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Aggey Semenov

Personal Details

First Name:Aggey
Middle Name:
Last Name:Semenov
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pse200
https://sites.google.com/site/semenovaggey/home
120 University Private FSS 9039 university of Ottawa K1N 6N5 ON Canada
1-613-562-5800 ext7066
Terminal Degree:2005 (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Département d'Économie
Université d'Ottawa

Ottawa, Canada
https://ruor.uottawa.ca/handle/10393/23320
RePEc:edi:deottca (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2018. "A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game," Post-Print halshs-01885428, HAL.
  2. David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2017. "Optimal stationary contract with two-sided imperfect enforcement and persistent adverse selection," Post-Print halshs-01630253, HAL.
  3. David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2016. "A Complete Characterization of Equilibria in Common Agency Screening Games," Working Papers 1618E, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
  4. Gamal Atallah & Aggey Semenov, 2016. "Technological Progress and Sectoral Shares," Working Papers 1610e, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
  5. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey & Stole, Lars, 2015. "A Complete Characterization of Equilibria in Two-type Common Agency Screening Games," MPRA Paper 66620, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Aggey Semenov, 2015. "On imperfect commitment in contracts," Working Papers 1503E, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
  7. Aggey Semenov & Hector Perez Saiz, 2014. "The Effect Of Campaign Contributions On State Banking Regulation And Bank Expansion In U.S," 2014 Meeting Papers 1265, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  8. Aggey Semenov, 2014. "Existence and continuity of the optimal contract in adverse selection models with constraints," Working Papers E1402E, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
  9. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey & Stole, Lars, 2014. "A Theory of Contracts With Limited Enforcement," MPRA Paper 53504, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  10. Aggey Semenov, 2012. "Delegation to a potentially uninformed agent," Working Papers 1215E, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
  11. Aggey Semenov & Julian Wright, 2011. "Vertical Limit pricing," Working Papers 1104E, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
  12. Aggey Semenov & Julian Wright, 2011. "Entry deterrrence via renegotiation-proof non-exclusive contracts," Working Papers 1105E, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
  13. Daouda Diakité & Aggey Semenov & Alban Thomas, 2009. "A proposal for social pricing of water supply in Côte d'Ivoire," Post-Print hal-01243467, HAL.
  14. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey, 2008. "Ideological Uncertainty and Lobbying Competition," MPRA Paper 6992, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  15. Semenov, Aggey, 2008. "Bargaining in the Appointment Process, Constrained Delegation and the Political Weight of the Senate," MPRA Paper 6988, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  16. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey, 2008. "The Informational Effects of Competition and Collusion in Legislative Politics," MPRA Paper 6989, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  17. DIAKITE Daouda & SEMENOV Aggey & THOMAS Alban, 2006. "Social Pricing and Water Provision in Côte d'Ivoire," LERNA Working Papers 06.14.207, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
  18. Semenov, Aggey, 2006. "Common Agency with Risk-Averse Agent," MPRA Paper 6991, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  19. Semenov, Aggey & Martimort, David, 2004. "Communication by Interest Groups and the Organization of Lobbying," MPRA Paper 8519, University Library of Munich, Germany.

Articles

  1. Semenov, Aggey & Tondji, Jean-Baptiste, 2019. "On the Dynamic Analysis of Cournot–Bertrand Equilibria," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 1-1.
  2. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey & Stole, Lars A., 2018. "A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(3), September.
  3. Aggey Semenov, 2018. "Delegation to a possibly ignorant agent," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 51(1), pages 64-93, February.
  4. Gamal Atallah & Aggey Semenov, 2018. "Technological Progress and Sectoral Shares," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(2), pages 142-153, June.
  5. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey & Stole, Lars, 2017. "Optimal stationary contract with two-sided imperfect enforcement and persistent adverse selection," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 18-22.
  6. David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2017. "A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 84(2), pages 816-852.
  7. Aggey Semenov & Julian Wright, 2014. "Exclusion via Non-Exclusive Contracts," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 47(1), pages 325-347, February.
  8. Semenov, Aggey, 2010. "Common agency with risk-averse agent," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 38-49, January.
  9. Diakité, Daouda & Semenov, Aggey & Thomas, Alban, 2009. "A proposal for social pricing of water supply in Côte d'Ivoire," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 258-268, March.
  10. Aggey Semenov, 2008. "Bargaining in the appointment process, constrained delegation and the political weight of the Senate," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(1), pages 165-180, July.
  11. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey, 2008. "Ideological uncertainty and lobbying competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 456-481, April.
  12. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey, 2008. "The informational effects of competition and collusion in legislative politics," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(7), pages 1541-1563, July.
  13. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey, 2007. "The pluralistic view of politics: Asymmetric lobbyists, ideological uncertainty and political entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 155-161, November.
  14. David Martimort & Aggey Semenov, 2007. "Political Biases in Lobbying under Asymmetric Information," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 5(2-3), pages 614-623, 04-05.
  15. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey, 2006. "Continuity in mechanism design without transfers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 182-189, November.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2018. "A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game," Post-Print halshs-01885428, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Didier Laussel & Joana Resende, 2018. "Complementary Monopolies with Asymmetric Information," AMSE Working Papers 1842, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.

  2. David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2017. "Optimal stationary contract with two-sided imperfect enforcement and persistent adverse selection," Post-Print halshs-01630253, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Shiv Dixit, 2023. "Online Appendix to "Contract Enforcement and Preventive Healthcare: Theory and Evidence"," Online Appendices 21-360, Review of Economic Dynamics.

  3. David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2016. "A Complete Characterization of Equilibria in Common Agency Screening Games," Working Papers 1618E, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Didier Laussel, 2018. "Tying the Politicians’ Hands: The Optimal Limits to Representative Democracy," AMSE Working Papers 1803, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
    2. Didier Laussel & Joana Resende, 2018. "Complementary Monopolies with Asymmetric Information," AMSE Working Papers 1842, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.

  4. Gamal Atallah & Aggey Semenov, 2016. "Technological Progress and Sectoral Shares," Working Papers 1610e, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Gamal Atallah & Aggey Semenov, 2018. "Technological Progress and Sectoral Shares," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(2), pages 142-153, June.

  5. Aggey Semenov & Hector Perez Saiz, 2014. "The Effect Of Campaign Contributions On State Banking Regulation And Bank Expansion In U.S," 2014 Meeting Papers 1265, Society for Economic Dynamics.

    Cited by:

    1. D. Brian Blank & Brandy Hadley & Omer Unsal, 2021. "Financial consequences of reputational damage: Evidence from government economic incentives," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 56(4), pages 693-719, November.
    2. Gazi I. Kara & Youngsuk Yook, 2023. "Policy Uncertainty and Bank Mortgage Credit," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 55(4), pages 783-823, June.
    3. Gazi I. Kara & Youngsuk Yook, 2019. "Policy Uncertainty and Bank Mortgage Credit," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2019-066, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).

  6. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey & Stole, Lars, 2014. "A Theory of Contracts With Limited Enforcement," MPRA Paper 53504, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Daniel Danau & Annalisa Vinella, 2017. "From fixed to state‐dependent duration in public‐private partnerships," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(3), pages 636-660, September.
    2. David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2017. "Optimal stationary contract with two-sided imperfect enforcement and persistent adverse selection," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01630253, HAL.
    3. Gülen Karakoç & Marco Pagnozzi & Salvatore Piccolo, 2017. "The Value of Transparency in Dynamic Contracting with Entry," CSEF Working Papers 482, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    4. Aggey Semenov, 2014. "Existence and continuity of the optimal contract in adverse selection models with constraints," Working Papers E1402E, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.

  7. Aggey Semenov, 2012. "Delegation to a potentially uninformed agent," Working Papers 1215E, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Krähmer, Daniel & Kováč, Eugen, 2016. "Optimal sequential delegation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 849-888.

  8. Daouda Diakité & Aggey Semenov & Alban Thomas, 2009. "A proposal for social pricing of water supply in Côte d'Ivoire," Post-Print hal-01243467, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Henrique Monteiro, 2010. "Residential Water Demand in Portugal: checking for efficiency-based justifications for increasing block tariffs," Working Papers Series 1 ercwp0110, ISCTE-IUL, Business Research Unit (BRU-IUL).
    2. Li, Yao & Fan, Jin & Zhao, Dingtao & Wu, Yanrui & Li, Jun, 2016. "Tiered gasoline pricing: A personal carbon trading perspective," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 194-201.
    3. Fuente, David & Kabubo-Mariara, Jane & Kimuyu, Peter & Mwaura, Mbutu & Whittington, Dale, 2017. "Assessing the Performance of Alternative Water and Sanitation Tariffs: The Case of Nairobi, Kenya," EfD Discussion Paper 17-21, Environment for Development, University of Gothenburg.
    4. NAUGES Céline & WHITTINGTON Dale, 2008. "Estimation of Water Demand in Developing Countries: An Overview," LERNA Working Papers 08.20.264, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
    5. Yerushalmi, Erez, 2012. "Measuring the administrative water allocation mechanism and agricultural amenities," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 992, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    6. Simon Porcher, 2013. "Efficiency and equity in two-part tariffs: the case of residential water rates," Post-Print halshs-01985238, HAL.
    7. Rui Fragoso & Carlos Marques, 2013. "The Economic Impact of Alternative Water Pricing Policies in Alentejo Region," CEFAGE-UE Working Papers 2013_02, University of Evora, CEFAGE-UE (Portugal).
    8. Georg Meran & Christian von Hirschhausen, 2014. "Increasing Block Tariffs in the Water Sector: An Interpretation in Terms of Social Preferences," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1434, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    9. David R. Bell & Ronald C. Griffin, 2011. "Urban Water Demand with Periodic Error Correction," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 87(3), pages 528-544.
    10. Zhisong Chen & Keith C.K. Cheung & Manyi Tan, 2019. "Inter-Basin Water Transfer Supply Chain Coordination with Ramsey Pricing," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 16(19), pages 1-22, September.
    11. Dalton, Christina M., 2014. "Estimating demand elasticities using nonlinear pricing," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 178-191.
    12. Whittington, Dale & Nauges, Céline & Fuente, David & Wu, Xun, 2015. "A diagnostic tool for estimating the incidence of subsidies delivered by water utilities in low- and medium-income countries, with illustrative simulations," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 70-81.
    13. Sağlam, Yiğit, 2011. "Optimal Pricing of Water: Optimal Departures from the Inverse Elasticity Rule," Working Paper Series 18553, Victoria University of Wellington, School of Economics and Finance.
    14. William F. Vásquez & Pallab Mozumder & Dina Franceschi, 2015. "Water Quality, Household Perceptions and Averting Behavior: Evidence from Nicaragua," Water Economics and Policy (WEP), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 1(04), pages 1-21, December.
    15. Kertous, Mourad & Zerzour, Sahad, 2015. "To pay or not to pay? Water bill and delay in payment in Bejaia (Algeria): A duration analysis," MPRA Paper 67801, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Fuente, David, 2019. "The design and evaluation of water tariffs: A systematic review," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    17. Barde, Julia Alexa & Lehmann, Paul, 2013. "Distributional effects of water tariff reforms: An empirical study for Lima, Peru," UFZ Discussion Papers 14/2013, Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research (UFZ), Division of Social Sciences (ÖKUS).

  9. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey, 2008. "Ideological Uncertainty and Lobbying Competition," MPRA Paper 6992, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Lefebvre, Perrin & Martimort, David, 2023. "Delegation, Capture and Endogenous Information Structures," TSE Working Papers 23-1418, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    2. David Martimort & Lars A. Stole, 2022. "Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-03758833, HAL.
    3. Guilherme Carmona & José Fajardo, 2006. "Existence of Equilibrium in Common Agency Games with Adverse Selection," IBMEC RJ Economics Discussion Papers 2006-05, Economics Research Group, IBMEC Business School - Rio de Janeiro.
    4. Javier Rivas Ruiz, 2016. "Lobbying, Campaign Contributions and Political Competition," Department of Economics Working Papers 55/16, University of Bath, Department of Economics.
    5. Martimort, David, 2019. ""When Olson Meets Dahl": From Inefficient Groups Formation to Inefficient Policy-Making," CEPR Discussion Papers 13843, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2018. "A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01885428, HAL.
    7. John Duggan & Jacque Gao, 2020. "Lobbying as a multidimensional tug of war," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(1), pages 141-166, January.
    8. Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline & Thomas P. Lyon, 2016. "Merchants of Doubt: Corporate Political Influence when Expert Credibility is Uncertain," CESifo Working Paper Series 6165, CESifo.
    9. Eddie Dekel & Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinksy, 2006. "Vote Buying II: Legislatures and Lobbying," Discussion Papers 1433, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    10. Alves, Amanda M. & Brousseau, Eric & Mimouni, Nada & Yeung, Timothy Yu-Cheong, 2021. "Competing for policy: Lobbying in the EU wholesale roaming regulation," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 45(3).
    11. Seungjin Han & Siyang Xiong, 2023. "Common Agency with Non-Delegation or Imperfect Commitment," Papers 2309.11595, arXiv.org.
    12. Lima, Rafael Costa & Moreira, Humberto, 2014. "Information transmission and inefficient lobbying," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 282-307.
    13. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey & Stole, Lars, 2015. "A Complete Characterization of Equilibria in Two-type Common Agency Screening Games," MPRA Paper 66620, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey & Stole, Lars, 2017. "A Complete Characterization of Equilibria in a Common Agency Screening Game," MPRA Paper 80870, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Felgenhauer, Mike, 2010. "Transparency and special interests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 4-7, January.
    16. Semenov, Aggey, 2006. "Common Agency with Risk-Averse Agent," MPRA Paper 6991, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Graham Mallard, 2014. "Static Common Agency And Political Influence: An Evaluative Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 17-35, February.
    18. Alam, Ahmed W. & Farjana, Ashupta & Houston, Reza, 2024. "Geopolitical risk, CEO power, and corporate lobbying: Do powerful CEOs lobby more?," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(PA).
    19. Lefebvre, Perrin & Martimort, David, 2023. "Reform for Sale: a Common Agency Model with Moral Hazard Frictions," TSE Working Papers 23-1419, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    20. Martimort, David & Stole, Lars, 2015. "Menu Auctions and Influence Games with Private Information," MPRA Paper 62388, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    21. Dimitrios Xefteris & Galina Zudenkova, 2018. "Electoral competition under costly policy implementation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 50(4), pages 721-739, April.
    22. Martimort, David & Stole, Lars, 2011. "Public Contracting in Delegated Agency Games," MPRA Paper 32874, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    23. Konstantinos Protopappas, 2022. "Optimal lobbying pricing," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(1), pages 37-61, July.
    24. Aggey Semenov, 2014. "Existence and continuity of the optimal contract in adverse selection models with constraints," Working Papers E1402E, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
    25. Mike Felgenhauer, 2007. "Policy Bias Equivalence under Common Agency," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 90(3), pages 295-312, April.

  10. Semenov, Aggey, 2008. "Bargaining in the Appointment Process, Constrained Delegation and the Political Weight of the Senate," MPRA Paper 6988, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Krähmer, Daniel & Kováč, Eugen, 2016. "Optimal sequential delegation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 849-888.
    2. Frédéric Koessler & David Martimort, 2008. "Multidimensional communication mechanisms: cooperative and conflicting designs," PSE Working Papers halshs-00586854, HAL.

  11. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey, 2008. "The Informational Effects of Competition and Collusion in Legislative Politics," MPRA Paper 6989, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Zoe Hitzig & Benjamin Niswonger, 2022. "Optimal Defaults, Limited Enforcement and the Regulation of Contracts," Papers 2203.01233, arXiv.org, revised May 2022.
    2. Rosar, Frank, 2015. "Continuous decisions by a committee: Median versus average mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 15-65.
    3. Nana Adrian & Marc Möller, 2020. "Self‐managed work teams: An efficiency‐rationale for pay compression," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(2), pages 315-334, April.
    4. Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2012. "Eliciting Information from a Committee," Working Papers 692, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    5. Ricardo Alonso & Isabelle Brocas & Juan D. Carrillo, 2014. "Resource Allocation in the Brain," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 81(2), pages 501-534.
    6. Kawamura, Kohei, 2008. "Communication for Public Goods," SIRE Discussion Papers 2008-25, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
    7. Frédéric Koessler & David Martimort, 2012. "Optimal Delegation with Multi-dimensional Decisions," Post-Print halshs-00754576, HAL.
    8. Kohei Kawamura, 2008. "Communication for Public Goods," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 182, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    9. MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi & Keivan Rezaei & Suho Shin, 2023. "Delegating to Multiple Agents," Papers 2305.03203, arXiv.org, revised May 2023.
    10. Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2010. "Decision Rules for Experts with Opposing Interests," Working Papers 674, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    11. Robin Boadway & Motohiro Sato, 2006. "Bureaucratic Advice And Political Governance," Working Paper 1070, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    12. Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenael Piaser, 2011. "Information Revelation in Competing Mechanism Games," CEIS Research Paper 205, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 04 Jul 2011.
    13. Mylovanov, Tymofiy & Zapechelnyuk, Andriy, 2013. "Decision rules revealing commonly known events," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(1), pages 8-10.
    14. Javier A. Prado Domínguez & Antonio García Lorenzo, 2010. "Competencia e incentivos a la cooperación en la interacción de grupos de interés que pretenden aumentar su influencia política directa: ¿cuál es la importancia de la presión política?," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 192(1), pages 105-125, March.
    15. Burnett, Johann Caro & Carrasco, Vinicius, 2011. "Coordination and the provision of incentives to a common regulated firm," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 606-627, September.
    16. McGee, Andrew & Yang, Huanxing, 2013. "Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 181-191.
    17. Gan, Tan & Hu, Ju & Weng, Xi, 2023. "Optimal contingent delegation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
    18. Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2013. "Optimal Arbitration," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 54(3), pages 769-785, August.
    19. Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël, 2013. "Two-sided communication in competing mechanism games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 62-70.

  12. DIAKITE Daouda & SEMENOV Aggey & THOMAS Alban, 2006. "Social Pricing and Water Provision in Côte d'Ivoire," LERNA Working Papers 06.14.207, LERNA, University of Toulouse.

    Cited by:

    1. Hagos, Fitsum, 2008. "Water supply and sanitation (WSS) and poverty: micro-level linkages in Ethiopia," IWMI Working Papers H041794, International Water Management Institute.
    2. José Silva Ruiz, 2010. "La eficiencia y la equidad en la fijación de precios de los servicios públicos: evolución de la teoría de la tarifa óptima en dos partes y el caso del servicio de agua potable," Revista CIFE, Universidad Santo Tomás, June.

  13. Semenov, Aggey, 2006. "Common Agency with Risk-Averse Agent," MPRA Paper 6991, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Graham Mallard, 2014. "Static Common Agency And Political Influence: An Evaluative Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 17-35, February.

Articles

  1. Semenov, Aggey & Tondji, Jean-Baptiste, 2019. "On the Dynamic Analysis of Cournot–Bertrand Equilibria," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 1-1.

    Cited by:

    1. Michael Kopel & Eva Maria Putz, 2021. "Information sharing in a Cournot–Bertrand duopoly," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(7), pages 1645-1655, October.
    2. Basak, Debasmita, 2021. "Cournot-Bertrand equilibria under two-part tariff contract," MPRA Paper 109588, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Jean‐Baptiste Tondji, 2022. "Overconfidence and welfare in a differentiated duopoly," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(3), pages 751-767, April.

  2. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey & Stole, Lars A., 2018. "A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(3), September.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Aggey Semenov, 2018. "Delegation to a possibly ignorant agent," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 51(1), pages 64-93, February.

    Cited by:

    1. Ball, Ian & Gao, Xin, 2024. "Benefiting from bias: Delegating to encourage information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 217(C).
    2. Li, Cheng & Mao, Huangxing, 2024. "Delegation to incentivize information production," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 1-11.

  4. Gamal Atallah & Aggey Semenov, 2018. "Technological Progress and Sectoral Shares," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(2), pages 142-153, June.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey & Stole, Lars, 2017. "Optimal stationary contract with two-sided imperfect enforcement and persistent adverse selection," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 18-22. See citations under working paper version above.
  6. David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2017. "A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 84(2), pages 816-852.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  7. Aggey Semenov & Julian Wright, 2014. "Exclusion via Non-Exclusive Contracts," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 47(1), pages 325-347, February.

    Cited by:

    1. Hiroshi Kitamura & Akira Miyaoka & Misato Sato, 2016. "Relationship-specific investment as a barrier to entry," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 119(1), pages 17-45, September.
    2. Hiroshi Kitamura & Akira Miyaoka & Misato Sato, 2013. "Relationship-specific Investment as a Barrier to Entry," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 13-24, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.

  8. Semenov, Aggey, 2010. "Common agency with risk-averse agent," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 38-49, January.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  9. Diakité, Daouda & Semenov, Aggey & Thomas, Alban, 2009. "A proposal for social pricing of water supply in Côte d'Ivoire," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 258-268, March.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  10. Aggey Semenov, 2008. "Bargaining in the appointment process, constrained delegation and the political weight of the Senate," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(1), pages 165-180, July. See citations under working paper version above.
  11. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey, 2008. "Ideological uncertainty and lobbying competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 456-481, April.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  12. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey, 2008. "The informational effects of competition and collusion in legislative politics," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(7), pages 1541-1563, July.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  13. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey, 2007. "The pluralistic view of politics: Asymmetric lobbyists, ideological uncertainty and political entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 155-161, November.

    Cited by:

    1. Ambrus, Attila & Egorov, Georgy, 2017. "Delegation and nonmonetary incentives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 101-135.
    2. Martimort, David, 2019. ""When Olson Meets Dahl": From Inefficient Groups Formation to Inefficient Policy-Making," CEPR Discussion Papers 13843, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey, 2008. "Ideological uncertainty and lobbying competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 456-481, April.
    4. Achim Voss & Jörg Lingens, 2018. "What's the damage? Environmental regulation with policy‐motivated bureaucrats," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 20(4), pages 613-633, August.
    5. Felgenhauer, Mike, 2010. "Transparency and special interests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 4-7, January.
    6. Semenov, Aggey, 2006. "Common Agency with Risk-Averse Agent," MPRA Paper 6991, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Graham Mallard, 2014. "Static Common Agency And Political Influence: An Evaluative Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 17-35, February.

  14. David Martimort & Aggey Semenov, 2007. "Political Biases in Lobbying under Asymmetric Information," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 5(2-3), pages 614-623, 04-05.

    Cited by:

    1. Octavian Strimbu, 2022. "Partial Verifiability Induced Contests," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 22.05, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
    2. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey, 2008. "Ideological uncertainty and lobbying competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 456-481, April.
    3. Strimbu, Octavian & Gonzalez, Patrick, 2013. "Does Transparency Reduce Corruption?," Working Papers 158368, University of Laval, Center for Research on the Economics of the Environment, Agri-food, Transports and Energy (CREATE).
    4. Schnakenberg, Keith & Turner, Ian R, 2023. "Formal Theories of Special Interest Influence," SocArXiv 47e26, Center for Open Science.
    5. Graham Mallard, 2014. "Static Common Agency And Political Influence: An Evaluative Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 17-35, February.
    6. Rafael Lima & Humberto Moreira & Thierry Verdier, 2008. "Lobbying and Information Transmission in Customs Unions," Working Papers 09_01, Universidade de São Paulo, Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade de Ribeirão Preto.
    7. Achim Voss & Mark Schopf, 2018. "Special interest politics: Contribution schedules vs. Nash bargaining," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(2), pages 256-273, July.
    8. Voß, Achim & Schopf, Mark, 2016. "Special Interest Politicsː Contribution Schedules versus Nash Bargaining," WiSo-HH Working Paper Series 30, University of Hamburg, Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences, WISO Research Laboratory.
    9. Bils, Peter & Duggan, John & Judd, Gleason, 2021. "Lobbying and policy extremism in repeated elections," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
    10. Manjhi, Ganesh & Mehra, Meeta Keswani, 2017. "Dynamics of the Economics of Special Interest Politics," Working Papers 17/206, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy.

  15. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey, 2006. "Continuity in mechanism design without transfers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 182-189, November.

    Cited by:

    1. Ester Manna & Alessandro De Chiara, 2016. "Delegation with a Reciprocal Agent," UB School of Economics Working Papers 2016/346, University of Barcelona School of Economics.
    2. Alexander Frankel, 2014. "Aligned Delegation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(1), pages 66-83, January.
    3. Florence Lachet-Touya, 2019. "The Assignment of a CSR Level of Action: Rule vs Discretion," Working papers of CATT hal-02141052, HAL.
    4. Glazer, Jacob & Kremer, Ilan & Perry, Motty, 2015. "Crowd Learning without Herding : A Mechanism Design Approach," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 10, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
    5. Liang, Pinghan, 2013. "Optimal delegation via a strategic intermediary," MPRA Paper 45271, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Elisabetta Iossa & David Martimort, 2016. "Corruption in PPPs, incentives and contract incompleteness," Post-Print halshs-01328626, HAL.
    7. Rosar, Frank, 2015. "Continuous decisions by a committee: Median versus average mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 15-65.
    8. Pierre Fleckinger, 2008. "Bayesian Improvement of the Phantom Voters Rule: An example of Dichotomic Communication," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-00641865, HAL.
    9. Anton Kolotilin & Hongyi, 2020. "Relational Communication," Discussion Papers 2018-12b, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    10. Amador, Manuel & Bagwell, Kyle, 2020. "Money burning in the theory of delegation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 382-412.
    11. Sarah Auster & Nicola Pavoni, 2020. "Limited Awareness and Financial Intermediation," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2020_252, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    12. Mark Armstrong & John Vickers, 2010. "A Model of Delegated Project Choice," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(1), pages 213-244, January.
    13. Florence Lachet-Touya, 2013. "The Assignment of a CSR Action Choice," Working Papers hal-02944767, HAL.
    14. David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2018. "A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01885428, HAL.
    15. Antinyan, Armenak & Corazzini, Luca & D'Agostino, Elena & Pavesi, Filippo, 2023. "Watch your words: An experimental study on communication and the opportunity cost of delegation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 214(C), pages 216-232.
    16. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey, 2008. "The informational effects of competition and collusion in legislative politics," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(7), pages 1541-1563, July.
    17. Ricardo Alonso & Niko Matouschek, 2008. "Optimal Delegation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 75(1), pages 259-293.
    18. Enrique Andreu & Damien Neven & Salvatore Piccolo, 2022. "Price Authority and Information Sharing with Competing Principals," IHEID Working Papers 29-2022, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
    19. Anton Kolotilin & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2024. "Persuasion Meets Delegation," Discussion Papers 2024-04, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    20. Marco Pagnozzi & Salvatore Piccolo & Matteo Bassi, 2016. "Entry and Product Variety with Competing Supply Chains," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(3), pages 520-556, September.
    21. Krähmer, Daniel & Kováč, Eugen, 2016. "Optimal sequential delegation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 849-888.
    22. Frédéric Koessler & David Martimort, 2012. "Optimal Delegation with Multi-dimensional Decisions," Post-Print halshs-00754576, HAL.
    23. Auster, Sarah & pavoni, Nicola, 2023. "Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness," CEPR Discussion Papers 18296, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    24. Jacob Glazer & Ilan Kremer & Motty Perry, 2021. "The Wisdom of the Crowd When Acquiring Information Is Costly," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(10), pages 6443-6456, October.
    25. Guillouet, Louise & Martimort, David, 2023. "Acting in the Darkness: Towards some Foundations for the Precautionary Principle," TSE Working Papers 23-1411, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Jul 2024.
    26. Andreu, Enrique & Neven, Damien & Piccolo, Salvatore, 2023. "Price authority and information sharing with competing supply chains," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 88(C).
    27. Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2010. "Decision Rules for Experts with Opposing Interests," Working Papers 674, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    28. Nicola Pavoni & Sarah Auster, 2016. "Optimal Delegation, Unawareness, and Financial Intermediation," 2016 Meeting Papers 1106, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    29. Ilan Kremer & Yishay Mansour & Motty Perry, 2014. "Implementing the "Wisdom of the Crowd"," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 122(5), pages 988-1012.
    30. Dino Gerardi & Lucas Maestri & Ignacio Monzon, 2023. "Delegation with Endogenous States," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 711 JEL Classification: C, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    31. Martimort, David & Guillouet, Louise, 2020. "Precaution, Information and Time-Inconsistency: On The Value of the Precautionary Principle," CEPR Discussion Papers 15266, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    32. Pouyet, Jérôme & Martimort, David & Staropoli, Carine, 2019. "Use and Abuse of Regulated Prices in Electricity Markets: "How to Regulate Regulated Prices?"," CEPR Discussion Papers 13801, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    33. Semenov, Aggey, 2012. "Delegation to potentially uninformed agent," MPRA Paper 42080, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    34. Iossa, Elisabetta & De Chiara, Alessandro, 2019. "Public Procurement as a Demand-side Policy: Project Competition and Innovation Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 13664, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    35. Manuel Amador & Kyle Bagwell & Alex Frankel, 2018. "A note on interval delegation," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 6(2), pages 239-249, October.
    36. Aggey Semenov, 2018. "Delegation to a possibly ignorant agent," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 51(1), pages 64-93, February.
    37. Alex Frankel, 2016. "Delegating Multiple Decisions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(4), pages 16-53, November.
    38. Ball, Ian & Gao, Xin, 2024. "Benefiting from bias: Delegating to encourage information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 217(C).
    39. Sarah Auster & Nicola Pavoni, 2018. "Optimal Delegation and Limited Awareness, with an Application to Financial Intermediation," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1869, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    40. Kremer, Ilan & Mansour, Yishay & Perry, Motty, 2013. "Implementing the "Wisdom of the Crowd"," Economic Research Papers 270435, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    41. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey & Stole, Lars, 2017. "A Complete Characterization of Equilibria in a Common Agency Screening Game," MPRA Paper 80870, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    42. Frédéric Koessler & David Martimort, 2008. "Multidimensional communication mechanisms: cooperative and conflicting designs," PSE Working Papers halshs-00586854, HAL.
    43. Kovác, Eugen & Mylovanov, Tymofiy, 2009. "Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: The regular case," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1373-1395, July.
    44. Yingni Guo, 2016. "Dynamic Delegation of Experimentation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(8), pages 1969-2008, August.
    45. Arve, Malin & Honryo, Takakazu, 2022. "Wasteful procedures?," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    46. Glazer, Jacob & Kremer, Ilan & Perry, Motty, 2015. "Crowd Learning without Herding : A Mechanism Design Approach," Economic Research Papers 269730, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    47. Matteo Bassi & Marco Pagnozzi & Salvatore Piccolo, 2015. "Product Differentiation by Competing Vertical Hierarchies," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(4), pages 904-933, October.
    48. Alonso, Ricardo & Matouschek, Niko, 2007. "Relational delegation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 58668, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    49. Salvatore Piccolo & Giovanni W. Puopolo & Luis Vasconcelos, 2013. "Non-Exclusive Financial Advice," CSEF Working Papers 347, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 13 Oct 2015.
    50. Martimort, David & Stole, Lars, 2015. "Menu Auctions and Influence Games with Private Information," MPRA Paper 62388, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    51. Noam Tanner, 2018. "Optimal Delegation Under Unknown Bias: The Role of Concavity," Supervisory Research and Analysis Working Papers RPA 18-1, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
    52. Semenov, Aggey, 2008. "Bargaining in the Appointment Process, Constrained Delegation and the Political Weight of the Senate," MPRA Paper 6988, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    53. Vincent Anesi & Daniel J. Seidmann, 2009. "Optimal Delegation with a Finite Number of States," Discussion Papers 2009-20, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    54. Florence Lachet-Touya, 2013. "The Assignment of a CSR Action Choice," Working papers of CATT hal-02944767, HAL.
    55. Gan, Tan & Hu, Ju & Weng, Xi, 2023. "Optimal contingent delegation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
    56. Martimort, David & Stole, Lars, 2011. "Public Contracting in Delegated Agency Games," MPRA Paper 32874, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    57. Florence Lachet-Touya, 2019. "The Assignment of a CSR Level of Action: Rule vs Discretion," Working Papers hal-02141052, HAL.
    58. Gregorio Curello & Ludvig Sinander, 2020. "Screening for breakthroughs," Papers 2011.10090, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
    59. Xiaoxiao Hu & Haoran Lei, 2022. "The optimality of (stochastic) veto delegation," Papers 2208.14829, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2024.

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NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 16 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (12) 2008-02-09 2008-02-09 2008-02-09 2011-06-18 2012-12-06 2013-12-15 2014-03-15 2014-03-15 2015-05-22 2015-09-18 2016-12-11 2017-08-27. Author is listed
  2. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (8) 2012-12-06 2013-12-15 2014-03-15 2014-03-15 2015-05-22 2015-09-18 2016-12-11 2017-08-27. Author is listed
  3. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (3) 2011-06-18 2011-06-18 2016-10-02
  4. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (3) 2015-09-18 2016-12-11 2017-08-27
  5. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (3) 2008-02-09 2008-02-09 2015-03-05
  6. NEP-BEC: Business Economics (2) 2011-06-18 2011-06-18
  7. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (2) 2008-02-09 2008-02-09
  8. NEP-HPE: History and Philosophy of Economics (2) 2015-09-18 2016-12-11
  9. NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (2) 2011-06-18 2011-06-18
  10. NEP-AFR: Africa (1) 2007-09-02
  11. NEP-BAN: Banking (1) 2015-03-05
  12. NEP-CBA: Central Banking (1) 2015-03-05
  13. NEP-DES: Economic Design (1) 2017-08-27
  14. NEP-EFF: Efficiency and Productivity (1) 2016-10-02
  15. NEP-INO: Innovation (1) 2016-10-02
  16. NEP-MFD: Microfinance (1) 2015-03-05
  17. NEP-REG: Regulation (1) 2014-03-15

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