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Sequential Learning

Author

Listed:
  • Yair Antler
  • Daniel Bird
  • Santiago Oliveros

Abstract

We develop a model in which two players sequentially and publicly examine a project. In our model the player who moves first can fabricate evidence to influence the second mover, which creates a moral hazard problem. We find that early strategic uncertainty can mitigate this problem. In particular, for intermediate prior beliefs about the project's quality, the Pareto-dominant equilibrium is in mixed strategies and consists of an early stage in which evidence may be fabricated and a later stage in which evidence is always authentic. Our findings shed light on the dynamics of R&D, quality assurance, and drug approval.

Suggested Citation

  • Yair Antler & Daniel Bird & Santiago Oliveros, 2023. "Sequential Learning," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 15(1), pages 399-433, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:15:y:2023:i:1:p:399-433
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200352
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality

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