IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-03113208.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Competing for policy: Lobbying in the EU wholesale roaming regulation

Author

Listed:
  • Amanda Alves

    (Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres, DRM - Dauphine Recherches en Management - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Eric Brousseau

    (Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres, DRM - Dauphine Recherches en Management - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Nada Mimouni

    (CEDRIC - ISID - CEDRIC. Ingénierie des Systèmes d'Information et de Décision - CEDRIC - Centre d'études et de recherche en informatique et communications - ENSIIE - Ecole Nationale Supérieure d'Informatique pour l'Industrie et l'Entreprise - CNAM - Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers [CNAM])

  • Timothy Yu-Cheong Yeung

    (KU Leuven - Catholic University of Leuven = Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres)

Abstract

This work examines the informational lobbying prior to the proposal drafting by the European Commission on the wholesale roaming regulation through the lens of the framework of political market. We employ a mixed approach that combines topic modelling, multivariate regression, and qualitative text analysis based on the textual replies to the public consultation launched by the Commission prior to the first draft of the regulation proposal. Our analysis identifies two main topics of debate and discovers diverse opinions within each topic. Regression analysis that explains alignments of preferences between the Commission and the stakeholders does not point to any evidence that the Commission consistently took the same positions as stakeholders of certain characteristics. Instead, this work argues that lobbying pressure was not effective in such a heterogeneous industry and the Commission was able to navigate easily the diverse interests and to pursue its own policy ambition.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Amanda Alves & Eric Brousseau & Nada Mimouni & Timothy Yu-Cheong Yeung, 2021. "Competing for policy: Lobbying in the EU wholesale roaming regulation," Post-Print hal-03113208, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03113208
    DOI: 10.1016/j.telpol.2020.102087
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Spruytte, Jonathan & Van der Wee, Marlies & de Regt, Mieke & Verbrugge, Sofie & Colle, Didier, 2017. "International roaming in the EU: Current overview, challenges, opportunities and solutions," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 41(9), pages 717-730.
    2. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey, 2008. "Ideological uncertainty and lobbying competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 456-481, April.
    3. Mahoney, Christine, 2007. "Lobbying Success in the United States and the European Union," Journal of Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 27(1), pages 35-56, May.
    4. Schuler, Douglas A. & Rehbein, Kathleen, 2011. "Determinants of Access to Legislative and Executive Branch Officials: Business Firms and Trade Policymaking in the U.S," Business and Politics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 13(3), pages 1-30, October.
    5. Ambjørnsen, Terje & Foros, Øystein & Wasenden, Ole-Christian B., 2011. "Customer ignorance, price-cap regulation, and rent-seeking in mobile roaming," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 27-36, March.
    6. Bonardi, Jean-Philippe & Holburn, Guy & Vanden Bergh, Rick, 2006. "Nonmarket performance: Evidence from U.S. electric utilities," MPRA Paper 14437, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Schuler Douglas A. & Rehbein Kathleen, 2011. "Determinants of Access to Legislative and Executive Branch Officials: Business Firms and Trade Policymaking in the U.S," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(3), pages 1-32, October.
    8. Infante, Jorge & Vallejo, Ivan, 2012. "Regulation of international roaming in the European Union—Lessons learned," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(9), pages 736-748.
    9. By Kishore Gawande & Pravin Krishna & Marcelo Olarreaga, 2012. "Lobbying Competition Over Trade Policy," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(1), pages 115-132, February.
    10. Rodolphe Durand & Robert M. Grant & Tammy L. Madsen & Sinziana Dorobantu & Aseem Kaul & Bennet Zelner, 2017. "Nonmarket strategy research through the lens of new institutional economics: An integrative review and future directions," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(1), pages 114-140, January.
    11. Karoliina Isoaho & Fanni Moilanen & Arho Toikka, 2019. "A Big Data View of the European Energy Union: Shifting from ‘a Floating Signifier’ to an Active Driver of Decarbonisation?," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 7(1), pages 28-44.
    12. Frédéric Bourassa & Sam Paltridge & Verena Weber & Yuki Yokomori & Dimitri Ypsilanti, 2016. "Developments in International Mobile Roaming," OECD Digital Economy Papers 249, OECD Publishing.
    13. de Figueiredo, John M & Silverman, Brian S, 2006. "Academic Earmarks and the Returns to Lobbying," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 49(2), pages 597-625, October.
    14. Rui J. P. De Figueiredo & Geoff Edwards, 2007. "Does Private Money Buy Public Policy? Campaign Contributions and Regulatory Outcomes in Telecommunications," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(3), pages 547-576, September.
    15. Baron, David P., 1999. "Integrated Market and Nonmarket Strategies in Client and Interest Group Politics," Business and Politics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(1), pages 7-34, April.
    16. Salsas, Roger & Koboldt, Christian, 2004. "Roaming free?: Roaming network selection and inter-operator tariffs," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 497-517, December.
    17. Fabrizi, Simona & Wertlen, Bruno, 2008. "Roaming in the Mobile Internet," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 50-61, February.
    18. Coen, David, 1998. "The European Business Interest and the Nation State: Large-firm Lobbying in the European Union and Member States," Journal of Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(1), pages 75-100, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Martins, Carlos Lúcio & Fonseca, Maria da Conceição & Pato, Margarida Vaz, 2017. "Modeling the Steering of International Roaming Traffic," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 261(2), pages 735-754.
    2. Amrita Saha & Vikrant Shirodkar & Thomas C. Lawton, 2023. "Bimodal lobbying and trade policy outcomes: Evidence from corporate political activity under uncertainty in India," Journal of International Business Policy, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 6(1), pages 24-46, March.
    3. Baranes, Edmond & Vuong, Cuong Hung, 2021. "A model of international roaming regulation and competition in European mobile markets," 23rd ITS Biennial Conference, Online Conference / Gothenburg 2021. Digital societies and industrial transformations: Policies, markets, and technologies in a post-Covid world 238008, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
    4. Orhan Dagli & Glenn P. Jenkins, 2015. "Consumer Preferences for Improvements in Mobile Telecommunication Services," Development Discussion Papers 2015-05, JDI Executive Programs.
    5. Michaël Tatham & Mads Thau, 2014. "The more the merrier: Accounting for regional paradiplomats in Brussels," European Union Politics, , vol. 15(2), pages 255-276, June.
    6. John M. de Figueiredo & Brian Kelleher Richter, 2013. "Advancing the Empirical Research on Lobbying," NBER Working Papers 19698, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Woon Leong Lin, 2018. "Do Firm’s Organisational Slacks Influence the Relationship between Corporate Lobbying and Corporate Financial Performance? More Is Not Always Better," IJFS, MDPI, vol. 7(1), pages 1-23, December.
    8. Martin Quinn & Miguel Godinho de Matos & Christian Peukert, 2022. "The Welfare Effects of Mobile Internet Access - Evidence from Roam-Like-at-Home," CESifo Working Paper Series 9612, CESifo.
    9. Saha, Amrita, 2019. "Trade policy & lobbying effectiveness: Theory and evidence for India," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 165-192.
    10. Albino-Pimentel, João & Dussauge, Pierre & El Nayal, Omar, 2022. "Intellectual property rights, non-market considerations and foreign R&D investments," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 51(2).
    11. Qi, Guoyou & Zou, Hailiang & Xie, Xuemei & Meng, Xiaohua & Fan, Tijun & Cao, Yuanhe, 2020. "Obedience or escape: Examining the contingency influences of corruption on firm exports," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 261-272.
    12. Kim Jin-Hyuk, 2008. "Corporate Lobbying Revisited," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(2), pages 1-25, September.
    13. Rodolphe Durand & Robert M. Grant & Tammy L. Madsen & Sinziana Dorobantu & Aseem Kaul & Bennet Zelner, 2017. "Nonmarket strategy research through the lens of new institutional economics: An integrative review and future directions," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(1), pages 114-140, January.
    14. Gautam Ahuja & Sai Yayavaram, 2011. "PERSPECTIVE ---Explaining Influence Rents: The Case for an Institutions-Based View of Strategy," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 22(6), pages 1631-1652, December.
    15. Fremeth, Adam R. & Holburn, Guy L. F. & Piazza, Alessandro, 2021. "Activist Protest Spillovers into the Regulatory Domain: Theory and Evidence from the U.S. Nuclear Power Generation Industry," OSF Preprints s39h2, Center for Open Science.
    16. Graham Mallard, 2014. "Static Common Agency And Political Influence: An Evaluative Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 17-35, February.
    17. Matilde Bombardini & Francesco Trebbi, 2020. "Empirical Models of Lobbying," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 12(1), pages 391-413, August.
    18. White, George O. & Hemphill, Thomas A. & Joplin, Janice R.W. & Marsh, Laurence A., 2014. "Wholly owned foreign subsidiary relation-based strategies in volatile environments," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 303-312.
    19. Adam R. Fremeth & Guy L. F. Holburn & Richard G. Vanden Bergh, 2016. "Corporate Political Strategy in Contested Regulatory Environments," Strategy Science, INFORMS, vol. 1(4), pages 272-284, December.
    20. Giulia Canzian & Gianluca Mazzarella & Frank Verboven & Stefano Verzillo & Louis Ronchail, 2021. "Evaluating the Impact of Price Caps - Evidence from the European Roam-Like-at-Home Regulation," CESifo Working Paper Series 9303, CESifo.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03113208. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.