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Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.20150218
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Ian M. Schmutte & Nathan Yoder, 2022. "Information Design for Differential Privacy," Papers 2202.05452, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2024.
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"Motivational Ratings [Toward the Next Generation of Recommender Systems: A Survey of the State-of-the-Art and Possible Extensions],"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(4), pages 1892-1935.
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Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 329-349.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
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