Lobbying as a multidimensional tug of war
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-019-01215-4
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Benjamin C. K. Egerod & Wiebke Marie Junk, 2022. "Competitive lobbying in the influence production process and the use of spatial econometrics in lobbying research," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 191(1), pages 193-215, April.
- Alex Dickson & Ian A. MacKenzie & Petros G. Sekeris, 2022. "Rent Dissipation in Simple Tullock Contests," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(6), pages 1-11, December.
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Sang-Hyun Kim, 2021.
"The Central Influencer Theorem: Spatial Voting Contests with Endogenous Coalition Formation,"
Working papers
2021rwp-193, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute.
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Sang-Hyun Kim, 2023. "The Central Influencer Theorem: Spatial Voting Contests with Endogenous Coalition Formation," Working Papers 2023019, The University of Sheffield, Department of Economics.
- Schnakenberg, Keith & Turner, Ian R, 2023. "Formal Theories of Special Interest Influence," SocArXiv 47e26, Center for Open Science.
- Alex Dickson & Ian MacKenzie & Petros G Sekeris, 2020. "Rent dissipation in share contests," Working Papers 2014, University of Strathclyde Business School, Department of Economics.
- Konstantinos Protopappas, 2022. "Optimal lobbying pricing," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(1), pages 37-61, July.
- Daniel Cardona & Jenny De Freitas & Antoni Rubí‐Barceló, 2022. "Lobbying policy makers: Share versus lottery contests," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 24(4), pages 709-732, August.
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