Special Interest Politics: Contribution Schedules versus Nash Bargaining
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- Voß, Achim & Schopf, Mark, 2016. "Special Interest Politicsː Contribution Schedules versus Nash Bargaining," WiSo-HH Working Paper Series 30, University of Hamburg, Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences, WISO Research Laboratory.
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Cited by:
- Voss, Achim & Schopf, Mark, 2021.
"Lobbying over exhaustible-resource extraction,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 135(C).
- Schopf, Mark & Voß, Achim, 2015. "Lobbying over Exhaustible-Resource Extraction," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 112814, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Achim Voss & Mark Schopf, 2017. "Lobbying over Exhaustible-Resource Extraction," Working Papers CIE 108, Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics.
- Achim Voss & Mark Schopf, 2016. "Lobbying over Exhaustible-Resource Extraction," Working Papers Dissertations 26, Paderborn University, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics.
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More about this item
Keywords
Nash Bargaining; Common-Agency Model; Lobbying;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2017-03-12 (Game Theory)
- NEP-POL-2017-03-12 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-UPT-2017-03-12 (Utility Models and Prospect Theory)
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