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A Rothschild-Stiglitz Approach to Bayesian Persuasion

Author

Listed:
  • Matthew Gentzkow
  • Emir Kamenica

Abstract

Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) represent random variables as convex functions (integrals of the cumulative distribution function). Combining this representation with Blackwell's Theorem (1953), we characterize distributions of posterior means that can be induced by a signal. This characterization provides a novel way to analyze a class of Bayesian persuasion problems.

Suggested Citation

  • Matthew Gentzkow & Emir Kamenica, 2016. "A Rothschild-Stiglitz Approach to Bayesian Persuasion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(5), pages 597-601, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:106:y:2016:i:5:p:597-601
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.p20161049
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Anton Kolotilin & Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ming Li, 2017. "Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85(6), pages 1949-1964, November.
    2. Anton Kolotilin, 2013. "Optimal Information Disclosure: Quantity vs. Quality," Discussion Papers 2013-19, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    3. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1972. "Addendum to "increasing risk: I. A definition"," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 306-306, October.
    4. Robert J. Aumann, 1995. "Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262011476, April.
    5. Yun Wang, 2015. "Bayesian Persuasion with Multiple Receivers," Working Papers 2015-03-24, Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE), Xiamen University.
    6. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1970. "Increasing risk: I. A definition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 225-243, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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