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Perfect Equilibria and Stable Cooperation in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma and Related Games

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  • P. Langlois

    (San Francisco State University, Mathematics)

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  • P. Langlois, 1991. "Perfect Equilibria and Stable Cooperation in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma and Related Games," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 11(2), pages 69-98, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:compsc:v:11:y:1991:i:2:p:69-98
    DOI: 10.1177/073889429101100204
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 2008. "The Folk Theorem In Repeated Games With Discounting Or With Incomplete Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 11, pages 209-230, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. Kalai, Ehud & Samet, Dov & Stanford, William, 1988. "A Note on Reactive Equilibria in the Discounted Prisoner's Dilemma and Associated Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 17(3), pages 177-186.
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