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Induction and the Ramsey policy

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  • Cho, In-Koo
  • Matsui, Akihiko

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  • Cho, In-Koo & Matsui, Akihiko, 1995. "Induction and the Ramsey policy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 19(5-7), pages 1113-1140.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:19:y:1995:i:5-7:p:1113-1140
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    1. Marcet, Albert & Sargent, Thomas J., 1989. "Convergence of least squares learning mechanisms in self-referential linear stochastic models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 337-368, August.
    2. V. V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1993. "Sustainable Plans and Mutual Default," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 60(1), pages 175-195.
    3. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008. "Reputation And Equilibrium Selection In Games With A Patient Player," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 7, pages 123-142, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    4. Stokey, Nancy L., 1991. "Credible public policy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 627-656, October.
    5. Lucas, Robert E, Jr, 1986. "Adaptive Behavior and Economic Theory," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(4), pages 401-426, October.
    6. Abreu, Dilip & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1988. "The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1259-1281, November.
    7. Chari, V V & Kehoe, Patrick J, 1990. "Sustainable Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(4), pages 783-802, August.
    8. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1986. "Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 83-96, June.
    9. Matsui, Akihiko, 1989. "Information leakage forces cooperation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 94-115, March.
    10. Margaret Bray & David M. Kreps, 1987. "Rational Learning and Rational Expectations," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: George R. Feiwel (ed.), Arrow and the Ascent of Modern Economic Theory, chapter 19, pages 597-625, Palgrave Macmillan.
    11. Kalai, Ehud & Samet, Dov & Stanford, William, 1988. "A Note on Reactive Equilibria in the Discounted Prisoner's Dilemma and Associated Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 17(3), pages 177-186.
    12. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dawid, Herbert & Deissenberg, Christophe, 2005. "On the efficiency-effects of private (dis-)trust in the government," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 57(4), pages 530-550, August.
    2. Diana N. Weymark, 2001. "Inflation Targeting, Announcements, and Imperfect Credibility," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0124, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics, revised Apr 2002.
    3. Gáti, Laura, 2023. "Monetary policy & anchored expectations—An endogenous gain learning model," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 140(S), pages 37-47.
    4. In-Koo Cho & Noah Williams & Thomas J. Sargent, 2002. "Escaping Nash Inflation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 69(1), pages 1-40.
    5. Sleet, Christopher, 2001. "On Credible Monetary Policy and Private Government Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 99(1-2), pages 338-376, July.
    6. In-Koo Cho & Noah Williams & Thomas J. Sargent, 2002. "Escaping Nash Inflation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(1), pages 1-40.
    7. Ramon Marimon, 2000. "Review of Sargent's The Conquest of American Inflation," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(2), pages 405-411, June.

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