, 1998. "Repeated games and limited forecasting," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 543-551, May.
    6. Jehiel, Philippe, 2005. "Analogy-based expectation equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 123(2), pages 81-104, August.
    7. Wichardt, Philipp C., 2010. "Modelling equilibrium play as governed by analogy and limited foresight," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 472-487, November.
    8. Mengel, Friederike, 2014. "Learning by (limited) forward looking players," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 59-77.
    9. Maenner, Eliot, 2008. "Adaptation and complexity in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 166-187, May.
    10. Philippe Jehiel & Andrew Lilico, 2006. "Smoking today or stopping tomorrow: A limited foresight perspective," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000198, UCLA Department of Economics.
    11. Young, H. Peyton, 2009. "Learning by trial and error," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 626-643, March.

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