IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/finrev/v56y2021i4p693-719.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Financial consequences of reputational damage: Evidence from government economic incentives

Author

Listed:
  • D. Brian Blank
  • Brandy Hadley
  • Omer Unsal

Abstract

We investigate and quantify the financial consequences of corporate reputation by using manually assembled litigation, fraud, and cyberattack data from 2000 to 2018 to measure reputation changes following events that are often tied to public scrutiny. We examine the role of reputation in government subsidy awards and find reputational damage is linked to lower subsidies and Mega Deals, particularly tax‐related and state government awards. Moreover, subsidies only relate to higher firm value for firms without reputational damage. Our findings suggest that reputation is an important determinant of relatively opaque economic incentive awards and that reputational damage constrains the benefits thereof.

Suggested Citation

  • D. Brian Blank & Brandy Hadley & Omer Unsal, 2021. "Financial consequences of reputational damage: Evidence from government economic incentives," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 56(4), pages 693-719, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:finrev:v:56:y:2021:i:4:p:693-719
    DOI: 10.1111/fire.12274
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/fire.12274
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/fire.12274?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Aggey Semenov & Hector Perez Saiz, 2014. "The Effect Of Campaign Contributions On State Banking Regulation And Bank Expansion In U.S," 2014 Meeting Papers 1265, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    2. Nihat Aktas & Bodt Eric De & Jean-Gabriel Cousin, 2011. "Do financial markets care about SRI? Evidence from mergers and acquisitions," Post-Print hal-02312637, HAL.
    3. Claessens, Stijn & Feijen, Erik & Laeven, Luc, 2008. "Political connections and preferential access to finance: The role of campaign contributions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3), pages 554-580, June.
    4. Mark P. Sharfman & Chitru S. Fernando, 2008. "Environmental risk management and the cost of capital," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(6), pages 569-592, June.
    5. Caroline Flammer, 2018. "Competing for government procurement contracts: The role of corporate social responsibility," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(5), pages 1299-1324, May.
    6. Daley, Lane A. & Vigeland, Robert L., 1983. "The effects of debt covenants and political costs on the choice of accounting methods : The case of accounting for R&D costs," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 195-211, April.
    7. Key, Kimberly Galligan, 1997. "Political cost incentives for earnings management in the cable television industry," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 309-337, November.
    8. Johnson, William C. & Xie, Wenjuan & Yi, Sangho, 2014. "Corporate fraud and the value of reputations in the product market," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 16-39.
    9. John (Jianqiu) Bai & Douglas Fairhurst & Matthew Serfling & David Denis, 2020. "Employment Protection, Investment, and Firm Growth," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 33(2), pages 644-688.
    10. Boone, Audra & Uysal, Vahap B., 2020. "Reputational concerns in the market for corporate control," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    11. Smith, Jared D., 2016. "US political corruption and firm financial policies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(2), pages 350-367.
    12. Eitan Goldman & Jörg Rocholl & Jongil So, 2009. "Do Politically Connected Boards Affect Firm Value?," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(6), pages 2331-2360, June.
    13. Michael J. Cooper & Huseyin Gulen & Alexei V. Ovtchinnikov, 2010. "Corporate Political Contributions and Stock Returns," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 65(2), pages 687-724, April.
    14. Priya Garg, 2020. "Cybersecurity breaches and cash holdings: Spillover effect," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 49(2), pages 503-519, June.
    15. Bowen, Robert M. & Noreen, Eric W. & Lacey, John M., 1981. "Determinants of the corporate decision to capitalize interest," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 151-179, August.
    16. Hossain, Ashrafee Tanvir & Hossain, Takdir & Kryzanowski, Lawrence, 2021. "Political corruption and corporate payouts," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 123(C).
    17. Bruce Haslem & Irena Hutton & Aimee Hoffmann Smith, 2017. "How Much Do Corporate Defendants Really Lose? A New Verdict on the Reputation Loss Induced by Corporate Litigation," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 46(2), pages 323-358, June.
    18. MARA FACCIO & RONALD W. MASULIS & JOHN J. McCONNELL, 2006. "Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(6), pages 2597-2635, December.
    19. Faccio, Mara & Parsley, David C., 2009. "Sudden Deaths: Taking Stock of Geographic Ties," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 44(3), pages 683-718, June.
    20. John C. Coates IV, 2012. "Corporate Politics, Governance, and Value Before and After Citizens United," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 9(4), pages 657-696, December.
    21. Tahoun, Ahmed, 2014. "The role of stock ownership by US members of Congress on the market for political favors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(1), pages 86-110.
    22. Armour, John & Mayer, Colin & Polo, Andrea, 2017. "Regulatory Sanctions and Reputational Damage in Financial Markets," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 52(4), pages 1429-1448, August.
    23. Hadley, Brandy, 2019. "Executive compensation and political sensitivity: Evidence from government contractors," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 276-301.
    24. Karpoff, Jonathan M & Lott, John R, Jr, 1993. "The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear from Committing Criminal Fraud," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(2), pages 757-802, October.
    25. Kamiya, Shinichi & Kang, Jun-Koo & Kim, Jungmin & Milidonis, Andreas & Stulz, René M., 2021. "Risk management, firm reputation, and the impact of successful cyberattacks on target firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 139(3), pages 719-749.
    26. Bernard Raffournier, 1995. "The determinants of voluntary financial disclosure by Swiss listed companies," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 4(2), pages 261-280.
    27. Mara Faccio, 2006. "Politically Connected Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 369-386, March.
    28. Raymond Fisman, 2001. "Estimating the Value of Political Connections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 1095-1102, September.
    29. Aktas, Nihat & de Bodt, Eric & Cousin, Jean-Gabriel, 2011. "Do financial markets care about SRI? Evidence from mergers and acquisitions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(7), pages 1753-1761, July.
    30. Claire Lending & Kristina Minnick & Patrick J. Schorno, 2018. "Corporate Governance, Social Responsibility, and Data Breaches," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 53(2), pages 413-455, May.
    31. Kevin M. Gatzlaff & Kathleen A. McCullough, 2010. "The Effect of Data Breaches on Shareholder Wealth," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 13(1), pages 61-83, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Chinmoy Ghosh & Cristian Pinto‐Gutiérrez & Jaideep Shenoy, 2024. "Does negative news disclosure induce better decision‐making? Evidence from acquisitions," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 59(2), pages 325-372, May.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ilona Babenko & Viktar Fedaseyeu & Song Zhang, 2017. "Do CEOs affect employees' political choices?," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1750, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    2. David Schoenherr, 2019. "Political Connections and Allocative Distortions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 74(2), pages 543-586, April.
    3. Brown, Jeffrey R. & Huang, Jiekun, 2020. "All the president's friends: Political access and firm value," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 138(2), pages 415-431.
    4. Colonnelli, Emanuele & Lagaras, Spyridon & Ponticelli, Jacopo & Prem, Mounu & Tsoutsoura, Margarita, 2022. "Revealing corruption: Firm and worker level evidence from Brazil," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(3), pages 1097-1119.
    5. Coulomb, Renaud & Sangnier, Marc, 2014. "The impact of political majorities on firm value: Do electoral promises or friendship connections matter?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 158-170.
    6. Ilona Babenko & Viktar Fedaseyeu & Song Zhang, 2017. "Executives In Politics," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1762, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    7. Wei, Chunyan & Hu, Shiyang & Chen, Feng, 2020. "Do political connection disruptions increase labor costs in a government-dominated market? Evidence from publicly listed companies in China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    8. Pantzalis, Christos & Park, Jung Chul, 2014. "Too close for comfort? Geographic propinquity to political power and stock returns," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 57-78.
    9. Cull, Robert & Li, Wei & Sun, Bo & Xu, Lixin Colin, 2015. "Government connections and financial constraints: Evidence from a large representative sample of Chinese firms," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 271-294.
    10. Park, SeHyun, 2023. "Profitability of politically corrupt firms: Evidence from Romania," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    11. Ozlem Akin & Nicholas S. Coleman & Christian Fons-Rosen & José-Luis Peydró, 2016. "Political Connections: Evidence From Insider Trading Around TARP," Working Papers 935, Barcelona School of Economics.
    12. Gounopoulos, Dimitrios & Mazouz, Khelifa & Wood, Geoffrey, 2021. "The consequences of political donations for IPO premium and performance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    13. Jackowicz, Krzysztof & Kozłowski, Łukasz & Podgórski, Błażej & Winkler-Drews, Tadeusz, 2020. "Do political connections shield from negative shocks? Evidence from rating changes in advanced emerging economies," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 51(C).
    14. Shen, Chung-Hua & Bui, Dien Giau & Lin, Chih-Yung, 2017. "Do political factors affect stock returns during presidential elections?," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 180-198.
    15. Ozlem Akin & Nicholas S. Coleman & Christian Fons‐Rosen & José‐Luis Peydró, 2021. "Political connections and informed trading: Evidence from TARP," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 50(3), pages 619-644, September.
    16. Soumyajit Mazumder, 2016. "Can I stay a BIT longer? The effect of bilateral investment treaties on political survival," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 477-521, December.
    17. Ormazabal, Gaizka & Jagolinzer, Alan D. & Larcker, David F. & Taylor, Daniel, 2017. "Political Connections and the Informativeness of Insider Trades," CEPR Discussion Papers 12153, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    18. Hui Chen & David Parsley & Ya-Wen Yang, 2015. "Corporate Lobbying and Firm Performance," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(3-4), pages 444-481, April.
    19. Coulomb, Renaud & Sangnier, Marc, 2014. "The impact of political majorities on firm value: Do electoral promises or friendship connections matter?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 158-170.
    20. Luechinger, Simon & Moser, Christoph, 2014. "The value of the revolving door: Political appointees and the stock market," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 93-107.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:finrev:v:56:y:2021:i:4:p:693-719. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/efaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.