IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/cawmdp/67.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

What's the damage? Environmental regulation with policy-motivated bureaucrats

Author

Listed:
  • Voß, Achim
  • Lingens, Jörg

Abstract

Many environmental-policy problems are characterized by complexity and uncertainty. Government's choice concerning these policies commonly relies on information provided by a bureaucracy. Environmental bureaucrats often have a political motivation of their own, so they might be tempted to misreport environmental effects in order to influence policy. This transforms a problem of uncertainty into one of asymmetric information. We analyze the ensuing principal-agent relationship and derive the government's optimal contract, which conditions policy and rewards on reported environmental effects. We find that agents who are more environmentalist than the government are rewarded for admitting that the environmental impact is low (and vice versa). With higher uncertainty, the bureaucrat has a stronger influence on policy. For some values of the environmental impact, the bureau is permitted to set its own preferred policy (optimal delegation).

Suggested Citation

  • Voß, Achim & Lingens, Jörg, 2014. "What's the damage? Environmental regulation with policy-motivated bureaucrats," CAWM Discussion Papers 67, University of Münster, Münster Center for Economic Policy (MEP).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:cawmdp:67
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/95873/1/782419755.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. repec:bla:scandj:v:97:y:1995:i:3:p:357-68 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Tracy R. Lewis, 1996. "Protecting the Environment When Costs and Benefits Are Privately Known," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(4), pages 819-847, Winter.
    3. Barry Bosworth & Gary Burtless & John Sabelhaus, 1991. "The Decline in Saving: Evidence from Household Surveys," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 22(1), pages 183-256.
    4. Kotakorpi, Kaisa & Poutvaara, Panu, 2011. "Pay for politicians and candidate selection: An empirical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7-8), pages 877-885, August.
    5. Trimborn, Timo & Koch, Karl-Josef & Steger, Thomas M., 2008. "Multidimensional Transitional Dynamics: A Simple Numerical Procedure," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 12(3), pages 301-319, June.
    6. Kent Smetters, 2003. "The (Interesting) Dynamic Properties of the Neoclassical Growth Model with CES Production," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 6(3), pages 697-707, July.
    7. Caliendo, Frank & Aadland, David, 2007. "Short-term planning and the life-cycle consumption puzzle," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 1392-1415, April.
    8. Caliendo, Frank N. & Findley, T. Scott, 2014. "Discount functions and self-control problems," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 122(3), pages 416-419.
    9. Spulber, Daniel F., 1988. "Optimal environmental regulation under asymmetric information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 163-181, March.
    10. Kevin Murdock, 2002. "Intrinsic Motivation and Optimal Incentive Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(4), pages 650-671, Winter.
    11. Thaler, Richard, 1981. "Some empirical evidence on dynamic inconsistency," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 201-207.
    12. Hall, Robert E, 1988. "Intertemporal Substitution in Consumption," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(2), pages 339-357, April.
    13. Jullien, Bruno, 2000. "Participation Constraints in Adverse Selection Models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 1-47, July.
    14. Evan Kwerel, 1977. "To Tell the Truth: Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 44(3), pages 595-601.
    15. Hoel, Michael & Karp, Larry, 2002. "Taxes versus quotas for a stock pollutant," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 367-384, November.
    16. V. V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe & Ellen R. McGrattan, 1996. "The Poverty of Nations: A Quantitative Exploration," NBER Working Papers 5414, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Muehlenbachs, Lucija & Staubli, Stefan & Cohen, Mark A., 2013. "The Effect of Inspector Group Size and Familiarity on Enforcement and Deterrence," IZA Discussion Papers 7876, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    18. repec:bla:scandj:v:94:y:1992:i:2:p:181-96 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Messner, Matthias & Polborn, Mattias K., 2004. "Paying politicians," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(12), pages 2423-2445, December.
      • Matthias Messner & Mattias Polborn, 2003. "Paying Politicians," Working Papers 246, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    20. repec:bla:scandj:v:94:y:1992:i:2:p:155-75 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. T. Findley & Frank Caliendo, 2009. "Short horizons, time inconsistency, and optimal social security," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 16(4), pages 487-513, August.
    22. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey, 2007. "The pluralistic view of politics: Asymmetric lobbyists, ideological uncertainty and political entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 155-161, November.
    23. Schmidt-Hebbel,Klaus & Servén,Luis (ed.), 1999. "The Economics of Saving and Growth," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521632959, September.
    24. Gómez, Manuel A., 2008. "Dynamics Of The Saving Rate In The Neoclassical Growth Model With Ces Production," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 12(2), pages 195-210, April.
    25. Maggi G. & Rodriguez-Clare A., 1995. "On Countervailing Incentives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 238-263, June.
    26. Findley, T. Scott & Caliendo, Frank N., 2014. "Interacting mechanisms of time inconsistency," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 68-76.
    27. David Laibson, 1997. "Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(2), pages 443-478.
    28. Louis Kaplow, 2010. "Taxing Leisure Complements," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 48(4), pages 1065-1071, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Yang, Xiaohui & Yan, Ji & Tian, Kun & Yu, Zihao & Yu Li, Rebecca & Xia, Senmao, 2021. "Centralization or decentralization? the impact of different distributions of authority on China's environmental regulation," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 173(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Farzin, Y. Hossein & Wendner, Ronald, 2014. "The Time Path of the Saving Rate: Hyperbolic Discounting and Short-Term Planning," Climate Change and Sustainable Development 178243, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    2. repec:grz:wpaper:2014-04 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Farzin, Y. Hossein & Wendner, Ronald, 2013. "Saving Rate Dynamics in the Neoclassical Growth Model – Hyperbolic Discounting and Observational Equivalence," MPRA Paper 45518, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. repec:grz:wpaper:2013-05 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Litina, Anastasia & Palivos, Theodore, 2010. "The Behavior Of The Saving Rate In The Neoclassical Optimal Growth Model," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(4), pages 482-500, September.
    6. Vislie,J., 2001. "Environmental regulation, asymmetric information and foreign ownership," Memorandum 07/2001, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    7. Lassi Ahlvik & Matti Liski, 2019. "Think global, act local! A mechanism for global commons and mobile firms," CESifo Working Paper Series 7597, CESifo.
    8. Park, Hyeon & Feigenbaum, James, 2018. "Bounded rationality, lifecycle consumption, and Social Security," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 65-105.
    9. Feigenbaum, James, 2008. "Can mortality risk explain the consumption hump?," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 844-872, September.
    10. Marcelo Caffera & Juan Dubra, 2005. "Getting Polluters to Tell the Truth," Microeconomics 0504008, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Dietrich Earnhart & Sarah Jacobson & Yusuke Kuwayama & Richard T. Woodward, 2023. "Discretionary Exemptions from Environmental Regulation: Flexibility for Good or for Ill," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 99(2), pages 203-221.
    12. T. Findley & Frank Caliendo, 2008. "The behavioral justification for public pensions: a survey," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 32(4), pages 409-425, October.
    13. Caffera, Marcelo & Dubra, Juan & Figueroa, Nicolás, 2018. "Mechanism design when players’ preferences and information coincide," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 56-61.
    14. Ambec, Stefan & Coria, Jessica, 2021. "The informational value of environmental taxes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 199(C).
    15. Huennemeyer, Anne-Juliane & Rollins, Kimberly S., 2001. "Private Resource Management And Public Trust: Optimal Resource Conservation Contracts Under Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 34141, University of Guelph, Department of Food, Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    16. Kang, Minwook, 2021. "Aggregate savings under quasi-hyperbolic versus exponential discounting," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
    17. Kirill Borissov & Mikhail Pakhnin & Ronald Wendner, 2020. "Naive Agents with Quasi-hyperbolic Discounting and Perfect Foresight," EUSP Department of Economics Working Paper Series 2020/03, European University at St. Petersburg, Department of Economics.
    18. Salvador Cruz Rambaud & María José Muñoz Torrecillas, 2016. "Measuring Impatience in Intertemporal Choice," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 11(2), pages 1-17, February.
    19. Kang, Minwook & Kim, Eungsik, 2024. "Present bias and endogenous growth," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 236(C).
    20. Juan-Pablo Montero, 2005. "Pollution Markets with Imperfectly Observed Emissions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(3), pages 645-660, Autumn.
    21. Francisco Cabo & Guiomar Martín-Herrán & María Pilar Martínez-García, 2020. "Non-constant Discounting, Social Welfare and Endogenous Growth with Pollution Externalities," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 76(2), pages 369-403, July.
    22. Shantanu Bagchi, 2011. "Can overconfidence explain the consumption hump?," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 35(1), pages 41-70, January.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Environmental Policy; Political Economy; Delegation; Bureaucracy; Regulatory Agency; Mechanism Design; Type-dependent Participation Constraint; Pure State Constraints in Optimal Control;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • Q52 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Pollution Control Adoption and Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:cawmdp:67. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/camuede.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.