IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ash/wpaper/109.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Communicating Bias

Author

Listed:
  • Swagata Bhattacharjee

    (Ashoka University)

  • Srijita Ghosh

    (Ashoka University)

  • Suraj Shekhar

    (Ashoka University)

Abstract

We consider a static cheap talk model in an environment with either one or two experts whose biases are privately known by the experts themselves. Before the experts learn the state, they send a cheap talk message about their bias to the decision maker. Subsequently, the decision maker chooses one expert to get state relevant advice from. We ask two questions - One, is there an equilibrium where the experts’ bias is fully revealed? Two, is the bias revealing equilibrium welfare improving for the decision maker? We find that when there is only one expert, there is no bias revealing equilibrium. However, if there are two experts, there exists a bias revealing equilibrium, and under some conditions it gives the decision maker more utility than any equilibrium which is possible without bias revelation. This highlights a new channel through which sender competition can benefit the decision maker, through which sender competition can benefit the decision maker.

Suggested Citation

  • Swagata Bhattacharjee & Srijita Ghosh & Suraj Shekhar, 2024. "Communicating Bias," Working Papers 109, Ashoka University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ash:wpaper:109
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://dp.ashoka.edu.in/ash/wpaper/paper109_0.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Li, Ming & Madarász, Kristóf, 2008. "When mandatory disclosure hurts: Expert advice and conflicting interests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 47-74, March.
    2. Mark Thordal-Le Quement, 2016. "The (Human) Sampler's Curses," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(4), pages 115-148, November.
    3. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Mechtenberg, Lydia & Münster, Johannes, 2012. "A strategic mediator who is biased in the same direction as the expert can improve information transmission," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(2), pages 490-492.
    2. Jindapon, Paan & Oyarzun, Carlos, 2013. "Persuasive communication when the sender's incentives are uncertain," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 111-125.
    3. Rantakari, Heikki, 2014. "A simple model of project selection with strategic communication and uncertain motives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 14-42.
    4. Blume, Andreas, 2018. "Failure of common knowledge of language in common-interest communication games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 132-155.
    5. Mezzetti, Claudio, 2020. "Manipulative Disclosure," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1250, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    6. Szalay, Dezső & Deimen, Inga, 2015. "Information, authority, and smooth communication in organizations," CEPR Discussion Papers 10969, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Kovác, Eugen & Mylovanov, Tymofiy, 2009. "Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: The regular case," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1373-1395, July.
    8. Daniel Stone, 2011. "A signal-jamming model of persuasion: interest group funded policy research," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 37(3), pages 397-424, September.
    9. Deimen, Inga & Szalay, Dezsö, 2014. "A Smooth, strategic communication," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 479, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    10. Anders Poulsen & Graciela Zevallos-Porles, 2019. "Sender-Receiver Games with Endogenous Ex-Post Information Acquisition: Experimental Evidence," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 19-04, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    11. Kim, Kyungmin & Pogach, Jonathan, 2014. "Honesty vs. advocacy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 51-74.
    12. Travis Dyer & Eunjee Kim, 2021. "Anonymous Equity Research," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(2), pages 575-611, May.
    13. Wonsuk Chung & Rick Harbaugh, 2012. "Biased Recommendations," Working Papers 2012-02, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
    14. Ole Jann, 2018. "Why Echo Chambers are Useful," Economics Series Working Papers 857, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    15. Cabrales, Antonio & Feri, Francesco & Gottardi, Piero & Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A., 2021. "Communication and social preferences: an experimental analysis," CEPR Discussion Papers 15711, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    16. Alp Atakan & Levent Kockesen & Elif Kubilay, 2017. "Optimal Delegation of Sequential Decisions: The Role of Communication and Reputation," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1701, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
    17. Archishman Chakraborty & Rick Harbaugh, 2010. "Persuasion by Cheap Talk," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 2361-2382, December.
      • Archishman Chakraborty & Rick Harbaugh, 2006. "Persuasion by Cheap Talk," Working Papers 2006-10, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy, revised Oct 2009.
    18. Ambrus, Attila & Azevedo, Eduardo M. & Kamada, Yuichiro & Takagi, Yuki, 2013. "Legislative committees as information intermediaries: A unified theory of committee selection and amendment rules," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 103-115.
    19. Schottmüller, Christoph, 2019. "Why Echo Chambers are Useful," VfS Annual Conference 2019 (Leipzig): 30 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall - Democracy and Market Economy 203517, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    20. Murali Agastya & Parimal Kanti Bag & Indranil Chakraborty, 2014. "Communication and authority with a partially informed expert," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(1), pages 176-197, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    bias revelation;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ash:wpaper:109. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Ashoka University (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.ashoka.edu.in .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.