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Efficient real-time routing for autonomous vehicles through Bayes correlated equilibrium: An information design framework

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  • Liu, Yixuan
  • Whinston, Andrew B.

Abstract

In this paper, we propose an information-based approach to eliminate inefficiency in traffic systems in the era of autonomous vehicles. We build up theoretical models to coordinate vehicles through Waze, a pervasive crowdsourcing mapping app. We apply the idea of Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011) in the basic model of a single vehicle and implement the unified information design framework (Bergemann and Morris, 2017) in the general model. Since the reliability of the information source (Waze) is crucial, we also incorporate queueing theory into the congestion model to obtain more accurate predictions of the traffic conditions. We demonstrate the significant efficiency improvement of implementing theoretical economic approach in the robotic area.

Suggested Citation

  • Liu, Yixuan & Whinston, Andrew B., 2019. "Efficient real-time routing for autonomous vehicles through Bayes correlated equilibrium: An information design framework," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 14-26.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:47:y:2019:i:c:p:14-26
    DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2019.05.005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2019. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 57(1), pages 44-95, March.
    2. Anna Nagurney & David Boyce, 2005. "Preface to “On a Paradox of Traffic Planning”," Transportation Science, INFORMS, vol. 39(4), pages 443-445, November.
    3. Emir Kamenica & Matthew Gentzkow, 2011. "Bayesian Persuasion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(6), pages 2590-2615, October.
    4. Anton Kolotilin & Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ming Li, 2017. "Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85(6), pages 1949-1964, November.
    5. Dietrich Braess & Anna Nagurney & Tina Wakolbinger, 2005. "On a Paradox of Traffic Planning," Transportation Science, INFORMS, vol. 39(4), pages 446-450, November.
    6. Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen, 2016. "Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(2), May.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ning, Yuqiang & Du, Lili, 2023. "Robust and resilient equilibrium routing mechanism for traffic congestion mitigation built upon correlated equilibrium and distributed optimization," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 170-205.
    2. Lan Lu & Zheng Zhu & Pengfei Guo & Qiao‐Chu He, 2022. "Service Operations for Mixed Autonomous Paradigm: Lane Design and Subsidy," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 31(4), pages 1595-1612, April.
    3. Wiseman, Jim & Wiseman, Thomas, 2023. "When do traffic reports make traffic better?," Economics of Transportation, Elsevier, vol. 36(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bayesian persuasion; Information design; Autonomous vehicles; Waze;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • R41 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - Transportation: Demand, Supply, and Congestion; Travel Time; Safety and Accidents; Transportation Noise
    • O35 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Social Innovation
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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