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On the distribution of pure strategy equilibria in finite games with vector payoffs

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  • Stanford, William

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  • Stanford, William, 1997. "On the distribution of pure strategy equilibria in finite games with vector payoffs," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 115-127, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:33:y:1997:i:2:p:115-127
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Powers, Imelda Yeung, 1990. "Limiting Distributions of the Number of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in N-Person Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 19(3), pages 277-286.
    2. Barry O'Neill, 1981. "The Number of Outcomes in the Pareto-Optimal Set of Discrete Bargaining Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 6(4), pages 571-578, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Rinott, Yosef & Scarsini, Marco, 2000. "On the Number of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Random Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 274-293, November.
    2. Klaus Kultti & Hannu Salonen & Hannu Vartiainen, 2011. "Distribution of pure Nash equilibria in n-person games with random best replies," Discussion Papers 71, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    3. Torsten Heinrich & Yoojin Jang & Luca Mungo & Marco Pangallo & Alex Scott & Bassel Tarbush & Samuel Wiese, 2023. "Best-response dynamics, playing sequences, and convergence to equilibrium in random games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(3), pages 703-735, September.
    4. Torsten Heinrich & Yoojin Jang & Luca Mungo & Marco Pangallo & Alex Scott & Bassel Tarbush & Samuel Wiese, 2021. "Best-response dynamics, playing sequences, and convergence to equilibrium in random games," Papers 2101.04222, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2022.
    5. Pangallo, Marco & Heinrich, Torsten & Jang, Yoojin & Scott, Alex & Tarbush, Bassel & Wiese, Samuel & Mungo, Luca, 2021. "Best-Response Dynamics, Playing Sequences, And Convergence To Equilibrium In Random Games," INET Oxford Working Papers 2021-23, Institute for New Economic Thinking at the Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford.
    6. Ben Amiet & Andrea Collevecchio & Marco Scarsini & Ziwen Zhong, 2021. "Pure Nash Equilibria and Best-Response Dynamics in Random Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 46(4), pages 1552-1572, November.
    7. Takahashi, Satoru, 2008. "The number of pure Nash equilibria in a random game with nondecreasing best responses," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 328-340, May.

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