IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/99355.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Values for level structures with polynomial-time algorithms, relevant coalition functions, and general considerations

Author

Listed:
  • Besner, Manfred

Abstract

Exponential runtimes of algorithms for TU-values like the Shapley value are one of the biggest obstacles in the practical application of otherwise axiomatically convincing solution concepts of cooperative game theory. We discuss how the hierarchical structure of a level structure improves the runtimes compared to an unstructured set of players. As examples, we examine the Shapley levels value, the nested Shapley levels value, and, as a new LS-value, the nested Owen levels value. Polynomial-time algorithms for these values (under ordinary conditions) are provided. Furthermore, we introduce relevant coalition functions where all coalitions which are not relevant for the payoff calculation have a Harsanyi dividend of zero. By these coalition functions, our results shed new light on the computation of values of the Harsanyi set and many values from extensions of this set.

Suggested Citation

  • Besner, Manfred, 2020. "Values for level structures with polynomial-time algorithms, relevant coalition functions, and general considerations," MPRA Paper 99355, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:99355
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/99355/1/MPRA_paper_99355.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/101464/1/MPRA_paper_101464.pdf
    File Function: revised version
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/112329/1/MPRA_paper_101464.pdf
    File Function: revised version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Manfred Besner, 2020. "Value dividends, the Harsanyi set and extensions, and the proportional Harsanyi solution," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(3), pages 851-873, September.
    2. M. Álvarez-Mozos & R. Brink & G. Laan & O. Tejada, 2017. "From hierarchies to levels: new solutions for games with hierarchical structure," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 1089-1113, November.
    3. A. van den Nouweland & P. Borm & W. van Golstein Brouwers & R. Groot Bruinderink & S. Tijs, 1996. "A Game Theoretic Approach to Problems in Telecommunication," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 42(2), pages 294-303, February.
    4. AUMANN, Robert J. & DREZE, Jacques H., 1974. "Cooperative games with coalition structures," LIDAM Reprints CORE 217, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    5. Béal, Sylvain & Ferrières, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe, 2018. "The proportional Shapley value and applications," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 93-112.
    6. Yoshio Kamijo, 2009. "A Two-Step Shapley Value For Cooperative Games With Coalition Structures," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 11(02), pages 207-214.
    7. Kalai, Ehud & Stanford, William, 1988. "Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 397-410, March.
    8. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1986. "Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 83-96, June.
    9. Calvo, Emilio & Javier Lasaga, J. & Winter, Eyal, 1996. "The principle of balanced contributions and hierarchies of cooperation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 171-182, June.
    10. María Gómez-Rúa & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2011. "Balanced per capita contributions and level structure of cooperation," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 19(1), pages 167-176, July.
    11. Futia, Carl, 1977. "The complexity of economic decision rules," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 289-299, December.
    12. Manfred Besner, 2019. "Axiomatizations of the proportional Shapley value," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 86(2), pages 161-183, March.
    13. S. C. Littlechild & G. Owen, 1973. "A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 20(3), pages 370-372, November.
    14. Mercedes Sastre & Alain Trannoy, 2002. "Shapley inequality decomposition by factor components: Some methodological issues," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 77(1), pages 51-89, December.
    15. Xiaotie Deng & Christos H. Papadimitriou, 1994. "On the Complexity of Cooperative Solution Concepts," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 19(2), pages 257-266, May.
    16. (*), Gerard van der Laan & RenÊ van den Brink, 1998. "Axiomatizations of the normalized Banzhaf value and the Shapley value," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(4), pages 567-582.
    17. Yoshio Kamijo, 2013. "The collective value: a new solution for games with coalition structures," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 21(3), pages 572-589, October.
    18. Winter, Eyal, 1989. "A Value for Cooperative Games with Levels Structure of Cooperation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 18(2), pages 227-240.
    19. Guillermo Owen, 1972. "Multilinear Extensions of Games," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 18(5-Part-2), pages 64-79, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Xun-Feng Hu, 2020. "The weighted Shapley-egalitarian value for cooperative games with a coalition structure," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 28(1), pages 193-212, April.
    2. Xun-Feng Hu & Deng-Feng Li, 2021. "The Equal Surplus Division Value for Cooperative Games with a Level Structure," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 30(6), pages 1315-1341, December.
    3. Besner, Manfred, 2017. "Weighted Shapley levels values," MPRA Paper 82978, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Besner, Manfred, 2022. "The grand surplus value and repeated cooperative cross-games with coalitional collaboration," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
    5. Encarnacion Algaba & Rene van den Brink, 2021. "Networks, Communication and Hierarchy: Applications to Cooperative Games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 21-019/IV, Tinbergen Institute.
    6. Manfred Besner, 2022. "Harsanyi support levels solutions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 93(1), pages 105-130, July.
    7. Besner, Manfred, 2018. "The weighted Shapley support levels values," MPRA Paper 87617, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. André Casajus & Rodrigue Tido Takeng, 2022. "Second-order productivity, second-order payoffs, and the Owen value," Post-Print hal-03798448, HAL.
    9. René Brink & Anna Khmelnitskaya & Gerard Laan, 2016. "An Owen-type value for games with two-level communication structure," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 243(1), pages 179-198, August.
    10. Besner, Manfred, 2018. "Two classes of weighted values for coalition structures with extensions to level structures," MPRA Paper 87742, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Besner, Manfred, 2021. "Disjointly productive players and the Shapley value," MPRA Paper 108241, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Besner, Manfred, 2021. "Disjointly and jointly productive players and the Shapley value," MPRA Paper 108511, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Xun-Feng Hu & Gen-Jiu Xu & Deng-Feng Li, 2019. "The Egalitarian Efficient Extension of the Aumann–Drèze Value," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 181(3), pages 1033-1052, June.
    14. Yoshio Kamijo, 2013. "The collective value: a new solution for games with coalition structures," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 21(3), pages 572-589, October.
    15. Besner, Manfred, 2018. "Weighted Shapley hierarchy levels values," MPRA Paper 88160, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Hu, Xun-Feng & Li, Deng-Feng & Xu, Gen-Jiu, 2018. "Fair distribution of surplus and efficient extensions of the Myerson value," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 1-5.
    17. André Casajus & Rodrigue Tido Takeng, 2023. "Second-order productivity, second-order payoffs, and the Owen value," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 320(1), pages 1-13, January.
    18. Besner, Manfred, 2018. "Proportional Shapley levels values," MPRA Paper 87120, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Besner, Manfred, 2022. "Impacts of boycotts concerning the Shapley value and extensions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 217(C).
    20. Besner, Manfred, 2023. "The per capita Shapley support levels value," MPRA Paper 116457, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cooperative game · Polynomial-time algorithm · Level structure · (Nested) Shapley/Owen (levels) value · Harsanyi dividends;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:99355. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.