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Ming Li

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Dorian BEAUCHÊNE & Jian LI & Ming LI, 2018. "Ambiguous Persuasion," Cahiers de recherche 25-2018, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.

    Cited by:

    1. Matthew Kovach, 2021. "Ambiguity and Partial Bayesian Updating," Papers 2102.11429, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2023.
    2. Sarah Auster & Christian Kellner, 2023. "Timing Decisions Under Model Uncertainty," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_460, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    3. Takashi Ui, 2023. "Strategic Ambiguity in Global Games," Papers 2303.12263, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2024.
    4. Shiri Alon & Sarah Auster & Gabi Gayer & Stefania Minardi, 2023. "Persuasion with Limited Data: A Case-Based Approach," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 245, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    5. Denis Shishkin & Pietro Ortoleva, 2021. "Ambiguous Information and Dilation: An Experiment," Working Papers 2020-53, Princeton University. Economics Department..
    6. P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Dominik Karos & Toygar T. Kerman, 2024. "Belief inducibility and informativeness," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 96(4), pages 517-553, June.
    7. Xiaoyu Cheng, 2020. "Ambiguous Persuasion: An Ex-Ante Formulation," Papers 2010.05376, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2023.
    8. Eitan Sapiro-Gheiler, 2021. "Persuasion with Ambiguous Receiver Preferences," Papers 2109.11536, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2023.
    9. Jonas Hedlund & T. Florian Kauffeldt & Malte Lammert, 2021. "Persuasion under ambiguity," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 90(3), pages 455-482, May.
    10. Grant, Simon & Stauber, Ronald, 2022. "Delegation and ambiguity in correlated equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 487-509.
    11. Cheng, Xiaoyu, 2022. "Relative Maximum Likelihood updating of ambiguous beliefs," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
    12. Pahlke, Marieke, 2022. "Dynamic consistency in incomplete information games with multiple priors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 85-108.
    13. Spyros Galanis & Christos A. Ioannou & Stelios Kotronis, 2023. "Information Aggregation Under Ambiguity: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Department of Economics Working Papers 2023_04, Durham University, Department of Economics.
    14. Ju Hu & Xi Weng, 2021. "Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 909-953, October.
    15. Ivanov, Maxim & Sam, Alex, 2022. "Cheap talk with private signal structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 288-304.
    16. Nikzad, Afshin, 2021. "Persuading a pessimist: Simplicity and robustness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 144-157.
    17. Pahlke, Marieke, 2019. "A Note on Dynamic Consistency in Ambiguous Persuasion," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 611, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    18. Spyros Galanis & Christos A. Ioannou & Stelios Kotronis, 2023. "Supplementary appendix to Information Aggregation Under Ambiguity: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Department of Economics Working Papers 2023_05, Durham University, Department of Economics.
    19. Burkovskaya, Anastasia & Li, Jian, 2020. "Comparative Profitability of Product Disclosure Statements," ISU General Staff Papers 202002040800001095, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    20. Xiaoyu Cheng, 2019. "Relative Maximum Likelihood Updating of Ambiguous Beliefs," Papers 1911.02678, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2021.
    21. Shishkin, Denis & Ortoleva, Pietro, 2023. "Ambiguous information and dilation: An experiment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
    22. Sarah Auster & Christian Kellner, 2023. "Timing Decisions under Model Uncertainty," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 252, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    23. Longjian Li, 2022. "Ambiguous Cheap Talk," Papers 2209.08494, arXiv.org.
    24. Zhiwei Liu & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 2021. "Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald’s maxmin preferences," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 801-833, October.
    25. Rumen Kostadinov, 2024. "Regret in Durable-Good Monopoly," Department of Economics Working Papers 2024-02, McMaster University.
    26. Kellner, Christian & Thordal-Le Quement, Mark & Riener, Gerhard, 2020. "Reacting to ambiguous messages: An experimental analysis," DICE Discussion Papers 357, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    27. Pietro Dall'Ara, 2024. "Persuading an inattentive and privately informed receiver," Papers 2408.01250, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2024.
    28. Takashi Ui, 2021. "Strategic Ambiguity in Global Games," Working Papers on Central Bank Communication 032, University of Tokyo, Graduate School of Economics.
    29. Pahlke, Marieke, 2022. "Dynamic Consistency and Ambiguous Communication," VfS Annual Conference 2022 (Basel): Big Data in Economics 264027, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    30. Auster, Sarah & Kellner, Christian, 2022. "Robust bidding and revenue in descending price auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 199(C).
    31. Emir Kamenica & Kyungmin Kim & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2021. "Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 701-704, October.
    32. Rui Tang, 2020. "A Theory of Updating Ambiguous Information," Papers 2012.13650, arXiv.org.

  2. Anton Kolotilin & Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ming Li, 2016. "Persuasion Of A Privately Informed Receiver," Working Papers 2016_22, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.

    Cited by:

    1. Ludmila Matyskova, 2018. "Bayesian Persuasion with Costly Information Acquisition," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp614, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    2. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2016. "Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion, and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(5), pages 586-591, May.
    3. Ottaviani, Marco & Di Tillio, Alfredo & Sørensen, Peter Norman, 2016. "Persuasion Bias in Science: Can Economics Help?," CEPR Discussion Papers 11343, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Alejandro Melo Ponce, 2018. "The Secret Behind The Tortoise and the Hare: Information Design in Contests," 2018 Papers pme809, Job Market Papers.
    5. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2017. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Working Papers 089_2017, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
    6. Raphael Boleslavsky & Bruce I. Carlin & Christopher Cotton, 2017. "Competing for Capital: Auditing and Credibility in Financial Reporting," NBER Working Papers 23273, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Dmitry Sedov, 2023. "Almost-truthful interim-biased mediation enables information exchange between agents with misaligned interests," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 27(3), pages 505-546, September.
    8. Yingkai Li & Boli Xu, 2024. "Falsifiable Test Design in Coordination Games," Papers 2405.18521, arXiv.org.
    9. Terstiege, Stefan & Wasser, Cédric, 2020. "Buyer-optimal extensionproof information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
    10. Mariotti, Thomas & Schweizer, Nikolaus & Szech, Nora & von Wangenheim, Jonas, 2018. "Information Nudges and Self-Control," CEPR Discussion Papers 13299, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Hao Li & Xianwen Shi, 2017. "Discriminatory Information Disclosure," Working Papers tecipa-583, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    12. Jerry Anunrojwong & Krishnamurthy Iyer & David Lingenbrink, 2022. "Persuading Risk-Conscious Agents: A Geometric Approach," Papers 2208.03758, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.
    13. Arianna Degan & Ming Li & Huan Xie, 2023. "An experimental investigation of persuasion through selective disclosure of evidence," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 56(4), pages 1490-1516, November.
    14. Manxi Wu & Saurabh Amin & Asuman E. Ozdaglar, 2021. "Value of Information in Bayesian Routing Games," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 69(1), pages 148-163, January.
    15. Anton Kolotilin & Alexander Wolitzky, 2020. "Assortative Information Disclosure," Discussion Papers 2020-08, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    16. Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti, 2022. "Data, Competition, and Digital Platforms," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2343, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    17. Gottardi, Piero & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2024. "Shuttle diplomacy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 216(C).
    18. Caio Lorecchio, 2022. "Persuading crowds," UB School of Economics Working Papers 2022/434, University of Barcelona School of Economics.
    19. Yang, Kai Hao, 2021. "Efficient demands in a multi-product monopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    20. Anton Kolotilin & Hongyi, 2020. "Relational Communication," Discussion Papers 2018-12b, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    21. Maxim Ivanov, 2021. "Optimal monotone signals in Bayesian persuasion mechanisms," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 955-1000, October.
    22. Sareh Vosooghi, 2017. "Information Design In Coalition Formation Games," Working Papers 2017.28, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    23. Eduardo Perez & Vasiliki Skreta, 2018. "Test Design Under Falsification," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03393136, HAL.
    24. Kocourek, Pavel & Steiner, Jakub & Stewart, Colin, 2024. "Boundedly rational demand," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(4), November.
    25. Christopher Cotton & Raphael Boleslavsky, 2015. "Limited Capacity In Project Selection: Competition Through Evidence Production," Working Paper 1343, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    26. Ehud Lehrer & Dimitry Shaiderman, 2022. "Markovian Persuasion with Stochastic Revelations," Papers 2204.08659, arXiv.org, revised May 2022.
    27. Saltuk Ozerturk, 2018. "Choosing a media outlet when seeking public approval," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 174(1), pages 3-21, January.
    28. Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2016. "Political disagreement and information in elections," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 390-412.
    29. Makoto Shimoji, 2016. "Rationalizable Persuasion," Discussion Papers 16/08, Department of Economics, University of York.
    30. Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2024. "Organizing data analytics," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 120780, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    31. Habibi, Amir, 2020. "Motivation and information design," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 1-18.
    32. Denter, Philipp & Dumav, Martin & Ginzburg, Boris, 2019. "Social Connectivity, Media Bias, and Correlation Neglect," MPRA Paper 97626, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    33. Pham, Hien, 2023. "How Information Design Shapes Optimal Selling Mechanisms," MPRA Paper 120989, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 Mar 2024.
    34. Lily Ling Yang, 2024. "Information Design with Costly State Verifi cation," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2024_502, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    35. Alonso, Ricardo & Zachariadis, Konstantinos E., 2024. "Persuading large investors," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 126040, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    36. Pak Hung Au & Mark Whitmeyer, 2018. "Attraction versus Persuasion: Information Provision in Search Markets," Papers 1802.09396, arXiv.org, revised May 2022.
    37. Chiba, Saori & Hori, Kazumi, 2022. "Two-sided strategic information transmission," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 229-241.
    38. Jonas Hedlund & T. Florian Kauffeldt & Malte Lammert, 2021. "Persuasion under ambiguity," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 90(3), pages 455-482, May.
    39. Zeng, Yishu, 2023. "Derandomization of persuasion mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
    40. Rosar, Frank, 2017. "Test design under voluntary participation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 632-655.
    41. Carroni, Elias & Ferrari, Luca & Righi, Simone, 2019. "The price of discovering your needs online," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 164(C), pages 317-330.
    42. Anton Kolotilin & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2024. "Persuasion Meets Delegation," Discussion Papers 2024-04, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    43. Ozan Candogan & Philipp Strack, 2021. "Optimal Disclosure of Information to a Privately Informed Receiver," Papers 2101.10431, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2022.
    44. Meng, Delong, 2021. "Learning from like-minded people," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 231-250.
    45. Yair Antler & Daniel Bird & Santiago Oliveros, 2023. "Sequential Learning," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 15(1), pages 399-433, February.
    46. Zerbini, Antoine, 2023. "The Case for Lobbying Transparency," SocArXiv w6vam, Center for Open Science.
    47. Elias Tsakas & Nikolas Tsakas, 2018. "Noisy Persuasion," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 11-2018, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
    48. Krähmer, Daniel, 2020. "Information disclosure and full surplus extraction in mechanism design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
    49. Juan Passadore & Juan Xandri, 2019. "Robust Predictions in Dynamic Policy Games," 2019 Meeting Papers 1345, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    50. Elias Tsakas & Nikolas Tsakas & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2021. "Resisting persuasion," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 723-742, October.
    51. Babichenko, Yakov & Talgam-Cohen, Inbal & Xu, Haifeng & Zabarnyi, Konstantin, 2022. "Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 226-248.
    52. Candogan, Ozan & Strack, Philipp, 2023. "Optimal disclosure of information to privately informed agents," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(3), July.
    53. Pham, Hien, 2023. "How Information Design Shapes Optimal Selling Mechanisms," MPRA Paper 120364, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 Mar 2024.
    54. Harbaugh, Richmond & To, Theodore, 2020. "False modesty: When disclosing good news looks bad," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 43-55.
    55. Liu, Yixuan & Whinston, Andrew B., 2019. "Efficient real-time routing for autonomous vehicles through Bayes correlated equilibrium: An information design framework," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 14-26.
    56. Chan, Jimmy & Gupta, Seher & Li, Fei & Wang, Yun, 2019. "Pivotal persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 178-202.
      • Jimmy Chan & Seher Gupta & Fei Li & Yun Wang, 2018. "Pivotal Persuasion," Working Papers 2018-11-03, Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE), Xiamen University.
    57. Matysková, Ludmila & Montes, Alfonso, 2023. "Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
    58. Yaron Leitner & Basil Williams, 2023. "Model Secrecy and Stress Tests," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 78(2), pages 1055-1095, April.
    59. Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti & Alex Smolin, 2017. "The Design and Price of Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2049R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    60. Jacopo Bizzotto & Adrien Vigier, 2022. "A Case for Tiered School Systems," Working Papers 202205, Oslo Metropolitan University, Oslo Business School.
    61. Parakhonyak, Alexei & Vikander, Nick, 2023. "Information design through scarcity and social learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
    62. Shihong Xiao & Ying-Ju Chen & Christopher S. Tang, 2022. "Customer Review Provision Policies with Heterogeneous Cluster Preferences," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(7), pages 5025-5048, July.
    63. Ayça Özdoðan, 2016. "A Survey of Strategic Communication and Persuasion," Bogazici Journal, Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies, Bogazici University, Department of Economics, vol. 30(1), pages 1-21.
    64. Maryam Saeedi & Ali Shourideh, 2020. "Optimal Rating Design under Moral Hazard," Papers 2008.09529, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.
    65. Amir Habibi, 2023. "Communicating Preferences to Improve Recommendations," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 394, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    66. Min, Daehong, 2023. "Screening for experiments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 73-100.
    67. Azarmsa, Ehsan & Cong, Lin William, 2020. "Persuasion in relationship finance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 138(3), pages 818-837.
    68. Artem Hulko & Mark Whitmeyer, 2017. "A Game of Random Variables," Papers 1712.08716, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2018.
    69. Kerman, Toygar & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Karos, Dominik, 2020. "Persuading Strategic Voters," Research Memorandum 004, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    70. Ginzburg, Boris, 2019. "Optimal information censorship," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 377-385.
    71. Dworczak, Piotr & Kolotilin, Anton, 2024. "The persuasion duality," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(4), November.
    72. Junze Sun & Arthur Schram & Randolph Sloof, 2019. "A Theory on Media Bias and Elections," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 19-048/I, Tinbergen Institute.
    73. Dirk Bergemann & Paul Duetting & Renato Paes Leme & Song Zuo, 2021. "Calibrated Click-Through Auctions: An Information Design Approach," Papers 2105.09375, arXiv.org.
    74. Whitmeyer, Joseph & Whitmeyer, Mark, 2021. "Mixtures of mean-preserving contractions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
    75. Kun Heo & Antoine Zerbini, 2024. "Segment and rule: Modern censorship in authoritarian regimes," Discussion Papers 2024-04, Nottingham Interdisciplinary Centre for Economic and Political Research (NICEP).
    76. Jeffrey C. Ely, 2017. "Beeps," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(1), pages 31-53, January.
    77. David Lingenbrink & Krishnamurthy Iyer, 2019. "Optimal Signaling Mechanisms in Unobservable Queues," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 67(5), pages 1397-1416, September.
    78. Kolotilin, Anton, 2018. "Optimal information disclosure: a linear programming approach," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(2), May.
    79. Zhou, Junya, 2023. "Costly verification and commitment in persuasion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 212(C), pages 1100-1142.
    80. Nicolás Figueroa & Carla Guadalupi, 2020. "Testing the sender: When signaling is not enough," Documentos de Trabajo 547, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
    81. Lyu, Chen, 2023. "Information design for selling search goods and the effect of competition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
    82. Pham, Hien, 2023. "How Information Design Shapes Optimal Selling Mechanisms," MPRA Paper 120462, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 17 Mar 2024.
    83. Matthew Gentzkow & Emir Kamenica, 2016. "A Rothschild-Stiglitz Approach to Bayesian Persuasion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(5), pages 597-601, May.
    84. Yamashita, Takuro, 2018. "Optimal Public Information Disclosure by Mechanism Designer," TSE Working Papers 18-936, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    85. Jacopo Bizzotto & Adrien Vigier, 2022. "Sorting and Grading," Papers 2208.10894, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
    86. Farzaneh Farhadi & Demosthenis Teneketzis, 2022. "Dynamic Information Design: A Simple Problem on Optimal Sequential Information Disclosure," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 443-484, June.
    87. Andrew T Little, 2023. "Bayesian explanations for persuasion," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 35(3), pages 147-181, July.
    88. Chen, Yanlin & Hu, Audrey & Zhang, Jun, 2024. "Optimal auction design with aftermarket Cournot competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 54-65.
    89. Boleslavsky, Raphael & Lewis, Tracy R., 2016. "Evolving influence: Mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 110-134.
    90. Aristidou, Andreas & Coricelli, Giorgio & Vostroknutov, Alexander, 2019. "Incentives or Persuasion? An Experimental Investigation," Research Memorandum 012, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).

  3. Arianna Degan & Ming Li, 2015. "Persuasive signalling," Working Papers 15003, Concordia University, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Koessler, Frédéric & Skreta, Vasiliki, 2022. "Informed Information Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 17028, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Yanlin Chen & Jun Zhang, 2019. "Signaling by Bayesian Persuasion and Pricing Strategy. Short title: Disclosure and Price Signaling," Working Paper Series 2019/14, Economics Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney.

  4. Arianna Degan & Ming Li, 2014. "Psychologically-Based Voting with Uncertainty," CESifo Working Paper Series 5014, CESifo.

    Cited by:

    1. Jan Schnellenbach & Christian Schubert, 2014. "Behavioral Political Economy: A Survey," CESifo Working Paper Series 4988, CESifo.

  5. FU, Qiang & LI, Ming, 2010. "Policy Making with Reputation Concerns," Cahiers de recherche 09-2010, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.

    Cited by:

    1. Ying Chen, 2015. "Career Concerns and Excessive Risk Taking," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(1), pages 110-130, March.
    2. Liu, Yaozhou Franklin & Sanyal, Amal, 2010. "When second opinions hurt: a model of expert advice under career concerns," MPRA Paper 27176, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Doukas, John A. & Mandal, Sonik, 2018. "CEO risk preferences and hedging decisions: A multiyear analysis," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 131-153.

  6. Li, Ming & Tymofiy Mylovanov, 2009. "Credibility for Sale: the Effect of Disclosure on Information Acquisition and Transmission," Working Papers 09008, Concordia University, Department of Economics, revised Oct 2009.

    Cited by:

    1. Wei Li, 2010. "Peddling Influence through Intermediaries," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(3), pages 1136-1162, June.

  7. Ming Li & Dipjyoti Majumdar, 2006. "A psychologically-based model of voter turnout," Working Papers 08008, Concordia University, Department of Economics, revised Dec 2008.

    Cited by:

    1. Degan, Arianna & Li, Ming, 2015. "Psychologically-based voting with uncertainty," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PB), pages 242-259.
    2. Elena Panova, 2011. "A Passion for Democracy," CIRANO Working Papers 2011s-47, CIRANO.
    3. Jan Schnellenbach & Christian Schubert, 2014. "Behavioral Political Economy: A Survey," CESifo Working Paper Series 4988, CESifo.
    4. Schnellenbach, Jan & Schubert, Christian, 2014. "Behavioral public choice: A survey," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 14/03, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    5. Conrad, Peter & Bergey, Meredith R., 2014. "The impending globalization of ADHD: Notes on the expansion and growth of a medicalized disorder," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 31-43.
    6. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2016. "Whither Game Theory?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000001307, David K. Levine.

  8. Ming Li, 2003. "To Disclose or Not to Disclose: Cheap Talk with Uncertain Biases," Working Papers 04003, Concordia University, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2004.

    Cited by:

    1. Kovác, Eugen & Mylovanov, Tymofiy, 2009. "Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: The regular case," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1373-1395, July.
    2. Karakoç Gülen, 2022. "Cheap Talk with Multiple Experts and Uncertain Biases," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 22(2), pages 527-556, June.
    3. Gulen Karakoc, 2020. "Cheap Talk with Multiple Experts and Uncertain Biases," Working Papers 451, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics.
    4. A.K.S. Chand, 2012. "Strategic Information Transmission with Budget Constraint," Working Papers 2012_19, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".

  9. Li, Ming, 2002. "Information collection in bargaining," MPRA Paper 11108, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Mar 2007.

    Cited by:

    1. Ming Li, 2009. "Information collection in bargaining," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(4), pages 481-498, November.

Articles

  1. Arianna Degan & Ming Li, 2021. "Persuasion with costly precision," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 869-908, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Shaofei Jiang, 2024. "Costly Persuasion by a Partially Informed Sender," Papers 2401.14087, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2024.
    2. Tomás Rodríguez Barraquer & Xu Tan, 2023. "A model of competitive signaling with rich message spaces," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 27(1), pages 1-43, February.
    3. Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2023. "On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(4), pages 1051-1067, November.
    4. Daehong Min, 2021. "Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 743-764, October.
    5. Figueroa, Nicolás & Guadalupi, Carla, 2023. "Signaling through tests," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 25-34.
    6. Jeahan Jung & Jeong Yoo Kim, 2024. "Cheap Talk with Transparent and Monotone Motives from a Seller to an Informed Buyer," Games, MDPI, vol. 15(3), pages 1-20, May.
    7. Zhiwei Liu & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 2021. "Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald’s maxmin preferences," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 801-833, October.
    8. Md. Maruf Ahmed Molla & Jannat Ara Disha & Mahmuda Yeasmin & Asish Kumar Ghosh & Tasnim Nafisa, 2021. "Decreasing transmission and initiation of countrywide vaccination: Key challenges for future management of COVID‐19 pandemic in Bangladesh," International Journal of Health Planning and Management, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(4), pages 1014-1029, July.
    9. Emir Kamenica & Kyungmin Kim & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2021. "Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 701-704, October.

  2. Qingqing Cheng & Ming Li, 2019. "Optimal Majority Rule in Referenda," Games, MDPI, vol. 10(2), pages 1-23, June.

    Cited by:

    1. Pathak, Seemantini & Chiu, Shih-Chi (Sana), 2020. "Firm-advisor ties and financial performance in the context of corporate divestiture," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 315-328.
    2. Cheffi, Walid & Kaleem Zahir-ul-Hassan, Muhammad & Omer Farooq, Muhammad & Baqrain, Abdelrahman & Mohamed Habib Mansour, Mourad, 2023. "Ethical leadership, management control systems and circular economy in SMEs in an emerging economy, the UAE," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 156(C).

  3. Beauchêne, Dorian & Li, Jian & Li, Ming, 2019. "Ambiguous persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 312-365.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Anton Kolotilin & Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ming Li, 2017. "Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85(6), pages 1949-1964, November.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. Degan, Arianna & Li, Ming, 2015. "Psychologically-based voting with uncertainty," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PB), pages 242-259.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  6. Fu, Qiang & Li, Ming, 2014. "Reputation-concerned policy makers and institutional status quo bias," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 15-25.

    Cited by:

    1. Morelli, Massimo & Gratton, Gabriele, 2020. "Optimal Checks and Balances Under Policy Uncertainty," CEPR Discussion Papers 14745, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Chia-Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida, 2014. "Careerist Experts and Political Incorrectness," ISER Discussion Paper 0894, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    3. Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2016. "Political disagreement and information in elections," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 390-412.
    4. Thomas Kiptanui TARUS, 2021. "Determinants of Corporate Risk Management: Does Board Size and Tenure Matter? Panel Data Approach from Kenyan Publicly Listed Firms," Journal of Economics and Financial Analysis, Tripal Publishing House, vol. 5(1), pages 65-79.
    5. Qiang Fu & Ming Li & Xue Qiao, 2022. "On the paradox of mediocracy," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(2), pages 492-521, April.
    6. Cassette, Aurélie & Farvaque, Etienne, 2015. "A dirty deed done dirt cheap: reporting the blame of a national reform on local politicians," MPRA Paper 67031, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Bergers, Dominic, 2022. "The status quo bias and its individual differences from a price management perspective," Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    8. Elisabeth Schulte & Mike Felgenhauer, 2015. "Preselection and Expert Advice," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201524, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    9. Dominic Bergers, 2021. "Individual differences in the susceptibility of biases relevant in price management: a state-of-the-art article," Journal of Revenue and Pricing Management, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 20(4), pages 497-528, August.
    10. Camara, Fanny, 2019. "Avoiding Judgement by Recommending Inaction: Beliefs Manipulation and Reputational Concerns," CEPR Discussion Papers 14149, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Hanzhe Li, 2022. "Transparency and Policymaking with Endogenous Information Provision," Papers 2204.08876, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2023.
    12. Arianna Degan & Ming Li, 2021. "Persuasion with costly precision," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 869-908, October.
    13. Kim, Doyoung, 2017. "Motivating for new changes when agents have reputation concerns," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 37-53.
    14. Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2013. "Rational Ignorance, Elections, and Reform," MPRA Paper 68638, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 10 Dec 2015.
    15. Andreas Grunewald & Emanuel Hansen & Gert Pönitzsch, 2020. "Political selection and the optimal concentration of political power," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(1), pages 273-311, July.

  7. Li Ming, 2010. "Advice from Multiple Experts: A Comparison of Simultaneous, Sequential, and Hierarchical Communication," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-24, April.

    Cited by:

    1. Catonini, Emiliano & Kurbatov, Andrey & Stepanov, Sergey, 2024. "Independent versus collective expertise," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 340-356.
    2. Li, Zhuozheng & Rantakari, Heikki & Yang, Huanxing, 2016. "Competitive cheap talk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 65-89.
    3. Junichiro Ishida & Takashi Shimizu, 2009. "Cheap Talk with an Informed Receiver," ISER Discussion Paper 0746r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Jun 2015.
    4. Yves Oytana & Nathalie Chappe, 2016. "Expert opinion in a tort litigation game," EconomiX Working Papers 2016-23, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    5. Mark Thordal-Le Quement, 2016. "The (Human) Sampler's Curses," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(4), pages 115-148, November.
    6. Chung, Jeahan & Kim, Jeong-Yoo, 2018. "Cheap talk by multiple speakers in the presence of network externalities," Economics Discussion Papers 2018-9, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    7. McGee, Andrew & Yang, Huanxing, 2013. "Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 181-191.
    8. Jeahan Jung & Jeong-Yoo Kim, 2019. "Cheap Talk by Two Senders in the Presence of Network Externalities," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 35, pages 249-274.
    9. Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2013. "Optimal Arbitration," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 54(3), pages 769-785, August.
    10. Szalay, Dezső & Deimen, Inga, 2020. "Authority in a theory of the firm," CEPR Discussion Papers 15026, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Killian J. McCarthy & Florian Noseleit, 2022. "Too many cooks spoil the broth: on the impact of external advisors on mergers and acquisitions," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 16(6), pages 1817-1852, August.
    12. Esra E. Bayindir & Mehmet Y. Gurdal & Ayca Ozdogan & Ismail Saglam, 2020. "Cheap Talk Games with Two-Senders and Different Modes of Communication," Games, MDPI, vol. 11(2), pages 1-22, April.

  8. Ming Li & Dipjyoti Majumdar, 2010. "A Psychologically Based Model of Voter Turnout," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(5), pages 979-1002, October.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  9. Ming Li, 2009. "Information collection in bargaining," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(4), pages 481-498, November.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  10. Ming Li, 2008. "Two (talking) heads are not better than one," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(63), pages 1-8.

    Cited by:

    1. Gurdal, Mehmet Y. & Ozdogan, Ayca & Saglam, Ismail, 2013. "Cheap talk with simultaneous versus sequential messages," MPRA Paper 45727, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Li Ming, 2010. "Advice from Multiple Experts: A Comparison of Simultaneous, Sequential, and Hierarchical Communication," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-24, April.
    3. Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2013. "Optimal Arbitration," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 54(3), pages 769-785, August.
    4. Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2010. "Decision Rules for Experts with Opposing Interests," Working Papers 674, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    5. Doojav, Gan-Ochir, 2018. "The political economy of central bank’s quasi-fiscal operations implemented for 2012-2016 in Mongolia," MPRA Paper 109850, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised May 2018.
    6. Esra E. Bayindir & Mehmet Y. Gurdal & Ayca Ozdogan & Ismail Saglam, 2020. "Cheap Talk Games with Two-Senders and Different Modes of Communication," Games, MDPI, vol. 11(2), pages 1-22, April.
    7. Gulen Karakoc, 2020. "Cheap Talk with Multiple Experts and Uncertain Biases," Working Papers 451, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics.

  11. Li, Ming & Madarász, Kristóf, 2008. "When mandatory disclosure hurts: Expert advice and conflicting interests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 47-74, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Rush Anthony & Smirnov Vladimir & Wait Andrew, 2010. "Communication Breakdown: Consultation or Delegation from an Expert with Uncertain Bias," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-29, August.
    2. Mechtenberg, Lydia & Münster, Johannes, 2011. "A strategic mediator who is biased into the same direction as the expert can improve information transmission," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2011-012, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
    3. Frédéric Loss & Estelle Malavolti & Thibaud Vergé, 2013. "Communication and Binary Decisions: Is it Better to Communicate?," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 169(3), pages 451-467, September.
    4. Mezzetti, Claudio, 2020. "Manipulative Disclosure," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1250, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    5. Kovác, Eugen & Mylovanov, Tymofiy, 2009. "Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: The regular case," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1373-1395, July.
    6. Deimen, Inga & Szalay, Dezsö, 2014. "A Smooth, strategic communication," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 479, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    7. Inga Deimen & Dezső Szalay, 2019. "Delegated Expertise, Authority, and Communication," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(4), pages 1349-1374, April.
    8. Anders Poulsen & Graciela Zevallos-Porles, 2019. "Sender-Receiver Games with Endogenous Ex-Post Information Acquisition: Experimental Evidence," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 19-04, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    9. Gesche, Tobias, 2021. "De-biasing strategic communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 452-464.
    10. Francesc Dilmé, 2022. "Strategic Communication With a Small Conflict of Interest," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2022_344, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    11. Miura, Shintaro & Yamashita, Takuro, 2018. "Divergent Interpretation and Divergent Prediction in Communication," TSE Working Papers 18-939, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    12. Szalay, Dezsö & Deimen, Inga, 2016. "Information, Authority, And Smooth Communication In Organizations," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145668, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    13. Archishman Chakraborty & Rick Harbaugh, 2010. "Persuasion by Cheap Talk," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 2361-2382, December.
      • Archishman Chakraborty & Rick Harbaugh, 2006. "Persuasion by Cheap Talk," Working Papers 2006-10, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy, revised Oct 2009.
    14. Li Ming, 2010. "Advice from Multiple Experts: A Comparison of Simultaneous, Sequential, and Hierarchical Communication," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-24, April.
    15. Park, Hyungmin & Squintani, Francesco, 2024. "The Choice of Political Advisors," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1507, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    16. Patrick Hummel & John Morgan & Phillip C. Stocken, 2013. "A model of flops," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(4), pages 585-609, December.
    17. Karakoç Gülen, 2022. "Cheap Talk with Multiple Experts and Uncertain Biases," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 22(2), pages 527-556, June.
    18. Tobias Gesche, 2016. "De-biasing strategic communication," ECON - Working Papers 216, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Sep 2021.
    19. Kim, Kyungmin & Pogach, Jonathan, 2014. "Honesty vs. advocacy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 51-74.
    20. Wonsuk Chung & Rick Harbaugh, 2012. "Biased Recommendations," Working Papers 2012-02, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
    21. Ascensión Andina-Díaz, 2015. "Competition and uncertainty in a paper’s news desk," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 116(1), pages 77-93, September.
    22. Roman Inderst & Marco Ottaviani, 2012. "Competition through Commissions and Kickbacks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(2), pages 780-809, April.
    23. Daniel Stone, 2011. "A signal-jamming model of persuasion: interest group funded policy research," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 37(3), pages 397-424, September.
    24. Maria Goltsman & Gregory Pavlov, 2008. "How to Talk to Multiple Audiences," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series 20081, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
    25. Alp Atakan & Levent Kockesen & Elif Kubilay, 2017. "Optimal Delegation of Sequential Decisions: The Role of Communication and Reputation," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1701, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
    26. Andina-Díaz, Ascensión & García-Martínez, José A., 2023. "Reputation and perverse transparency under two concerns," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    27. Szalay, Dezső & Deimen, Inga, 2020. "Authority in a theory of the firm," CEPR Discussion Papers 15026, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    28. Travis Dyer & Eunjee Kim, 2021. "Anonymous Equity Research," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(2), pages 575-611, May.
    29. Jesse M. Shapiro, 2014. "Special Interests and the Media: Theory and an Application to Climate Change," NBER Working Papers 19807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    30. Jindapon, Paan & Oyarzun, Carlos, 2013. "Persuasive communication when the sender's incentives are uncertain," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 111-125.
    31. Ismayilov, Huseyn & Potters, Jan, 2013. "Disclosing advisor's interests neither hurts nor helps," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 314-320.
    32. Atakan, Alp & Koçkesen, Levent & Kubilay, Elif, 2020. "Starting small to communicate," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 265-296.
    33. van Gils, Freek & Müller, Wieland & Prüfer, Jens, 2020. "Big Data and Democracy," Other publications TiSEM ecc11d8d-1478-4dd2-b570-4, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    34. Behnk, Sascha & Barreda-Tarrazona, Iván & García-Gallego, Aurora, 2014. "The role of ex post transparency in information transmission—An experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 45-64.
    35. Schottmüller, Christoph, 2019. "Why Echo Chambers are Useful," VfS Annual Conference 2019 (Leipzig): 30 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall - Democracy and Market Economy 203517, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    36. Rantakari, Heikki, 2014. "A simple model of project selection with strategic communication and uncertain motives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 14-42.
    37. Wonsuk Chung & Rick Harbaugh, 2019. "Biased recommendations from biased and unbiased experts," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(3), pages 520-540, June.
    38. Gulen Karakoc, 2020. "Cheap Talk with Multiple Experts and Uncertain Biases," Working Papers 451, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics.
    39. Saori Chiba & Kaiwen Leong, 2013. "Managerial Economics of Cheap Talk," Working Papers 24, Venice School of Management - Department of Management, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia.
    40. Swagata Bhattacharjee & Srijita Ghosh & Suraj Shekhar, 2024. "Communicating Bias," Working Papers 109, Ashoka University, Department of Economics.
    41. Blume, Andreas, 2018. "Failure of common knowledge of language in common-interest communication games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 132-155.
    42. Murali Agastya & Parimal Kanti Bag & Indranil Chakraborty, 2014. "Communication and authority with a partially informed expert," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(1), pages 176-197, March.
    43. Sascha Behnk & Iván Barreda-Tarrazona & Aurora García-Gallego, 2012. "Reducing deception through subsequent transparency - An experimental investigation," Working Papers 2012/14, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).
    44. Ambrus, Attila & Azevedo, Eduardo M. & Kamada, Yuichiro & Takagi, Yuki, 2013. "Legislative committees as information intermediaries: A unified theory of committee selection and amendment rules," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 103-115.
    45. De Moragas, Antoni-Italo, 2022. "Disclosing decision makers’ private interests," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 150(C).

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